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A Reverse Production System (RPS) is a network of transportation logistics and 
processing functions that collects, refurbishes, and demanufactures for reuse/recycle used 
or end-of-life products.  In this thesis, I focus on the RPS strategic decisions of a 
processor and collectors when the collection network and contracts for materials can be 
co-designed. 
The research problem is motivated by the need of material processors to ensure a 
consistent flow of material from collectors at a cost that will enable them to be 
competitive with virgin raw materials.  The failure to develop a cost-effective collection 
network can lead to poor overall economics where expensive processing assets are not 
fully utilized.  The three key problems from the processor’s point of view are: 1) how to 
design a strategic collection network; 2) how to be competitive in the collected materials 
market place when significant investment is at risk; and 3) how to avoid overpaying for 
materials when collectors are in regions with different volumes and costs. 
The multiple goals of this research are: 1) to integrate the contract and strategic 
network design in RPS; 2) to develop contract mechanism designs to improve the 
performance under incomplete information and study the value of information (complete 
vs. incomplete); and 3) to introduce and analyze new strategic network models for 
effectiveness in solution quality and time.   
Concepts of mathematical optimization, contract theory, and game theory are 
utilized in proposing models that couple contract and network problems, including lump 
sum and variable volume contracts.    
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, I introduce the research topics of my thesis.  First, I provide an 
overview of Reverse Production Systems in Section 1.1.  Subsequently, I motivate the 
research in Section 1.2 and formally present the research problem in Section 1.3.  Finally, 
I discuss the organization of the thesis in Section 1.4. 
 
1.1 Reverse Production System Overview 
Recycling end-of-life products is important today due to the increasing concern 
about both the environmental impact of discarded materials and the economic reuse value 
of such materials.  A Reverse Production System (RPS) can be defined as a network of 
transportation logistics and processing functions that collect, refurbish, and 
demanufacture for reuse/recycle, used, or end-of-life products.  An abstraction of forward 
and reverse production systems is shown in Figure 1.1, adapted from Realff et al. (1999).  
The products’ recovery values and waste disposal avoidance costs are the heart of the 
economics of recycling.  The recycler must balance these two factors with the costs 





Figure 1.1:  Abstraction of Forward and Reverse Production Systems (Realff et al. 1999) 
  
While the financial and environmental benefits of handling return flows of supply 
chain production wastes, packaging, and end-of-life products are potentially substantial, 
the financial viability and efficiency of a RPS in today’s marketplace is highly dependent 
on its infrastructure design and operational decisions.  Decision tools can play an 
important role in strategically planning the design and growth of RPS infrastructure.  A 
model of recycling system infrastructure is shown in Figure 1.2.  There are four stages 
which include: supply (collected from sources of packaging, wastes, and end-of-life 
products), collection, processing, and demand (end users of refurbished products, 
components, and recycled materials), with transportation between stages.  Strategic 
network design makes decisions on the locations of the collection and processing 
facilities, the type(s) of materials collected at collection facilities, the type(s) of processes 
installed at processing facilities, and the amount of materials collected, processed, and 
transported to various locations. 
New Forward Logistics Arcs
Economically Optimal Closed Cycle
Increase in Manufactured Value



















Figure 1.2:  Recycling System Infrastructure 
  
My research has been motivated by actual situations in the carpet industry.  The 
major interest has been in integrating contract theory and strategic network design from 
the processor’s point of view.  Motivation details are given in the subsequent section. 
 
1.2 Motivation 
For certain industries, such as carpet and electronics, recycling infrastructure is 
beginning to mature with collectors and processors being established and significant 
volumes of material being collected and processed.  As new technology for recycling is 
translated from research into practice, new avenues for the material to be recycled are 
being established.  In addition, there is still a significant appetite for materials for export.  
In this situation, a new processor, or one who wishes to expand his or her existing 
network, must ensure that s/he can supply their processing facilities.  These facilities may 
require significant capital investment to build.  Moreover, a failure to secure a reliable 
supply of material could be fatal to the overall viability.  Furthermore, the economics of 
recycling can be marginal, and if the processor does not successfully manage the cost of 
the supply of material, then this could render the operation economically inviable. 
Supply Collection Processing Demand
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This situation presents the processor with the problem of making sure that the 
collection network is sufficiently incentivized to provide the material to the processor and 
not to sell it elsewhere, and yet do so for the lowest possible cost.  In this thesis, I explore 
this question through the design of contracts that the processor should offer to the 
collectors and the concomitant design of the collection network. 
One example of an industry that faces this problem is carpet recycling.  The nylon 
fibers (used in carpet) produced in 1998, which should be disposed by approximately 
2008, are worth a potential one billion U.S. dollars (Wongthatsanekorn 2006).  
Nevertheless, according to Carpet America Recovery Effort’s Annual Report in 2006, 5 
billion pounds of used carpet were discarded to landfill in 2006 while less than 5% was 
recycled.  The renewal of Nylon 6 saves 4.4 Trillion BTUs of energy annually, enough 
power to heat over 100,000 U.S. homes each year, (International Fiber Journal 1999).  
The Carpet and Rug Institute (2003) has shown how the carpet industry has reduced its 
environmental footprint over the years.  Not only was the magnitude of landfill use, 
energy consumption, CO2 emissions, hazardous air pollutants, and water usage reduced 
by 80% per square yard over the past decade from 1990, but the production increased by 
47% over the same period.  The goal is to reduce the environmental footprint a further 
28% by 2012.  A significant component of this reduction could be achieved through more 
successful recycling systems for carpet.   
The gross energy of virgin Nylon 6 is approximately 120.5 MJ/kg, (Boustead 
2005).  This includes the energy to produce Nylon 6 and the feedstock energy.  The 
required transportation energies for heavy truck and rail are 985 J/kg-mile and 355 J/kg-
mile (Center for Transportation Analysis 2007), respectively.  In transporting 1 kg of 
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Nylon 6 carpet by truck for 500, 1,000, and 10,000 miles, the required transportation 
energies are 985 KJ, 2.0 MJ, and 19.7 MJ, respectively.  For rail, the required 
transportation energies are 355 KJ, 710 KJ, and 7.1 MJ for distances of 500, 1,000, and 
10,000, respectively.  The upper bound on the energy consumption for Nylon 6 carpet 
recycling process can be obtained by the difference between the gross energy to produce 
virgin Nylon 6 and the transportation energy.  If the processor is transporting carpet by 
truck, the upper bounds on energy consumption for recycling process are 119 MJ, 118 
MJ, and 100.3 MJ for distances of 500, 1,000, and 10,000 miles, respectively.  For rail, 
these upper bounds are 119.6 MJ, 119.3 MJ, and 112.9 MJ, respectively.  The mechanical 
energy to recycle 1 kg of carpet will be significantly less than these upper bounds. This 
suggests that even when the processor needs to transport carpet for 10000 miles (via truck 
or rail), there is clearly energy benefit for recycling Nylon 6 carpet.   
As explained in Wongthatsanekorn (2006), two major carpet recycling companies 
suffered financial problems that led to their shutdowns.  Evergreen Nylon Recycling, 
located in Augusta, GA, was shut down in 2001, (Atlanta Business Chronicle 2001).  
Polyamid 2000, located in Premnitz, Germany, declared bankruptcy in 2003, (Carpet 
America Recovery Effort 2004).  In both cases, a key contributing factor was the high 
cost of supplied material.  The strategic planning of collection networks to supply the 
processing plant is deemed a critical factor in the success (or failure) of recycling 
operations.  The solution must include good network design of collection facilities and 
associated contractual arrangements to ensure high quality and appropriate flows of 
material.  This concept is the key motivation in developing the models and solution 
approaches in this thesis. 
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Using the above motivation, I formally describe the research problem in the next 
section. 
 
1.3 Research Problem 
The research problem statement can be written as: 
From the point of view of the processor when s/he has incomplete information about 
potential collectors, how should contract alternatives for potential collectors be designed 
and how should a network of collection facilities be strategically chosen to meet the 
target quantity and budget constraints, while aiming to maximize the processor’s net 
profit? 
 
The processor’s problem is considered when s/he does not have collectors’ private 
information on type.  This collector type is based on marginal cost.  For more details on 
the definition and specification of types, see Section 5.1.  I assume that there are many 
types of collectors with different marginal costs.  Without this private information, the 
processor is uncertain about the performance of each collector.  To provide incentives to 
collectors to align their objectives with the processor’s own goals, a contract is designed.  
A contract is an agreement between two or more parties in which an offer is made and 
accepted. 
In this thesis, two contract designs are proposed: lump sum and variable volume 
contracts.  The lump sum contract utilizes the principal-agent concept, which is discussed 
in Chapter 3.  The processor (principal) provides a simple menu contract, which includes 
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many contract alternatives, to the set of potential collectors.  This menu contract specifies 
collected quantity (lb) and lump sum transfer payment ($).  Each collector selects the 
contract alternative that is most beneficial for his or her type of operation.    From the 
revelation principle, see Section 3.1, collectors truthfully select the contract alternative 
designed for his or her type because it is also the most beneficial alternative.  For the 
variable volume contract, different contract structures are offered to each collector.  This 
contract specifies the dollar per pound, and then lets the collector determine the collected 
quantity (lb).  The selected contract has embedded incentive for collector not to deviate 
from the promised quantity.  It utilizes Nash Equilibrium concept, which is discussed in 
Chapter 7. 
Concurrent to the design of contracts, the processor wants to establish an overall 
collection network.  From the list of potential collectors, the processor must select a 
subset of collectors to provide enough total material (meet the target quantity) to the 
processing facility.  Moreover, collectors are chosen in such a way that the total material 
cost is within the processor’s budget.  In designing this collection network, transportation 
costs and fixed costs (transport and administration) are incorporated into the processor’s 
net profit.  Figure 1.3 illustrates the problem.   
I hypothesize that co-designing the collection network and contracts for materials 
at the same time should produce a higher processor’s net profit than first designing the 




Figure 1.3:  Contract & Strategic Network Problem Overview 
 
The research goals and key assumptions are described in the following sections.  
These key assumptions are held in most of the models; if any of these assumptions is 
relaxed in addressing specific situations, it will be clearly stated. 
1.3.1 Key Assumptions 
1) One (recycle/reuse) product, 
2) One processor, many collectors, 
3) One can group collectors into different types, based on characteristics such 
as their efficiency, 
4) Each collector collects from his or her region, and the presence of other 

















transfer +  fixed + transportation costs)
Net Profit = valuation of total q
– total transfer 
– total fixed cost to collector
– total transportation cost
(collected quantity , transfer + 
fixed + transportation costs)
(collected quantity , transfer + 
fixed + transportation costs)
 9
5) Each collector’s collected quantity to processor’s overall target quantity 
ratio (scaling parameter) has relatively small value. 
Assumptions 1 and 2 define the scope of the research analysis.  Assumption 3 
initiates the analysis with two collector types.  Assumption 4 enforces no cross-region 
collection and no impact of competition between collectors.  Finally, Assumption 5 states 
that a processor needs to select a significant number of collectors in order to achieve his 
or her overall target quantity.  If there are only a few chosen collectors, the processor has 
a potential problem of defection so that for any unforeseeable reason prohibiting a 
collector’s operations, the processor’s network could entirely collapse.  Again, 
assumptions can be relaxed as different problems are addressed. 
1.3.2 Goals 
My research goals are: 1) to integrate the contract and strategic network design in 
RPS planning; 2) to study the value of information (complete vs. incomplete); 3) to 
develop contract mechanism designs to improve system performance under incomplete 
information; and 4) to introduce and analyze new strategic network planning models for 
effectiveness in solution quality and time.  I apply the models for a recycled carpet 
application to evaluate my models. 
With the above description of research problem, key assumptions, and research 
goals, the thesis chapters are outlined in the next section.  
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1.4 Organization of the Thesis 
My thesis is organized as follows.  The relevant literature review is discussed in 
Chapter 2.  Chapter 3 provides background and proposed models for the contract 
problem.  The different models developed in the thesis are presented in Figure 1.4. The 
leaves of the tree are the six different models that are developed and solved. The tree has 
two main branches, one for the contract and network problem and one for the network 
problem on its own. 
 
 
Figure 1.4:  Research Tree 
 
In Chapter 4, I present three alternative approaches to determine the RPS strategic 
network decisions, which are the right branch of the tree: Coupled, Decoupled, and 
Iterated Models.  I denote a coupled system as a comprehensive representation that 
simultaneously considers every component in the RPS infrastructure to determine both 
collection decisions and processing decisions.  This model has been presented previously 
in research done within the RPS group at Georgia Tech (Newton (2000) and 
Contract & Network Problem Network Problem
Lump Sum Contract Variable Volume Contract
Non-regional Model Regional Model
Decoupled Model Iterated Model
Constant Probability of Acceptance Stochastic Programming Model
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Assavapokee (2004)).  With a decoupled system, I first examine only the supply and 
collection stages to determine the collection decisions, and for the second step determine 
the processing structure based on the collection decisions.  The iterative strategy employs 
clustering techniques for situations where the first two approaches do not perform well.  
The effectiveness of each approach is measured by solution quality and computational 
time, using the more traditional Coupled Model as the baseline. 
In Chapters 5, 6, and 7, I focus only on the system of processor and collectors that 
operate between the supply and demand stages.  The aim is to study two different types 
of contracts for establishing a collection network of used materials, namely a lump sum 
contract and a variable volume contract.  A lump sum contract specifies the quantity and 
monetary decision pair.  On the other hand, a variable volume contract specifies the 
contract structure and quantity.  Using optimization and stochastic programming as tools, 
concepts of game theory and contract (incentive) theory are utilized in the study.  A 
major part of the research utilizes the concept of an incomplete information game. 
The proposed contract and network lump sum models are presented in Chapter 5 
which include sequential and simultaneous models of non-regional and regional 
problems.  A Stochastic Programming approach to co-design the lump sum contract and 
strategic collection network is presented in Chapter 6.  Chapter 7 presents the proposed 
variable volume models, which are quite different from the lump sum contract.  Finally, 
the summary, contributions, and future directions are discussed in Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 2  
BACKGROUND & LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this chapter, I present the research background and a review of the published 
literature related to various aspects of the research.  This thesis draws upon a wide range 
of modeling and algorithmic techniques.  The review of each area therefore focuses on 
the information that is most pertinent to the development of the thesis.  Section 2.1 
reviews the literature in the area of reverse logistics network design.  A brief review of 
(forward) supply chain management is presented in Section 2.2.  Section 2.3 discusses 
fundamental literature in the area of mixed integer linear programming, whereas Section 
2.4 reviews the literature in the contract theory field.  A review is presented in Section 
2.5 which stresses the literature in dynamic and complete information games.  Section 2.6 
reviews literature in stochastic programming optimization.  Lastly, literature of the mixed 
integer nonlinear programming area is reviewed in Section 2.7. 
 
2.1 Reverse Production Systems 
The economic importance of Reverse Production Systems (RPS) has recently 
become much better understood.  According to Rogers and Tibben-Lembke (1999), 
reverse logistics cost approximately US $35 billion in 1997.  Fleischmann et al. (2004) 
show that both the environmental consciousness of consumers and environmental laws 
have stimulated RPS development. 
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A broad overview of recycling logistics is given by Flapper (1995), Flapper 
(1996), and Fleischmann et al. (2000).  A survey on environmentally-conscious 
manufacturing and product recovery can be found in Gungor and Gupta (1999).  Also 
using a coupled approach, Spengler et al. (1997) propose a location-allocation model in 
determining the infrastructure of reclamation facilities and demanufacturing plants.  
Srivastava (2008) replicates published optimization concepts in the reverse logistics 
network design in his case study.  Fleischmann et al. (2004) distinguish the reverse 
logistics facility location models according to the network scope and the supply type 
(push/pull). 
Strategic planning, design, and implementation of the reverse logistics can be 
found in Realff et al. (2000), Dowlatshahi (2005), Pochampally and Gupta (2005), 
Walther et al. (2008), and Jacobs and Subramanian (2008).  Given that uncertainty is a 
key characteristic of product recovery networks, Hong et al. (2006), Inderfurth (2005), 
Listes and Dekker (2005), and Realff et al. (2004) specifically address this issue.  Other 
reverse logistics network models include Barros et al. (1998), Marin and Pelegrin (1998), 
Schultmann (2006), and Thierry (1997).  RPS infrastructure design has been seen as a 
large-scale optimization problem in Spengler et al. (1997) and Realff et al. (2004) while it 
has been approached through the use of genetic algorithms in Min et al. (2006) and Zhou 
et al. (2005). 
 
2.2 (Forward) Supply Chain Management 
Although I center attention on the reverse supply chain, the variable volume 
contract models can be generalized to the forward supply chain (see Section 7.6).  My 
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research specifically focuses on the strategy or design phase, addressing facility, 
transportation, and information decisions.  Hence I present a brief literature review in 
(forward) supply chains, which has received much interest both practically and 
academically in recent years. 
According to Chopra and Meindl (2003), a “supply chain consists of all parties 
involved, directly or indirectly, in fulfilling a customer request.  The supply chain not 
only includes the manufacturer and supplies, but also transporters, warehouses, retailers, 
and customers themselves. ”  They categorize decision phases in a supply chain into three 
groups, namely 1) supply chain strategy or design, 2) supply chain planning, and 3) 
supply chain operations.  Decisions made in each phase have different time frames: years 
in the strategy phase; a quarter to a year in the planning phase; and weeks or days in the 
operations phase.  Drivers of any supply chain performance include facilities, inventory, 
transportation, and information.  Typical measurements of supply chain performance 
include profit, cost, quality, visibility, and responsiveness.  Additional introductions to 
supply chain management can be found in Chopra and Meindl (2003), Simchi-Levi et al. 
(2003), Shapiro (2001), and Stadtler (2005). 
Modeling of supply chains includes descriptive and normative (optimization) 
models, Shapiro (2001).  The descriptive model is developed to understand functional 
relationships, including forecasting, costing, resource utilization, and simulation.  On the 
other hand, the optimization model is constructed to help make good decisions.  Both 
model types are widely studied in different application areas.  Some of the most 
commonly studied fields include network configuration, supply chain coordination, 
decision-support systems, inventory control, vehicle routing and transportation, 
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warehousing, information technology implementation, value of information, strategic 
alliances, and distribution strategies.  Tayur et al. (1998) and Klose et al. (2002) present 
fundamental and advanced quantitative models for many of the above fields. 
 
2.3 Mixed Integer Linear Programming Modeling 
As a decision tool, mixed integer linear programming (MILP) is attractive due to 
its modeling capabilities and the availability of powerful commercial solvers.  Using 
MILP for large RPS infrastructure design problems requires challenging solution 
requirements.  MILP has motivated the employment of decomposition and relaxation 
methodologies for the Decoupled and Iterated formulations in my research.  General 
concepts of optimization for large scale systems are presented in Lasdon (1970) and 
Wismer (1971), while Geoffrion (1971) has shown an important feature of large-scale 
mathematical programming is that most problems possess distinctive structures that can 
be exploited. 
In my new Decoupled and Iterative approaches for RPS design presented in 
Chapter 4, the classic idea of problem decomposition has been used.  Although my 
decomposition and relaxation methods are new for this application, they are based on 
well-established ideas.  Classic decomposition techniques include Benders 
decomposition, Benders (1962), and Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition, Dantzig and Wolfe 
(1960).  A summary of these two techniques and their generalizations, variable 
decomposition and constraint decomposition approaches, can be found in Olaf et al. 
(1993). 
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 This thesis does not emphasize the development of new MILP algorithms.  
Rather, these algorithms are exercised as the solution tool for the contract and network 
problems. 
 
2.4 Contract Theory 
In many cases, information is held asymmetrically by market participants.  Two 
examples include: 1) a firm hiring a worker and usually knowing less than the worker 
about the worker’s natural ability, and 2) an auto insurance company insuring a driver 
and knowing less than the insured about his driving skill and the probability of his having 
an accident. 
 As discussed in Laffont and Martimort (2002), the delegation of a task to a 
worker who has different objectives than those of the firm is problematic when 
information about the worker is imperfect.  This is at the core of worker incentive 
questions.  If the worker has a different objective function but no private information, the 
firm can propose a contract that perfectly controls the worker without any delegation. 
Conflicting objectives and asymmetric information are the two basic elements of 
contract (incentive) theory.  Private information can be of two types: either the worker 
can take an action unobserved by the firm (moral hazard, hidden action), or the worker 
has private knowledge about his cost or valuation that is ignored by the firm (adverse 
selection, hidden knowledge/type).  The allocation of resources is no longer ruled by the 
price system alone but also by contracts between asymmetrically informed partners.  
Because contract theory has changed the view of the function of organizations and 
markets, it has become an important area in microeconomic modeling. 
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Comprehensive discussions of contracts in supply chain management (SCM) are 
given by Tsay et al. (1999) and Cachon (2002).  The former paper summarizes model-
based research on contracts in the supply chain setting and provides a taxonomy for work 
in this area.  The fundamentals of contract analysis, including supply chain structure and 
purposes of contracts, are addressed.  The authors classify the literature in the contracting 
areas into specification of decision rights, pricing, minimum purchase commitments, 
quantity flexibility, buyback or returns policy, allocation rules, lead time, and quality. 
In the latter paper, Cachon (2002) studies many supply chain models with various 
complexities.  Optimal actions for each model are identified and incentives are created to 
obtain these optimal actions.  A number of different contract types are identified with 
their benefits and drawbacks illustrated.   The models are based on the newsvendor 
model, Silver et al. (1998) and Nahmias (1993).  Although not complex, the newsvendor 
model is sufficiently rich to study three important questions in supply chain coordination.  
These questions are: 1) which contracts coordinate the supply chain, 2) which contracts 
have sufficient flexibility, and 3) which contracts are worth adopting.  Other papers in 
SCM contracts include Anupindi and Bassok (1998), Bassok and Anupindi (1997), 
Cachon (1998), Drake and Swann (2005), Katz (1989), Lariviere (1998), Monahan 
(1984), Tsay and Lovejoy (1999), and Whang (1995). 
As an overview of the principal-agent model, Laffont and Martimort (2002) 
provide a model where the principal delegates an action to a single agent through the 
take-it-or-leave-it offer of a contract.  They make two implicit assumptions: 1) the 
bargaining issues are put aside and 2) a court of law is available to enforce the contract 
and impose penalties if one of the contractual partners deviates from the specification of 
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the contract.  The three types of information problems considered are adverse selection, 
moral hazard, and nonverifiability. 
Another important summary of principal-agent theory is presented by Bolton and 
Dewatripont (2005).  The authors present the basic ideas in incentive and information 
theory such as screening, signaling, and moral hazard.  They give a comprehensive 
discussion of bilateral contracting, multilateral contracting, private information or hidden 
actions, auction theory, long-term contract, incomplete contracts, theory of ownership 
and control, and contracting with externalities.  Again, a well-functioning legal system in 
the market is assumed. 
The bilateral principal-agent model provides a flexible framework for studying a 
variety of important economic phenomena, ranging from planning problems such as the 
design of optimal social insurance programs, Diamond and Mirrless (1978), to 
contractual relations, Stiglitz (1974).  Other more specific models in principal-agent 
include: 1) Bernheim and Whinston (1986) that address the situations where risk-neutral 
principals simultaneously and independently attempt to influence a common agent; 2) 
Segal (1999) that studies contracting between one principal and many agents in the 
presence of externalities and discusses inefficiencies from publicly and privately 
observed contracts; 3) Prat and Rustichini (2003) that introduce a complete information 
game with multiple principals and multiple common agents and applications such as 
lobbying (many principals, one agent) and multiple auctions.  The decision of each agent 
affects the payoffs of all principals with each principal offering transfers to each agent, 
conditional on the agent’s action.  The Prat and Rustichini paper provides a general 
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of pure-strategy equilibrium; and 4) 
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Spier (1992) that presents asymmetric information leading to contractual incompleteness, 
considering two types of costs, ex ante cost and ex post cost. 
Although, there are several papers which employ games in network formation in 
social networks, markets, and electrical engineering, it is difficult to find contract models 
in network formation.  The only known paper is Johari et al. (2006) which consider a 
network game where the nodes of the network wish to form a graph to route traffic.  This 
is an application in the electrical engineering field which uses the idea of link stability 
equilibrium concept. 
To my knowledge, no publication incorporates formal modeling of contracts in 
the field of reverse logistics.  As a result, exploring the setting of contracts in reverse 
production systems is a major contribution of my doctoral research. 
 
2.5 Game Theory (Dynamic and Complete Information) 
Game theory is the study of multi-person decision problems, Gibbons (1992).  
The game employs strategic behavior, e.g., each person acts due to self interest. The basic 
elements of the game include player, type, belief, timing, action, and payoff with a few 
ways to categorize the games.  A game can be cooperative or non-cooperative, 
simultaneous or sequential, involve perfect information or imperfect information, 
complete information or incomplete information.  In a cooperative game, the players are 
able to form binding commitments, but cannot do so in a non-cooperative (competitive) 
game.  As the name suggests, the simultaneous (static) game has all players moving or 
acting at the same time.  In the sequential (dynamic) game, the player’s move may 
precede one another.   In the dynamic game, a player has perfect information if he knows 
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the full history of the plays in the game up to his move.  If not, it is an imperfect 
information game.  The concept of complete information is different than the concept of 
perfect information.  A player has complete information when all players’ payoff 
functions are common knowledge to everyone. 
The most widely used solution concept in applications of game theory is the Nash 
Equilibrium (NE) solution, Mas-Collell et al. (1995).  In the NE, each player’s strategy is 
the best response to the strategies actually played by others.  Different notions of 
equilibrium exist for different classes of games.  These are NE for static games with 
complete information, subgame-perfect NE (SPNE) for  dynamic games with complete 
information, Bayesian NE for static games with incomplete information, and perfect 
Bayesian NE for dynamic games with incomplete information. 
I consider a dynamic game with complete and perfect information in the variable 
volume contract analysis in Chapter 7.  The complete information game involves players 
with common knowledge about each player’s payoff function.  In the perfect information 
game, at each move a player knows the full history of the plays up to that point.  The goal 
of the game is to find the NE for each subgame and history.  In the NE, no player would 
find it beneficial to deviate from a strategy, provided that all other players do not deviate 
from their strategies played at the Nash extreme.   
A good introduction to game theory can be found in Gibbons (1992) and Varian 
(1992).  Additionally, Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) present a more in-depth study of this 
topic.  
A Stackelberg or Stackelberg leadership game (Stackelbergh 1934) is an 
economic game in which the leader moves before the follower (i.e., a complete and 
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perfect information game).  A corresponding model is solved by backward induction.  
Optimization is applied to the best response function in order to determine the SPNE 
solutions.  Many real situations can be represented by a Stackelberg game because typical 
games are sequential with the more powerful player normally having the privilege of 
acting first.  Numerous papers model the supply chain, mostly with two tiers, using a 
Stackelberg game.  Aviv and Pazgal (2005) study the problem of finding optimal pricing 
for fashion-like seasonal goods, considering the seller as the leader and customers as 
followers.  Baysar et al. (2007) research the effects of customer rebates and retailer 
incentives for the automotive industry.  In their work, the manufacturer is the leader and 
the retailer is the follower.  Pekgun et al. (2006) model the coordination of marketing and 
production for price and lead-time decisions, where the marketing and production 
departments are considered to be leader or follower in their settings. 
Ferguson and Toktay (2005), Majumder and Groenevelt (2001), Savaskan et al. 
(2004), and Savaskan and Van Wassenhove (2006) apply game theory in their research 
on remanufacturing or reverse logistics field.  Ferguson and Toktay (2005) develop 
models to support a manufacturer’s recovery strategy with competition in remanufactured 
product markets.  Majumder and Groenevelt (2001) present a two-period model with 
competition between the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a local 
manufacturer.  Once the items are returned in the first period, the OEM and local 
manufacturer compete by setting prices, as depicted in Figure 2.1a).  The demand 
function is utilized and complete information is assumed.  Savaskan et al. (2004) consider 
a closed-loop supply chain with decentralized and centralized channels and with the 
manufacturer as the Stackelberg leader.  They consider three decentralized models, which 
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have returned products to 1) retailer, 2) manufacturer, and 3) third party collector, as in 
Figure 2.1b).  Utilizing a market demand function, their decisions are wholesale price, 
product return rate, transfer price, and retail price.   Lastly, the interaction between a 
manufacturer’s reverse channel collection and forward channel pricing is studied in 
Savaskan and Van Wassenhove (2006).  Examining direct and indirect collection 
systems, their decentralized channels employ a Stackelberg model, shown in Figure 
2.1c).  The manufacturer is still the Stackelberg leader with two retailers as followers.  
Similar decisions to Savaskan et al. (2004) are determined with additional competition 







































To my knowledge, no one has studied the used product collector and processor 
contract structure without considering a market.  Although Majumder and Groenevelt 
(2001) and Savaskan et al. (2004) implement a two-period game with complete 
information in remanufacturing, they consider competition between players.  In contrast, 
I am looking at the coordination between a processor and a collector, with no 
competition.  Because the reuse/recycle materials do not have a well established market 
and the flow of reuse/recycle materials is a small fraction of the overall market, it will 
fully use whatever the price.  Although Savaskan and Van Wassenhove (2006) use 
market demand in setting price by maximizing net profit, with no competition, they have 
different decisions so that the present research is the only one to address contract 
structure using the Stackelberg game approach in a reverse logistics setting, shown in 
Figure 2.1d). 
 
2.6 Stochastic Programming  
An optimization model seeks decision variables that maximize or minimize 
objective functions while subjected to constraints limiting possible decision choices, 
Rardin (1997).  Such models are deterministic if all parameter values are assumed to be 
certain.  On the other hand, it is stochastic if there is uncertainty.  Stochastic 
programming is viewed as mathematical programming with parameters that are random 
variables with specified distributions. 
Typically, the impact of uncertainty is ignored or dealt with by sensitivity analysis 
or careful determination of instances parameters.  When one has a large problem or a 
complex set of decisions, sensitivity analysis becomes inadequate.  Moreover, one cannot 
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eliminate inherent randomness no matter how careful he or she is, Linderoth (2007).  
Scenario analysis constructs or samples possible futures and then solves the 
corresponding problem for these values.  Once one obtains a number of possible 
decisions, s/he either picks the best decision or combinations of decisions.  Options have 
no value in scenario analysis and therefore never show up in the solution.  It is often 
misunderstood that with enough scenarios, one will eventually obtain a correct solution.  
In hindsight, a scenario solution always turn out to be the best choice for that scenario.  
The setback is the same scenario solution is typically hardly optimal in all cases.  In fact, 
most solutions are bad in all other cases, except for the scenario where they are best.  On 
the contrary, even though the stochastic programming solution is never optimal after the 
fact, it is often a good solution for all cases, Kall and Wallace (1994). 
Two-stage stochastic programming is the most widely applied and studied.  Here 
one takes some actions in the first stage, after which a random event occurs affecting the 
outcome of the first-stage decision.  The optimal policy is a single first-stage policy and a 
collection of recourse decisions identifying which second-stage action should be taken in 
response to each random outcome, Shapiro and Philpott (2007). 
A summary of stochastic programming can be found in Kleywegt and Shapiro 
(2000), Birge and Louveaux (1997), Kall and Wallace (1994), and Shapiro and Philpott 
(2007).  Stochastic programming has become an accepted approach to numerous 
applications, such as communication network (Liu 2005), crew scheduling (Yen and 
Birge 2006), financial planning (Carino et al. 1994), pension insurance (Hilli et al. 2007), 
product recovery (Listes and Dekker 2005), and supply chain management (Fisher et al. 
1997). 
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 In Chapter 6, the contract and strategic network problem can be modeled as a 
two-stage stochastic programming problem.  In the first stage, the processor determines 
1) regions to operate, 2) contracts for each region, and 3) collection hub(s) for each 
region.  The uncertainty is whether each collection site accepts or rejects the given 
contracts.  In the second stage, the processor determines the assignment of collections to 
hubs and the vehicle routing. 
 
2.7 Mixed Integer Nonlinear Programming (MINLP) Modeling 
Nonlinear programming (NLP) relaxes the key assumption of a linear objective 
function and constraints of the linear programming.  Even though the linearity 
assumption holds for many practical problems, it often does not hold.  Countless physical 
processes and properties are not linear.  An introduction to NLP can be found in Hillier 
and Lieberman (2001) and Winston (2004).  Both provide basic examples, properties, 
formulations, examples, and solving methods.  More in-depth references can be found in 
Bazaraa et al. (2006), Bertsekas (1999), and Nash and Sofer (1996).  One can find 
various solution methods and proofs in all these books. 
The binary variables are very useful in modeling yes/no decisions, enforcing 
logical conditions, enforcing disjunctions, modeling fixed costs, and modeling piecewise 
linear functions.  When a variable associates with a physical indivisible entity, one must 
consider an integer variable.  Both the binary and integer variables are the mixed integer 
(MI) term in the mixed integer nonlinear programming (MINLP).  There are numerous 
applications of the MINLP such as chemical engineering (Kocis and Grossmann 1988), 
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gas transmission (De Wolf and Smeers 2000), and scheduling problems (Jain and 
Grossmann 1998). 
Classical solution methods for MINLP include classical Branch-and-Bound, 
Outer Approximation (Duran and Grossmann 1986), Benders Decomposition, and 
LP/NLP-based Branch-and-Bound (Akrotirianakis et al. 2001).  Modern developments in 
MINLP are summarized in Leyffer and Linderroth (2005). 
I implement MINLP for my models in Chapters 5 and 6.  With the binary and 
continuous decisions with nonlinear objective function and constraints, the MINLP 
allows more accurate representations of the underlying problem.  Again, I would like to 
stress that this thesis does not contribute to MINLP algorithm development, but applies 
MINLP as a modeling tool for the contract and network problems. 
 
The above sections review the related literature to this research problem.  As RPS 
continues to be an important research area, the exploration of the strategic network and 
contract design is targeted.  Problem definitions and proposed models are discussed next 
in Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 3  
CONTRACT THEORY BACKGROUND & MODELS 
 
Contract theory background and models are presented in this chapter.  Section 3.1 
discusses the Classical Principal-Agent (CPA) model for both complete and incomplete 
information contract models.  Multiple Type Principal-Agent (MTPA) models are 
discussed in detail in Section 3.2, again with both complete and incomplete information 
contract models provided.   
The CPA model is the fundamental contract model in this research.  This model 
shows how a contract for different player types can be designed, while ensuring 
participation as well as simultaneously giving incentives.  The MTPA model is a 
generalization of the CPA model.  While the research focus is on the incomplete 
information contract, a complete information case is also discussed for all proposed 
models.  In understanding the value of information, it is crucial to determine the best the 
processor can do in terms of net profit when all the information is available. 
 
3.1 Classical Principal-Agent (CPA) Model 
The Classical Principal-Agent (CPA) Model and notation are adapted from 
Laffont and Martimort (2002).  A contract is an agreement between two or more parties 
in which an offer is made and accepted.  Parties in a contract may not have all 
information about each other’s abilities or types.  Moreover, information usually is only 
revealed if it is in the agent’s best interest.  The CPA game is a one-shot game.  The 
 28
principal (processor) wants the agent (collector) to supply q units of (recycle/reuse) 
resource.  The principal’s valuation for the q units of the resource is S(q).  Assuming 
that '( ) 0,  ''( ) 0,  and (0) 0S q S q S> < = , the marginal value of goods is positive and strictly 
decreasing.   
In one version of the model, the agent receives a lump sum transfer of funds from 
the principal when accepting the contract.  In the simplest case, two types of agents are 
assumed: an agent is either efficient or inefficient depending upon the agent’s marginal 
cost, θ .   The marginal cost for an efficient agent is denoted by θ
 
, and by θ  for an 
inefficient agent, where 0θ θ− > .  Note that the pairs (principal, agent) and (processor, 
collector) are interchangeable. 
The objective of the principal is to propose a menu of contracts appropriate for 
both types of agents.  The menu contract, which specifies collected quantity and lump 
sum transfer payment, has to be designed to enforce the behavior so that each agent will 
truthfully pick the right contract for his or her type.  This truthful selection is a result of 
the Revelation Principle, Gibbard (1973) and Myerson (1979), which is presented in 
Section 3.1.2.  
The game summary can be described as follows: 
Players: Agent (collector) and Principal (processor) 
Types: Agent – efficient or inefficient; Principal – none 
Beliefs:  Agent – none , Principal - prob(efficient) = p, prob(inefficient) = 1-p   
Timing & Actions:  Dynamic with the following moves: 
1) Nature determines the type of collector 
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2) The principal offers a contract – as functions of wage and effort (in this case 
material quantity is used to represent the effort). 
3) The agent chooses the (wage, quantity) decision pair to maximize his or her 
utility. 
Next the notation, terms, and decision variables are defined in order to develop 
the contract models used throughout this research. 
Notation 
q:  Amount material (lb) provided by an agent (collector), can take values of  or q q  
t:  Transfer payment (lump sum) received by the collector for q pounds of material, can 
take values of  or t t  
θ :  Marginal cost for an efficient collector 
θ :  Marginal cost for an inefficient collector, 0θ θ− >
 
F:  Fixed cost of a collector, both types 
( , )C q q Fθ θ= + :  Cost function of efficient collector 
( , )C q q Fθ θ= + :  Cost function of inefficient collector 
Α
     




:  Valuation of the q units to the principal, '( ) 0,  ''( ) 0,  and (0) 0S q S q S> < =
  
Terms 
Principal’s net profit ($): ( )S q t−  
Agent’s utility ($): t qθ−  
Information rent ($): t qθ− , which is generated by the information advantage of the 





:  Lump sum transfer payment to an efficient collector, $ 
t
  
:  Lump sum transfer payment to an inefficient collector, $ 
q
 
:  Quantity provided by an efficient collector, lb 
q
 
:  Quantity provided by an inefficient collector, lb 
 
 Using this notation, first I present the CPA model with complete information in 
the next section.   
3.1.1 Complete Information 
In the CPA problem with complete information, the processor knows what type 
the collector is and is able to offer the correct contract to maximize the principal’s net 
profit.  This net profit consists of a nonnegative valuation and transfer payment to the 
collector.  The only constraint ensures that the collector has an incentive to participate 
and in general is termed the participation constraint (PC).  The processor’s contracts for 
efficient and inefficient agents can be solved using the following models. 
CPA Model - Efficient Contract 
Maximize ( )S q t−  
s.t. 0t qθ− ≥  
 , 0t q ≥
  
CPA Model - Inefficient Contract 
Maximize ( )S q t−  
s.t. 0t qθ− ≥  
 , 0t q ≥
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 It is unlikely that the processor has complete information for each collector type.  
However in hindsight, the processor can always compute his or her net profit for each 
collector type.  In obtaining these additional solutions with the complete information, 
knowledge about the value of information is gained. 
 Having discussed the complete information variation, the incomplete information 
case is presented in the next section. 
3.1.2 Incomplete Information 
Incomplete information is a situation where each player knows his or her own 
payoff function, but may be uncertain about the other player’s payoff functions.  In this 
research, incomplete information concerns the type of the collectors, which is an adverse 
selection problem.  Although the parametric form of the payoff is known, the specific 
value of the parameter is unknown.  In this case, the processor does not know the agent’s 
private information (type), but the probability distribution of this information is assumed 
to be common knowledge.   
The CPA Model with incomplete information is typically called the CPA Model 
and can be stated as follows: 
CPA Model – Incomplete Information Contract 
Maximize   [ ( ) ] (1 )[ ( ) ]p S q t p S q t− + − −  (OBJ) 
s.t. 0t qθ− ≥  (PC-E) 
 0t qθ− ≥
 
(PC-I) 
 t q t qθ θ− ≥ −
 
(IC-E) 
 t q t qθ θ− ≥ −
 
(IC-I) 
 , 0t t ≥
       





In this model, the principal wants to maximize his or her expected net profit.  The 
PC-E and PC-I represent the participation constraints for efficient (E) and inefficient (I) 
agents, respectively.  For the agent to take the contract, s/he must get nonnegative utility.  
The IC-E and IC-I represent the incentive constraints for each agent’s type, respectively.  
The goal of these constraints is to ensure that there is an appropriate incentive for the 
efficient agent to select the contract, designed for the efficient type, and not the 
inefficient contract; hence IC-E must be satisfied.  This same reasoning goes for the 
inefficient type.  This model is a nonlinear program (NLP) because of the S(q) term in the 
objective function.  However with linear constraints, commercial optimization software 
BARON (2007) can solve this problem very quickly.  The solution to the CPA Model is a 
menu contract{( , ), ( , )}t q t q .  
Laffont and Martimort (2002) provide the following insights for the CPA Model. 
1) The PC-E constraint is redundant.  It is automatically implied from the PC-I and 
IC-I constraints.  When adding these two constraints, the result is 
( ) ( ) 0 ( )t q t q t qθ θ θ− − − ≥ − − .  Hence 0t qθ− ≥  .   With the assumption of 
0θ θ− >  , PC-E will never bind.  Another explanation can be found in the 
mimicking concept.  Because of the ability of the efficient agent to mimic the 
inefficient, the PC-E constraint is always strictly satisfied. 
2) The IC-I constraint does not bind.  It is irrelevant because the difficulty of 
asymmetric information comes when the efficient agent is willing to claim that he 
is inefficient, and not the reverse. 
3) The notation U t qθ= −  and U t qθ= −  represent the information rent for the 
efficient and inefficient types, respectively. 
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4) Adding the IC-E and IC-I constraints gives a monotonicity constraint, which only 
occurs in the incomplete information case.  The relation q q≥  is a by-product. 
5) From the IC-E and IC-I constraints, there exists lump sum transfer payments 
 and t t .  It is enough to set the transfer payment values such that 
( )   and  ( )q q t t t t q qθ θ− ≤ − − ≥ − . 
The binding of constraints can also be shown by Lagrangian relaxation (Fisher 
1981) of the CPA Model.  The Lagrangian relaxation of the CPA model can be written 
as: 
Maximize   ( , , , , , , ) [ ( ) ] (1 )[ ( ) ] ( )
                                ( ) ( )
L q q t t p S q t p S q t t q
t q t q t q t q
λ μ γ λ θ
μ θ θ γ θ θ
= − + − − + −
+ − − + + − − +
 
s.t. , , 0λ μ γ ≥  
 
  Setting the first order condition to zero for , , ,q q t t , there follows; 
/ : '( ) 0L q pS q μθ γθ∂ ∂ − + =  I 
/ : (1 ) '( ) 0L q p S q λθ μθ γθ∂ ∂ − − + − =  II 
/ : 0L t p μ γ∂ ∂ − + − =  III 
/ : 1 0L t p λ μ γ∂ ∂ − + − + =  IV 
 
From III and IV, 1λ = , which concludes that constraint PC-I is tight.  Additionally, 
'( )pS q γθμ
θ
+
= , which means 0μ > based upon the key assumptions.  Hence, the 
constraint IC-E binds in the CPA Model. 
As described in Laffont and Martimort (2002), the Revelation Principle ensures 
that, without loss of generality, it is possible to restrict the principal to offer simple 
menus having as many options as the cardinality of type space.  The direct revelation 
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mechanism maps type space to allocation space { , }q t .  The processor commits to offer 
( )q θ and ( )t θ  if the collector announces his type θ .  This means that if one can capture 
all the type space correctly, i.e. each agent’s potential types is a subset of all possible 
types; the { , }q t menu contract is optimal.  In the CPA Model, the collector is either 
efficient or inefficient.  With two possible types, the processor can offer an optimal lump 
sum menu contract with two options to the collector. 
More generally in Laffont and Martimort (2002), a complex mechanism is 
involved with message space, Μ .  Given message m from the agent, the principal 
requests ( )q m  and provides ( )t m .  Here the mechanism is a mapping from message space 
to allocation space.  The agent chooses the best message *( )m θ  such that 
* *( ( )) ( ( )) ( ) ( )  t m q m t m q m mθ θ θ θ− ≥ − ∀ ∈Μ .  Any allocation rule obtained with this 
mechanism can be implemented with a truthful direct revelation mechanism.  Hence, the 
truthful direct revelation mechanism for the CPA model is denoted by {( , ), ( , )}t q t q .  By 
offering this optimal menu contract, the collector will truthfully reveal his or her type by 
accepting the corresponding contract alternative. 
 The situation where the agent could be one of more than two types is discussed in 
the following section. 
 
3.2 Multiple Type Principal-Agent (MTPA) Model 
The Multiple Type Principal-Agent (MTPA) Model is an extension of the CPA 
Model and represents cases where the agent could be one of many types.  Each of these 
types is distinguished by a single characteristic - different marginal cost parameter value.  
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The MTPA Model yields a menu contract alternative for each potential type of agent.  
The model is adapted from Laffont and Martimort (2002). 
Starting with three types of agents, let the marginal costs associated with each 
agent type be 1 2 3, ,θ θ θ , and without loss of generality let 1 2 3θ θ θ≤ ≤ .  The smaller 
subscripts suggest more efficient collectors.  The probabilities of a given collector being 
of type i is pi, where i = 1, 2, and 3 and 1 2 3 1p p p+ + = .  The truthful direct revelation 
mechanism (menu contract) is denoted by 1 1 2 2 3 3{( , ), ( , ), ( , )}t q t q t q . 
The MTPA Model for three potential types of agents thus can be written as: 
Full MTPA Model 
Maximize   1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3[ ( ) ] [ ( ) ] [ ( ) ]p S q t p S q t p S q t− + − + −  (OBJ) 
s.t. 1 1 1 0t qθ− ≥  (PC-1) 
 2 2 2 0t qθ− ≥
 
(PC-2) 
 3 3 3 0t qθ− ≥
 
(PC-3) 
 1 1 1 2 1 2t q t qθ θ− ≥ −
 
(IC-1,2) 
 1 1 1 3 1 3t q t qθ θ− ≥ −
 
(IC-1,3) 
 2 2 2 1 2 1t q t qθ θ− ≥ −
 
(IC-2,1) 
 2 2 2 3 2 3t q t qθ θ− ≥ −
 
(IC-2,3) 
 3 3 3 1 3 1t q t qθ θ− ≥ −
 
(IC-3,1) 
 3 3 3 2 3 2t q t qθ θ− ≥ −
 
(IC-3,2) 




However, this model can be further simplified.  Similar to the CPA Model, it can 
be shown that only the PC-3 constraint is tight.  As discussed in Laffont and Martimort, 
(2002), the incentive constraints can be classified as local and global.  The local incentive 
constraints are the ones involved in adjacent agent types (in terms of agent marginal costs 
in this model), such as constraints IC-1,2, IC-2,1, IC-2,3, and IC-3,2.  On the other hand, 
global incentive constraints are the ones for non-adjacent types; constraints IC-1,3, and 
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IC-3,1 in the MTPA Model.  Using the same reasoning as applied to the CPA Model, the 
more efficient type should not be given any incentive to lie and claim s/he is less 
efficient.  Hence, the incentive constraints that matter are the IC-1,2, IC-1,3, and IC-2-3 
constraints.  When adding the two incentive constraints for the two adjacent types of 
agents, the quantity constraints are obtained.  For example, adding constraints IC-1,2 to 
IC-2,1 yield 1 2q q≥ .  Similarly, adding constraints IC-2,3 and IC-3,2 yield 2 3q q≥ .  
Together this yields the monotonicity constraint 1 2 3q q q≥ ≥ .  When monotonicity holds, 
the two local constraints imply a global constraint.  Therefore, a simplified model can be 
written as: 
Simplified MTPA Model – 3 Types 
Maximize   1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3[ ( ) ] [ ( ) ] [ ( ) ]p S q t p S q t p S q t− + − + −  (OBJ) 
s.t. 3 3 3 0t qθ− ≥
 
(PC-3) 
 1 1 1 2 1 2t q t qθ θ− ≥ −
 
(IC-1,2) 
 2 2 2 3 2 3t q t qθ θ− ≥ −
 
(IC-2,3) 
 1 2q q≥
 
(MC-1) 
 2 3q q≥
 
(MC-2) 




This model can be generalized to more than three agents.  Let 'm  be the number 
of types of agents.  Let k be the subscript denoting type index, where 1,..., 'k m=  and let 









=∑ .  







Maximize   '
1








s.t. ' ' ' 0m m mt qθ− ≥
 
(PC-m’) 
 1 1        1,..., ' 1k k k k k kt q t q k mθ θ+ +− ≥ − = −
 
(IC-k) 
 1                                   1,..., '-1k kq q k m+≥ =
 
(MC-k) 




The truthful direct revelation mechanism is denoted by 
1 1 2 2 ' '{( , ), ( , ),..., ( , )}m mt q t q t q .  With many types, it is necessary to distinguish whether 
infeasibility occurs when a type is removed.  In a large collection network, it is often that 
a collector defects.  In this case, the processor needs to confirm that all the incentives are 
still enforced.  The situation when an agent type is removed, for any reason, must be 
addressed as follows: 
 For the PC-m’ constraint,  
if the m’ type is not in the model, the model needs re-solving. 
 For the IC-k constraint, 
if the kth type is not in the model, check ex-post that IC-k and IC-k-1 are satisfied.  If 
not satisfied, the model needs re-solving with the new IC-k’, where k’ is the 
adjacent larger marginal cost type to k. 
 For the MC-k constraint,  
there is no need to check ex-post since it is always satisfied. 
 
The case of re-solving the MTPA Model with new parameters afterwards is 
explained in Chapter 5 when these steps are repeated until all constraints are satisfied.  
Suppose that the type i collector is removed, the affected constraints are: 
 38
Old 
1 1 1 1            (1)i i i i i it q t qθ θ− − − −− ≥ −  (IC-i-1) 
1 1                 (2)i i i i i it q t qθ θ+ +− ≥ −  (IC-i) 
1 1                           (3)i i iq q q− +≥ ≥  (MC-i-1 & MC-i) 
New 
1 1 1 1 1 1       (4)i i i i i it q t qθ θ− − − + − +− ≥ −  (ICnew) 
1 1                                 (5)i iq q− +≥  (MCnew) 
Rewritten 
1 1 1 1 1(1) (2) : ( ) ( ) 0                (6)i i i i i i i it t q q q qθ θ− + − − ++ − − − + − ≥  
1 1 1 1 1(4) : ( ) 0                                          (7)i i i i it t q qθ− + − − +− − − ≥  
Hence, it is required to check whether ?1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( )i i i i i i i i iq q q q q qθ θ θ− − + − − +− − − ≥ −  
or not.  If yes, then dropping i does not violate any constraint. 
 For the complete information situation, the principal knows the private 
information of the agent (type).  Hence, there is a contract developed for each of the 
available types.  The solution to the MTPA Model with complete information is 
1 1'( )S q θ= , 2 2'( )S q θ= , …, ' ''( )m mS q θ= .  This solution extends directly from the CPA 
with complete information contract. 
 A direct benefit to the processor of solving the contract problem is quantifying the 
value of information.  Knowing net profits in the cases of both complete and incomplete 
information, s/he can recognize the maximum value (cost) of information.  If the 
processor has knowledge of the collectors’ types, s/he can design a contract individually 
for each collector.  S/he should not expend more than the difference between net profits 
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of the complete information and the incomplete information cases to obtain this 
information (marginal costs).  
 
 This chapter has covered the fundamentals of the contract theory applied to my 
research problem.  The other half of the problem is the strategic network problem, which 





CHAPTER 4  
NETWORK PROBLEM DEFINITIONS & MODELS 
 
The network strategic problem is discussed in this chapter.  The network strategic 
decisions for RPS include: 1) the number and size of the collection and processing sites; 
2) the allocation of processing functions to the sites; 3) the routes for products and 
materials through the potential task network; 4) the modes of transportation used; and 5) 
the amount of material allocated to each potential end-use, Realff et al. (2000). 
A coupled system is denoted as a comprehensive representation that 
simultaneously considers every component (supply, collection, processing, and demand) 
in the RPS infrastructure to determine both collection decisions and processing decisions.  
With a decoupled system, an initial examination is made only of the supply and collection 
stages to determine the collection decisions but then is followed by determination of the 
processing decisions.  I employ an iterative strategy with clustering techniques for 
situations where the first two approaches do not perform well. 
The primary objective of the research is to develop and analyze models called 
Coupled, Decoupled, and Iterated Models as well as to provide suggestions on when to 
use each formulation.  The chapter begins with the Coupled Model in Section 4.1.  The 
Decoupled Model is discussed in Section 4.2, followed by the Iterated Model in Section 
4.3.  The effectiveness of each approach is measured by the solution quality and 
computational time, using the more traditional Coupled Model as the baseline.  A 
numerical study is performed in Section 4.4. 
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4.1 Coupled Model 
The Coupled Model, which considers the full scope of the decisions in reverse 
production systems, incorporates decisions for the four stages of RPS infrastructure, 
(supply, collection, processing, and demand) over multiple periods of time.  The mixed 
integer linear programming (MILP) model for the RPS infrastructure determination 
problem introduced in Realff et al. (2004) serves as the formulation for the Coupled 
Model.  In words, it can be stated as: 
Maximize:   Net Profit  
(sales revenues – fixed costs – storage costs – collection and processing 
costs – transportation costs);  
Subject to:  Conservation of Flow between Sites  
(on material consumed and produced by the tasks located at sites); 
Upper and Lower Bounds  
(on storage, transportation, and processing of materials at sites); 
Logical Constraints on Sites  
(i.e., the need to open a site before allowing tasks to be located there). 
 
Reviewing the MILP from Realff et al. (2004) provides the starting point for 
developing the Decoupled and Iterated Models.  Because the Coupled Model produces 
optimal solutions, it is utilized as the baseline in comparing the other two models.  The 
indices are: i represents sites, j represents material types, m represents transportation 
modes, p represents the process types, q represents the replications of recycling tasks, and 
t represents the time periods.  The following superscripts are used:  c stands for 
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collection, r stands for storage, s stands for site, h stands for transportation, and d stands 
for material sales.   
The continuous decision variables are:   
1)  ijtM , the amount of type j material collected at site i at time t;  
2)  ijtS , the amount of type j material stored at site i at time t;  
3) 'iji mtH , the amount of type j material shipped from site i to i’ using 
transportation mode m at time period t;  
4)  ijtD , the amount of type j material sold at site i during time period t; and  
5)  iptξ , the extent of process p performed at site i in period t. 
 
The binary decision variables include:   
1)  ( )ciy equals 1 if collection is to be performed at site i and equals 0 otherwise;  
2)  ( )'
h
ii my equals 1 if shipment is allowed between site i and site i’ of transportation 
mode m and equals 0 otherwise;  
3)  ipqy equals 1 if replica q of process p is to be allowed at site i and equals 0 
otherwise;  
4)  ( )rijy equals 1 if storage of material j is to be allowed at site i and equals 0 
otherwise;  
5)  ( )dijy  equals 1 if material j is allowed to be sold at site i and equals 0 otherwise; 
and  
6)  ( )siy equals 1 if site i is to be opened and equals 0 otherwise. 
 
The parameters for the MILP employ the following notations: 
ijtP , the price of selling type j material at site i at time t; 
( )r
iK , the unit cost per time period for storage at site i; 
( )c
iK , the unit cost per time period for collection at site i; 




ii mK , the unit transportation cost per distance from sites i to i’ of mode m; 
'ii mb , the distance from sites i to i’ by transportation mode m; 
jpρ , the proportion of type j material consumed by process p; 
' jpρ , the proportion of type j material produced by process p; 
( )s
if , the fixed opening cost of site i; 
( )r
if , the fixed storage cost of site i; 
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( )c
if , the fixed material collecting cost of site i; 




ii mf , the fixed cost of transportation from sites i to i’ by transportation mode m; 
( )c
ijtε , the maximum collection capacity of material type j at site i at time period t; 
( )d
ijε , the maximum amount of material type j that can be sold at site i at any time 
period; 
( )r





ii mε , the maximum amount of material that can be shipped from sites i to i’ by 
transportation mode m; 
iptε , the maximum amount of material that process p produces at site i at time t; 
( )r
iα  equals 1 if storage is allowed at site i, and 0 otherwise; 
( )d




ii mα  equals 1 if shipment is allowed between site i and site i’ of transportation 
mode m, and 0 otherwise; 
ipα  equals 1 if process p is allowed at site i, and 0 otherwise; 
( )c
iα  equals 1 if collection is allowed at site i, and 0 otherwise; 
 
Utilizing the above notations, the RPS strategic infrastructure planning problem is 
posed as follows.  
Coupled Model 
Maximize (Objective)  Maximize  




P D∑∑∑   Sales revenue  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )  ( )c c s s r ri i i i i i
i
f y f y f y− + +∑
 
 Fixed cost  




ip ip q ii m ii m
i p q i i i m
f y f y
≠
− −∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
 




K S−∑∑∑   Storage cost  
( )c
i ijt ip ipt
t i j t i p
K M K ξ− −∑∑∑ ∑∑∑   Collection and   
processing costs 
 




ii m ii m iji mt
t i j i i m
K b H
≠












ijt ijt ijt ijimt i jimt
m i i m
iji mt ijimt jp ipt
i i m m p
jp ipt
p
S M S H H









∑∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑
 




i iy        y≤  i∀  Logical constraints   (3) 
(s)




i iy        y≤  i∀   (5) 
(d) (s)
ij iy        y≤  ,i j∀   (6) 
(c) (c)
i iy        α≤  i∀   (7) 
(c)
ipq ipy        α≤  , ,i p q∀   (8) 
(r) (r)
i iy        α≤  i∀   (9) 
(d) (d)
ij ijy        α≤  ,i j∀   (10) 
(h) (h)
ii'm ii'my        α≤  , ' | ',i i i i m∀ ≠  (11) 
ipq+1 ipqy        y≤  , ,i p q∀   (12) 
( ) ( )
ijt ijt i       
c cM yε≤  , ,i j t∀  Capacity constraints (13) 
( ) ( )
iji'mt ii'm ii'm       
h hH yε≤  , ' | ', ,i i i i m t∀ ≠  (14) 
( ) ( )
ijt ij ij       
r rS yε≤  , ,i j t∀   (15) 
( ) ( )
ijt ij ij       
d dD yε≤  , ,i j t∀   (16) 
ipt ipt ipq
q
       yξ ε≤ ∑  , ,i p t∀   (17) 
  Variable constraints (18) 
ijt ijt iji'mt ijt ipt, , , , 0M S H D ξ ≥  , ' , , ,i i i p m t∀ ≠              
(c) (h) (r) (d) (s)
i ii'm ipq i ij iy ,y ,y ,y ,y ,y {0,1}∈  , ' , , ,i i i p m q∀ ≠  (19) 
 
Solutions to this model yield mathematically optimal strategic infrastructure 
design decisions.    Nevertheless, there are shortcomings with the Coupled formulation.  
First, and most importantly, there is a significant amount of uncertainty that is not 
captured well by this deterministic model.  Good long-term decisions are desired to 
provide comfort with a significant commitment of resources and effort, as well as 
operational viability.  To address this problem, Realff et al. (2004) propose a robust 
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optimization model formulation and Hong et al. (2006) implement a robust scenario-
based RPS design.  Secondly, as the problem size becomes large scale, the computational 
effort required to solve it becomes unacceptable.  To address this problem, I propose a 
Decoupled Model which finds “good” but not necessarily globally optimal solutions with 
computationally tractable solution requirements.  Case studies have shown that the 
Decoupled Model provides reasonably high-quality solutions.  In the next section, 
decomposition principles are applied to the Coupled Model to develop the Decoupled 
Model. 
 
4.2 Decoupled Model 
There are three motivations for developing a model that decouples the collection 
decisions from the processing decisions.  First, it is often the case in practice that the 
collection is planned and implemented separately from the processing infrastructure, and 
so the Decoupled Model captures this situation.  Second, according to data from the Hong 
et al. (2006) case study, when the focus is on a regional area, typically the RPS 
processing strategic decisions do not have a significant impact on the RPS collection 
decisions.  Third, the Coupled Model becomes unmanageably large for regional scale 
problems and the computation time prohibitive.  These factors stimulated my 
development of a decomposition approach for RPS strategic planning.    
Note that the objective function component (1A) of the Coupled Model can be 
decomposed into three components, as shown below. 
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ii m ii m iji mt
t i j i i m
K b H
≠
=∑∑∑∑∑  ( ) ( )' ' '
|collection sites ' |sources
h h
ii m ii m iji mt
t i j i i m
K b H
≠
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  (1A1) 
 ( ) ( )
' ' '
|processing sites ' |collection sites
h h
ii m ii m iji mt
t i j i i m
K b H
≠
+∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  (1A2) 
 ( ) ( )
' ' '
|demand sites ' |processing sites
h h
ii m ii m iji mt
t i j i i m
K b H
≠
+∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  (1A3) 
 
The inbound transportation to the collection points, (1A1), consists of passenger vehicles, 
less-than-truckload trucks, and occasionally full-truckload trucks.  The outbound 
transportation from collection sites to the processing sites, (1A2), and from the 
processing points to end-users, (1A3), is frequently full-truckload trucks.  As a result in 
(1A1), there is a much more expensive collection transportation cost than the post-
collection transportation costs of (1A2) and (1A3). 
However, the single most important reason to consider a decomposed model is the 
complexity of the large-scale problem.  For example, a problem structure with a high 
resolution that focuses on cities instead of counties or regions of the U.S. cannot be 
solved in a reasonable computational time.  As a result, focusing on separate supply and 
collection phases is conceptually appealing.  The Decoupled Model formulation for the 
collection phase has the following modifications to the Coupled Model: 
 Consideration only of terms maximizing net profit composed of the fixed costs of 
collection sites, storage costs, collection costs, and transportation costs to and 
from collection sites    
 In the net conservation of flow constraints (2), elimination of the last four 
summation terms: the transportation from-to processing site terms and the 
production and consumption at processing site terms (which are done at all 
indexed points). 
 Elimination of the logical constraints (4), (6), (10), (11), and (12). 
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 Elimination of the capacity constraints (16) and (17)  
 Removal of the last two terms of the variable restrictions constraints (18)  
 Elimination of the third and fifth terms of the variable restrictions constraints (19)  
Since these modifications remove the processing and demand stages from the RPS 
infrastructure, it is possible to focus only on the collection infrastructure (supply and 
collection stages).  As a result, the maximization of net profit is equivalent to minimizing 
cost. 
The strategic decisions made by the Decoupled Model for the collection phase 
include the location, number, and size of the collection sites, the modes of transportation 
between supply and collection sites, and the flows of products and materials from the 
supply to collection sites.  Once these collection decisions are determined, the processing 
decisions are easily obtained (provided the processing information is available) simply by 
substituting the values for the ( )siy solutions obtained by solving the Decoupled Model for 
the collection phase into the Coupled formulation.  From numerous research instances, 
solving the Coupled formulation containing these fixed collection decisions can be 
performed relatively quickly.  Due to the specific RPS Model structure, the Decoupled 
collection solution values are always feasible when the integer variables are fixed in the 
Coupled Model. 
The Coupled Model never gives a worse solution than the Decoupled Model 
because of its integrated decision structure.  Consequently, one can view the Decoupled 
formulation as utilizing local structures with a trade off between solution quality and 
execution time.  From case study investigations, the solution quality of the Decoupled 
Model is generally excellent and obtained with lower computational requirements.  This 
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is consistent with the reality of current RPS infrastructures where the coupling between 
collection decisions and processing decisions is small.  Municipalities often take on the 
former responsibility while the latter is often true for the private sector whose location is 
driven by the existing infrastructure reflecting the demand for collection services. 
Nevertheless, in a very small number of specific cases, it was found that the 
Decoupled Model may not yield a satisfactory result.  The researcher’s experience 
demonstrates that it is not possible to entirely concentrate on the mathematically optimal 
objective function value in making comparisons.  In these cases, the optimal solution 
structures differ between Coupled and Decoupled Model solutions, even with a similar 
objective function value.  One example of these specific cases is when the problem has 
sites located in clusters.  To solve this problem, a new formulation called “Iterated 
Model” is introduced and will be discussed in the next section.   
 
4.3 Iterated Model 
As pointed out in the previous section, there can be cases where the Decoupled 
Model may not perform well.  In this subsection I will illustrate these limitations with 
small examples.  Unfortunately, these problem situations may occur in many actual RPS 
infrastructure design problems.  
The first case of concern is when the collection sites and processing sites are not 
mixed uniformly throughout the region; that is, when there are clusters of sites.  I 
illustrate this limitation with a small example as depicted in Figure 4.1a).  In its optimal 
solution the Coupled Model opens the Collection Site 2 (CS2) and Processing Site 2 
(PS2) whereas the Decoupled Model solution opens all three collection sites and PS2.  
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Even though the objective function value of the Decoupled Model solution has a small 
deviation of only 1.5% from the value of the solution obtained by the Coupled Model, it 
clearly has a different collection infrastructure.  This deviation could be much larger with 
different parameters values for site opening costs and transportation costs.  With the 
Decoupled Model, instead of opening a shared collection and processing at the center 
between two clusters, there are individual collection and processing sites for each cluster.  
This small example could be generalized to the case of many clusters of collection sites 
in the big cities on the coast but only processing sites in the central part of the country.  In 







Figure 4.1:  Examples of Decoupled Model Limitation – a) top-left: Clusters, b) top-right: 
Significant capacity difference, c) bottom-left: Transportation cost difference 
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Another dysfunctional case is when the capacity of collection sites and processing 
sites are significantly different.  If there are some very high capacity collection sites in 
the region, but only a few low capacity processing sites, then there is a need to send the 
collected materials to be processed in other regions.  A small example shows this 
limitation in Figure 4.1b).  Here the CS1 and PS3 have high capacity whereas PS1 and 
PS2 do not have enough capacity to serve the processing demand in the cluster.  The 
optimal solution obtained by the Coupled Model opens CS2, CS3, and PS3 whereas the 
solution to the Decoupled Model opens CS1, CS2, CS3, and PS3 with a difference in 
objective function values of 3%.  One can see that in the Decoupled solution there is an 
unnecessary collection site (CS1) that does not need to be present in the optimal solution.  
When there are significant differences between the collection and production site 
capacities,   use of the Decoupled Model is not recommended. 
Finally, when the relative transportation costs between the supply-collection sites 
and the collection-processing sites are widely dissimilar, the Decoupled Model does not 
perform well.  In the  Figure 4.1c) example with the collection-processing site 
transportation costs per distance four times  those of the supply-collection site 
transportation costs, the Decoupled Model determines a different infrastructure solution 
than the Coupled Model.  The Decoupled Model solution opens CS1, CS2, and PS1 while 
the Coupled Model solution opens CS2 and PS1.  Moreover, there is a difference in 
solution objective values of 2.3%, but, with different parameter values, the solution value 
differences could potentially be very large.  However, this case corresponds to the 
particular scenario where the consumer essentially would be bearing the cost of supply to 
the collection transportation which would cause the cost structure of transportation to 
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shift to a low local cost and high long distance cost pattern for the RPS, rather than the 
expected high local cost and low long distance cost on a per item or lb basis.  This 
situation will arise if the model represents an entity that considers only the capital and 
operating costs of the collection and processing centers as well as the transportation 
between them and the end market, but fails to consider the consumer cost.  In the current 
RPS operation, this is a likely scenario as consumers are not usually compensated for 
bringing items to collection centers.  But if curbside recycling or drop-off bins are 
utilized, it would not apply. 
For commonly found situations such as the three cases described above, I propose 
the Iterated Model.  Although some data manipulations are needed for this model, they 
are simple and do not require very complicated coding.  As an alternative, though, one 
could attempt solving the Coupled Model with associated high computation time for 
large-scale problems.     
In the first step of the Iterated Model, every collection site is assigned to a cluster, 
although it is possible to have a single site in a cluster if needed.  Exclusive clustering is 
desired such that each site belongs to only one particular cluster.  Cluster assignments can 
be done geographically (by county, by region or by state).  For example, one can directly 
form one cluster of the metro-area of a major city as a geographical consideration.  One 
can also create clusters mathematically by using fast minimum spanning tree (MST) 
algorithms, Ahuja et al. (1993).  Once a MST is determined, the n longest arcs can be 
removed to obtain n+1 clusters.  There are many other algorithms for the cluster 
determination, e.g., Rasmussen (1992).  Since accuracy in this approach is not a 




Figure 4.2:  Iterated Model Data - a) top-left: Regular data, b) top-right: Cluster 
assignment and distances between clusters, c) bottom-left: Distances between suppliers 
and clusters, and d) bottom-right: Distances between processing sites to clusters 
 
 The Iterated Model uses two sets of data:  regular and cluster data.  Figure 4.2 
describes the two data types.  Figure 4.2a) represents the regular data including the 
supply and collection sites.  Figure 4.2b) represents the collection sites cluster assignment 
and the distance between clusters.  Let CI represent the cluster I and CJ represent the 
cluster J.  Also, let i and j index the sites in CI and CJ respectively.  Let 
min{ |  and }IJ ij I Jdc d i C j C= ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈  represent the distance between cluster I and cluster 
J.  Figure 4.2c) shows the distances between supplies and clusters.  Let s be the index for 
supply points.  Then, the distance between a supply s and a cluster is calculated 
from min{ | }sI si Ids d i C= ∀ ∈ .  Figure 4.2d) displays the distances between clusters 
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(collection) and processing sites.  Let k be the index for the processing sites.  Then, the 
distance between a cluster and a processing site is calculated 
from min{ | }Ik ik Idp d i C= ∀ ∈ .  The distances between clusters, distances between supply 
and clusters, distances between supply and clusters, the minimum site opening cost of all 
sites in each cluster, and the total collection capacities in each cluster constitute the 
cluster data. 
 The Iterated Model is composed of two submodels, namely, the lowerbound 
model (LM) and the upperbound model (UM).  The LM is a RPS Coupled Model that 
utilizes the regular data.  The UM is a modifications of the Coupled Model that utilizes 
the cluster data.  The UM has the following modification to the RPS Coupled Model: 
 Let 1, 2,..., ,...,collect totali N N= , where collectN  represents the number of collection 
clusters.  There are  total collectN N−  processing sites, which is the same as the 
regular data. 
 For each cluster, assign a nonnegative integer variable, in  to denote the minimum 
required sites.  
 Introduce a new variable, maxiC , which represents the maximum capacity of a site 
within the cluster i. 
 Include the minimum sites needed to be open for feasibility in the cluster 
constraint of max/   1,...,i ijt i collect
t j
n M C i N≥ ∀ =∑∑ . 
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 In (1), replace the term ( ) ( )  s si i
i







i i i i
i i N
n f f y
= = +
− −∑ ∑ .  This 
incorporates the minimum sites needed to be open within the cluster i and aims to 
help the convergence of upperbound and lowerbound. 
At each iteration, the UM and LM models are solved.  Let Z be the optimal 
objective function value (total net profit) of the solution for the Iterated Model.  Given an 
opening infrastructure (decisions of what sites to be opened)π , then Z(π ) obtained with 
the original data is no better than the solution value obtained using the cluster data.  This 
holds true by construction since the transportation costs, site opening costs, and capacity 
of the cluster data are lower than in the formulation with the original data.  From this 
point forward, I will refer to the objective function value of the solution to the LM at 
iteration i using the original data as the lower bound model value, LBi, and the objective 
function value of the UM at iteration i using the cluster data as the upper bound model 


















Figure 4.3:  Iterated Model Steps 
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Figure 4.3 illustrates the steps in the Iterated Model approach.  At each iteration, 
the UM is solved first to obtain the opened collection clusters, optimal processing and 
demand infrastructures.  These processing and demand structures are fixed in the LM to 
solve for the optimal collection infrastructure (what collection sites to be opened).  At the 
end of iteration, UBi and LBi are obtained.  The current best solution, LBi*, is also updated 
at each iteration. The iterations terminate only when the UBi has higher cost than the LBi-
1
*.  If not, another iteration is executed.  If a better (higher) LBi than the LBi-1* is obtained, 
the LBi* is updated to this value.  If not, the same current best value is used.    The crucial 
step is to enforce that no previously obtained processing infrastructure configuration can 
be allowed in the solution of the next UBi+1 model.  Additionally, a bound on collection 
is enforced.  Each collection cluster comprises fixed opening and variable costs.  With the 
flow information from the LM, a (lower) bound can be inserted into the next UM.  The 
Iterated Model iterations continue until the termination condition is satisfied.  With a 
finite number of sites, it is guaranteed to terminate after a finite number of iterations.   
To reduce iterations, additional constraints can be inserted at the enforcing steps 
to reflect a specific problem structure.  Examples of these additional constraints for the 
research case study include the type and the nearness of the collection and processing 
sites.  The types of sites include governmental, or non-profit, or large commercial.  Each 
type has a different site opening cost, capacity, and variable cost.  The nearness 
specification can be specified subjectively.  In the computational study reported in 
Section 4.5, when sites are no more than 50 miles apart, it is assumed they are near and 
belong in the same cluster.  When a certain type of collection site does not belong to the 
optimal solution, it is extended to other collection sites in the proximity of the same type 
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to eliminate symmetric solutions as a group.  One can add logical constraints to force 
some particular sites not to open, which can drastically reduce the number of iterations. 
The UBi is non-increasing between iterations.  This is trivial because before each 
UBi is solved, at least one elimination constraint (no duplicate process and demand 
infrastructures) is added.  Figure 4.4 shows an example of the solution values over 
iterations.  At iteration i, if the LBi turns out to be the new current best value LBi*,  UBi+1 
and LBi+1 are next solved to find the same current best value.  At this next iteration, the 
UBi+2 crosses the current best value to terminate the algorithm, thus obtaining the 
collection structure from the current best solution, which is the solution of the LBi model 





































With a finite number of sites, the Iterated Model always converges. The current 
best solution is non-decreasing and the UBi is non-increasing between iterations.  As a 
result, the Iterated Model yields an optimal solution.   
This chapter has discussed the development of the three models.  To validate the 
two proposed models, Decoupled and Iterated, it is necessary  to implement numerical 
studies.  This research has used the Coupled Model as the baseline in evaluating the 
performances.  These implementations are discussed in the subsequent section. 
 
4.4 Numerical Study 
This part gives numerical studies for the purposes of validation and verification.  
The Decoupled Model is applied to the case study data of Hong et al. (2006), in section 
4.4.1.  Subsequently, the Iterated Model is implemented to the generated examples with 
clusters in section 4.4.2. 
4.4.1 Decoupled Model Example 
The Decoupled Model is implemented to the E-Scrap in the State of Georgia Case 
Study, Hong et al. (2006).  Rather than repeat the details of the case study, I will only 
discuss the performance of the Decoupled Model in terms of solution quality and time.  
Using the Windows 2000-based personal computer with Pentium 1.80 GHz with 1GB 
RAM, the Coupled and Decoupled Models are run with C++ program and CPLEX 9.0 
(2007) for the optimization software.  MS-Access was used to store and manage the case 
study database.  The Decoupled Model performance, with the 16 scenarios, can be 
summarized in Figure 4.5 and Table 4.1. 
 58
 
Figure 4.5:  Comparison of Decoupled Model solution versus Coupled Model Solution 
Net Profits for 16 Case Study Scenarios 
 
The solution quality performance of the Decoupled Model is excellent when 
compared to the baseline values obtained by the Coupled Model.  For all 16 scenarios, 
the optimal net profits of the Decoupled Model solution are no larger than 3.39% of those 
associated with the optimal solution of the Coupled Model.  Importantly, half of the 
scenarios optimal solutions are within 1.00%.  Given the uncertainty and ambiguity in the 
data, this performance would appear reasonable. 
Table 4.1 reports the solution time required for the Coupled and Decoupled 
Models for each of the sixteen scenarios.   The Decoupled Model requires a significant 
reduction in computational time.  For all 16 scenarios, there is at least a 23% saving from 
the baseline Coupled Model.  Twelve of the sixteen scenarios have time reductions of at 
least 50%.  From the research experience (with other problems as well as the ones 
















































Table 4.1:  Comparison of Decoupled vs. Coupled Models Solution Time 
Scenario Coupled Model (Sec)
Decoupled Model  
(Sec)
Time Difference 
(Sec) % Time Reduction
1 232 103 129 55.6%
2 147 40 107 72.8%
3 64 49 15 23.4%
4 52 37 15 28.8%
5 261 35 226 86.6%
6 176 38 138 78.4%
7 64 40 24 37.5%
8 67 37 30 44.8%
9 3,338 370 2,968 88.9%
10 2,267 455 1,812 79.9%
11 265 46 219 82.6%
12 561 186 375 66.8%
13 4,030 996 3,034 75.3%
14 6,349 827 5,522 87.0%
15 428 154 274 64.0%
16 1,404 495 909 64.7%  
 
4.4.2 Iterated Model Example 
I am also concerned about many actual situations where sites may be clustered 
together in regions.   To test the solution quality and computation time of the Iterated 
Model for this situation, examples with a cluster structure, known to cause potential 
problems for the Decoupled Model, were generated.  The problem inputs include the 
number of clusters, maximum number of sites allowed in a cluster, and the size of the 
dimensional plane.  For this example, a random number generator utilizing a uniform 
distribution is used to position the site locations.  For the clusters, the generator first 
determines the cluster center location, then the number of sites in the cluster is generated 
within a 25 mile radius from the center.  The site locations are enforced to satisfy the 
exclusive clustering condition such that each site belongs to only one cluster.  With these 
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site locations and other parameter specifications, the cluster structure examples are then 
obtained. 
For the tests, examples of small (1000x1000 mile2, 40 collection and 15 
processing sites), medium (1000x1000 mile2 , 100 collection and 30 processing sites), and 
large (2000x2000 mile2 , 320 collection and 80 processing sites) problem sizes were 
generated.  Table 4.2 reports the results which suggest that as the problem size grows 
larger, the Iterated Model provides larger advantages in computational requirements.  In 
the large problem, the Iterated Model outperforms the Coupled Model in solution time by 
more than 50%. 
 




In this chapter, I have developed the Decoupled and Iterated Models.  Details of 
Coupled, Decoupled, and Iterated Models are discussed with numerical studies.  
Although the Decoupled Model does not provide optimal solutions, it does provide good 
solutions with significant execution time reduction in most cases.  The Iterated Model 
gives the optimal solution with more advantages in computational requirements as the 




















small problem $331,866 1 $337,837 7 +6
medium problem $1,536,782 15 $1,532,122 29 +14
large problem $991,638 1823 $995,285 796 -1027
Coupled Model Iterated Model
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All of the strategic network design models address the four stages of RPS.  
However, in the research problem, the contract model and network models are connected 
at the collection and processing stages.  The incorporation of the contract and network 
model is proposed in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5  
CONTRACT/NETWORK LUMP SUM MODELS 
  
This chapter presents the contract and network lump sum models.  Two 
approaches for Lump Sum Models are investigated.  The first is a deterministic 
mathematical programming approach which is discussed in this chapter.  The second is a 
stochastic programming approach which will be presented in Chapter 6. 
 This chapter begins with a discussion of collector types in Section 5.1, followed 
by a non-regional and regional contract model discussion in Section 5.2.  A Sequential 
Model is applied to the regional model in Section 5.3 which is followed by a 
Simultaneous Model in Section 5.4.  Section 5.5 presents a numerical study of all the 
models in this chapter.  This chapter concludes with a discussion of the advantages of the 
Simultaneous Model over the Sequential Model. 
 
5.1 Collector Type 
I assume that collectors are categorized into types, based on their marginal costs.  
In economic terms, marginal cost is defined as the change in total cost that arises when 
the quantity produced (or purchased) changes by one unit.  Mathematically, it can be 





.  Marginal cost is represented byθ , in units of $/lb 
for my studies where I am concerned with the cost of collecting certain quantities of 
material.  This marginal cost usually has an embedded profit margin.  As happens in 
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numerous supply chains, the more powerful member drives the less dominant one(s) to 
sell at cost.  Hence, some percentage of profit has to be designed into the collector’s 
marginal cost.  The typical marginal cost curve, which has a “u-shape” (convex), can be 
broken into three regions, as shown in Figure 5.1. 
 
 
Figure 5.1:  Marginal Cost Curve and Constrained Operational Regions 
 
The first region, in the small quantity domain, has a high marginal cost drop as 
the start up costs are typically very high.  The second region, which contains the optimal 
marginal cost, is a relatively flat section.   Because this section is where the collector 
operates, constraints are placed so that operational quantity is limited within this section.  
Finally the third region, in the large quantity domain, is where the marginal cost rises 
rapidly.  Reasons for the rapid climb could be that the plant capacity is reached (passed) 























This categorization of collectors by marginal costs is implemented throughout the 
discussion of lump sum and variable volume models.    
 
5.2 Non-Regional and Regional Contract Models 
I propose two models: a Non-Regional and Regional Model.  The Non-Regional 
is the initial model that only considers two collector types.  On the other hand, the 
Regional Model deals with multiple types with incorporation of additional factors to 
determine the type. 
 The Non-Regional model assumes that the collector is either efficient or 
inefficient.   Additional constraints are added to the CPA Model to reflect that each 
collector wants to be in the operational domain.  The contract model can be written as: 
Non-Regional Principal-Agent (NRPA) Model 
Maximize   [ ( ) ] (1 )[ ( ) ]p S q t p S q t− + − −  (OBJ) 
s.t. 0t qθ− ≥  (PC-E) 
 0t qθ− ≥
 
(PC-I) 
 t q t qθ θ− ≥ −
 
(IC-E) 









min maxq q q≤ ≤
 
(DC-I) 




where minmin , 0q q ≥ .  The DC-E and DC-I are the domain constraints of the efficient and 
inefficient collectors, respectively. 
With complete information, the processor can tailor a different model for different 
collector types.  In knowing the different contracts for each type, the processor realizes 
the upper and lower bounds on the net profit due to the fact that NRPA incorporates both 
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types of collectors in a weighted manner.   The complete information models can be 
written as: 
Efficient Contract Non-Regional Model 
Maximize ( )S q t−  
s.t. 0t qθ− ≥  
 
min max
q q q≤ ≤
  , 0t q ≥
  
Inefficient Contract Non-Regional Model 
Maximize ( )S q t−  
s.t. 0t qθ− ≥  
 
min maxq q q≤ ≤
  , 0t q ≥
  
For the Regional Model, the principal offers different contracts to different 
regions.  With different space and cost, the ease of collection of each region can vary 
greatly.  Because each region carries the same assumption that the collectors can be typed 
as efficient or inefficient, it can be depicted with an example of m  independent regions 
as shown in Figure 5.2.  Note that the Non-Regional Contract Model is a subset of the 
Regional Model. 
Let j be the index for regions, j = 1, 2, …, m, and let k be the index for distinct 
collector marginal cost values over all regions such that, k = 1, 2, …, m’, where ' 2m m≤ .  
Before modeling the problem with the MTPA model, it is necessary to perform a sorting 
algorithm.  There are m regions, hence up to 2m distinct marginal cost values.  In ranking 
all ( , ) values,   1,...,jj j mθ θ ∀ = , there are m’ number of distinct marginal cost values.   A 




Figure 5.2:  Regional Model Depiction 
 
This ranking algorithm can be done in O(mlogm), polynomial time in parameter 
m.  The subscript k = 1 is the lowest marginal cost (most efficient type).  The subscript k 
= m’, on the other hand, is the highest marginal cost (least efficient type).  Moreover,  pk 










With these notations and assumptions, the Regional Principal-Agent (RPA) 
Model can therefore be stated as: 
RPA Model 
Maximize   '
1








s.t. ' ', ' 0m m j mt qθ− ≥
 
(PC-m’) 
 , 1 , 1         1,..., ' 1k k j k k k j kt q t q k mθ θ+ +− ≥ − = −
 
(IC-k) 
 1                                   1,..., '-1k kq q k m+≥ =
 
(MC-k) 
 min min                     1,..., 'k k kq q q k m≤ ≤ =
 
(DC-k) 
 , 0                                  1,..., 'k kt q k m≥ =
 
 
(    1,     1)
(    m,     m)
(    4,     4)
(    3,    3)







As explained in Laffont and Martimort (2002), the Revelation Principle ensures 
that it is possible to restrict the processor to offer simple menu contracts having as many 
options as the total number of types.  When the processor captures all the types correctly, 
i.e., each collector is assigned a marginal cost from a list of all existing costs, the menu 
lump sum contract is optimal.  As the processor offers a menu lump sum contract, the 
collector will truthfully select a contract alternative that corresponds to his or her type.  
The truthful direct revelation mechanism is denoted by 1 1 2 2 ' '{( , ), ( , ),..., ( , )}m mt q t q t q . 
 The RPA Model is solved to obtain the m’ menu contract pairs.  The next step is 
to convert the solution back to the original setting. The sorting of contract pairs can also 
be performed in O(mlogm).  For each region j, there are two values of k.  For the smaller 
k, there is the contract of ( , )j jt q .  For the larger k, there is the contract of ( , )j jt q .  
Eventually a contract is obtained for efficient and inefficient types for each region j in 
consideration. 
 Utilizing these contract models, the processor develops a menu of these lump sum 
contracts.  The contract alternatives for both types of collectors become inputs for the 
strategic network model.  This is the Sequential Model which is discussed in the 
subsequent section.  I only consider the regional contract because of its generality in the 
following sections. 
 
5.3 Sequential Model 
The strategic network problem in the contract problem is essentially which 
collectors to offer contract alternatives to.  Figure 5.3 summarizes the Sequential Model.  
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This is the decision in the collection stage of the RPS infrastructure.  In the Sequential 
Model, the contract model is solved first.  Then, the strategic network model is 
implemented.  The following notations are employed in all variations of the models 
proposed in the following sections.  Note that for the non-regional model, the index j is 
omitted. 
 
Figure 5.3:  Sequential Model Summary 
 
Index 
j:  index of regions, j = 1, 2, …, m 
ij:  index of collectors in region j, ij = 1, 2, …, Ij, where j
j
n I=∑  
k: index of the distinct set of collector marginal cost values, k = 1, 2, …, m’, where  
' 2m m≤ . 
 
Known Parameters 
    jct :  Transportation cost coefficient of region j, $/mile.lb 
 
ji
d : Distance between processor and collector i in region j, mile 
 
ji
F : Fixed cost to processor if collector i in region j joins the network, $ 
 Q: Target total material quantity required by the processor, lb 
 B:  Material purchase budget limit for the processor, $ 
jπ :  Probability of a collector in region j accepting the given contract 
jp :  Probability of a collector in region j being the efficient type 











∀   
ji j
y i j∀ ∀
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jθ :  Marginal cost of inefficient collector in region j 
jt :  Lump sum transfer payment to efficient collector in region j, $ 
jt :  Lump sum transfer payment to inefficient collector in region j, $ 
j
q :  Quantity material collected from efficient collector in region j, lb 
jq :  Quantity material collected from inefficient collector in region j, lb 
 
Decision Variables 
   
ji
y :  Binary variable for collector ij 
      







 With these notations, the strategic network model for the case of incomplete 
information can be stated as follows. 
Sequential Model (Incomplete Information) 
Maximize
 
( ( (1 ) ) ) ( (1 ) )
( (1 ) )
j j
j j
j j j j
j j
jj j j j i j j j j ij
j i j i
j j i j j j i j i ij
j i j i
S p q p q y p t p t y
ct d p q p q y F y
π π
π π
+ − − + −
− + − −
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
(OBJ) 
s.t. ( ) ( (1 ) )
j j
j j
j j j i j j j i
j i j i




 ( ) ( (1 ) )
j j
j j
j j j i j j j i
j i j i











The objective function (OBJ) represents the principal valuation collected product 
from all the chosen collectors in all regions minus the costs which include the lump sum 
transfer payments to all the chosen collectors in all regions, the transportation cost to 
move material from all the chosen collector sites in all regions, and the total fixed cost to 
the processor for including the chosen collectors in his or her network.  The target 
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quantity constraint (QC) requires that the total collected quantity from all the chosen 
collectors provide the required target quantity needed by the processor.  The budget 
constraint (BC) suggests that the total of the lump sum transfer payments to the chosen 
collectors must be within the processor’s material budget. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, one research goal is to understand the value of 
information.  With complete information, the processor knows the type of each collector 
and wants to use this information to make sure s/he does not overpay for the product.  In 
comparing the processor’s net profits obtained from the complete information and 
incomplete information models, the processor can have a better idea of how much s/he 
should pay to get the information (if possible).  An example showing how to calculate the 
value of information is discussed in Section 5.5.5.  
I also want to consider an intermediate case, which unlike the complete 
information case where all collectors accept the given contracts, each collector can accept 
or reject the offered contract.  While the case where the collectors cannot reject a contract 
is called “complete information without collector’s choice,” the intermediate case is 
denoted as “complete information with collector’s choice.”  Let E represent the set of 
efficient collectors and IE represent the set of inefficient collectors.  Let ji E∈  be the 
collector i in region j that belongs to set E.  Similarly, let  ji IE∈  be the collector i in 
region j that belongs to set IE.  The strategic network model with the assumption of 
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This model is different from the incomplete information model in that it does not 
incorporate the probability of a collector being of a particular type.  The probability of a 
collector accepting the contract terms, jπ , may inflate the quantity and transfer payment 
values because the collector has the option of rejecting the contract.  For the perfect 
complete information case where the collector must accept the contract and does not have 
a choice, jπ
 
is equal to one for every j. 
The Sequential Model is a tool to help the processor decide which collector(s) to 
offer the contract.  With the contract decisions as inputs, the model is an integer program 
(IP).  The performance of the Sequential Model will be discussed in Section 5.5. 
The Simultaneous Model where contract and strategic network decisions are 




5.4 Simultaneous Model 
In the Simultaneous Model, both contract and network problems are solved at 
once.  The anticipated advantages of the Simultaneous Model when compared to the 
Sequential Model are both the relative ease of implementation and the better net profit 
obtained by the processor.  Figure 5.4 summarizes the Simultaneous Model. 
 
 
Figure 5.4:  Simultaneous Model Summary 
 
The simultaneous approach is expected to provide higher net profit to the 
processor because it maximizes the end objective by incorporating valuation, transfer 
payment, transportation cost, and fixed cost of the collectors simultaneously.  This higher 
net profit expectation will be discussed in Section 5.5.   
It is necessary to include an additional index and variable for the Simultaneous 
Model.  Let l be the index of the unique rank order marginal costs such that l = 1, 2, …, 
L.  The relation between l and j is 
1 2( ) ( ) 1 2 1 2
( , ) { , | ( ) ( ) , }jj l l l l j l lα αθ θ θ θ α α= = = ≤ , 
/ 2l L J= ≤ .  Also, let lq  be the quantity material collected from the marginal cost rank 
















Simultaneous Model (Incomplete Information) 
Maximize
 
( ( (1 ) ) ) ( (1 ) )
( (1 ) )
j j
j j
j j j j
j j
jjj j j i j j j ijj
j i j i
j j i j j i j i ijj
j i j i
S p q p q y p t p t y
ct d p q p q y F y
π π
π π
+ − − + −
− + − −
∑∑ ∑∑
∑∑ ∑∑  
(OBJ) 
s.t. ( (1 ) )
j
j
j j j ijj
j i
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j
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jjj j j i
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  0L L Lt qθ− ≥
 
(PC) 
 1 1  l l l l l lt q t qθ θ+ +− ≥ −
                                          
1,..., 1l L∀ = −
 
(IC) 
 1l lq q +≥
                                                                
1,..., 1l L∀ = −
 
(MC) 
 minl lq q≥




 maxl lq q≤




 , , 0jj lt t t ≥
       











 The OBJ function includes terms to represent the material valuation, transfer 
payment costs, transportation costs, and fixed costs.  The PC, IC, MC constraints are 
from the MTPA contract model.  The LQC and UQC constraints enforce the quantity 
domain.  The remaining constraints follow explanations from the previous sections. 
 I expect that the Simultaneous Model will have higher net profit than the 
Sequential Model because of the single solution step.  A numerical study is performed in 
the following section.  Insights of the Sequential and Simultaneous models are given, 
which confirm the expectation. 
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5.5 Numerical Study 
In assessing the Sequential and Simultaneous Models, I performed numerical 
studies on many small examples, though only four examples are reported in detail.  In the 
final example, I compute the value of information for a small instance via the Complete 
and Incomplete Information Simultaneous Models.  The expected value on information is 
found from combinations of collectors being efficient or inefficient.  For simplicity, these 
are examples of a non-regional problem.  At the end of this section, the advantages and 
disadvantages of both models are discussed. 
5.5.1 Example 1 
In this example, I assume that there are three available collectors.  The non-
regional problem has marginal costs of 0.05 and 0.08 $/lb for efficient and inefficient 
collectors, respectively.  The probability of being an efficient collector, p, has a value of 
0.5.  The processor has a coefficient of valuation of 10 with a target quantity and budget 
of 150 lb and $20, respectively.  The collectors have distances from the processor and 
fixed costs of 100 mile and $10, 150 miles and $5, and 50 miles and $15, respectively.  
Finally, the operating quantity of an efficient collector is between 20 and 300 lb.  On the 
other hand, the inefficient collector has an operating quantity between 10 and 100 lb. 
The Sequential and Simultaneous Model solutions are obtained using the BARON 
(2007) commercial solver on the Window XP computer platform.  Table 5.1 reports the 
solutions.  Each row represents solutions for different values of the probability of 




Table 5.1:  Solutions to Example 1 
Sequential Model Simultaneous Model
Eff. Contract  
($,lb)
Ineff. Contract  
($,lb) (y1,y2,y3)
Net Profit  
$
Eff. Contract  
($,lb)
Ineff. Contract  
($,lb) (y1,y2,y3)
Net Profit  
$
0.0 (18, 300) (8, 100) Infeasible Infeasible Infeasible Infeasible Infeasible Infeasible
0.1 (18, 300) (8, 100) Infeasible Infeasible Infeasible Infeasible Infeasible Infeasible
0.2 (18, 300) (8, 100) Infeasible Infeasible Infeasible Infeasible Infeasible Infeasible
0.5 (18, 300) (8, 100) (1,1,1) 116.2 (18, 300) (8, 100) (1,1,1) 116.2
0.8 (18, 300) (8, 100) (1,0,0) 96.1 (18, 300) (7, 91) (1,0,0) 116.9
0.9 (18, 300) (8, 100) (1,0,0) 100.9 (17, 300) (5, 66) (1,0,0) 116.8




 For the extremely small π  values, both the Sequential and Simultaneous Models 
give infeasible solutions.  For the median π  value, both models result in the same 
solution.  However, there are obvious differences between the two models for relatively 
large π  values.  The contract for an inefficient collector varies greatly.  This example 
suggests that the Simultaneous Model may yield better net profits for all values of π . 
 To more clearly see the difference in solution feasibility for the two models, 
Example 2 is introduced. 
5.5.2 Example 2 
This example has many of the same parameters as Example 1.  The differences 
are 1) a target quantity of 300 lb, 2) a budget of $30, and 3) an operating quantity 
between 100 and 3000 lb for both types of collectors.  Table 5.2 summarizes the 
solutions. 
 
Table 5.2:  Solutions to Example 2 
Sequential Model Simultaneous Model
Eff. Contract  
($,lb)
Ineff. Contract  
($,lb) (y1,y2,y3)
Net Profit  
$
Eff. Contract  
($,lb)
Ineff. Contract  
($,lb) (y1,y2,y3)
Net Profit  
$
0.0 (212, 3000) (165, 2066) Infeasible Infeasible Infeasible Infeasible Infeasible Infeasible
0.1 (212, 3000) (165, 2066) (0,0,1) 130.1 (205, 3000) (146, 1818) (1,0,1) 158.0
0.2 (212, 3000) (165, 2066) Infeasible Infeasible (205, 3000) (146, 1818) (0,0,1) 163.5
0.5 (212, 3000) (165, 2066) Infeasible Infeasible (8, 100) (132, 2580) (0,0,1) 168.6
0.8 (212, 3000) (165, 2066) Infeasible Infeasible (8, 100) (80, 1530) (0,0,1) 163.4
0.9 (212, 3000) (165, 2066) Infeasible Infeasible (8, 100) (70, 1336) (0,0,1) 161.7





 The Sequential Model yields infeasibility for most π  values, while the 
Simultaneous Model mostly finds feasible solutions.  Moreover, for the π  value of 0.1 
with feasible solutions for both models, there are significant differences in contracts.  At 
the same time, the Sequential Model only offers a contract to Collector 3 whereas the 
Simultaneous offers a contract to Collectors 1 and 3. 
Varying the marginal costs such that the efficient and inefficient collectors differ 
greatly is addressed in Example 3. 
5.5.3 Example 3 
Consider an example with three available collectors.  The non-regional problem 
has marginal costs of 0.02 and 0.10 $/lb for efficient and inefficient collectors, 
respectively.  As a result, the efficient collector has a marginal cost 5 times cheaper than 
that of inefficient collectors.  The processor has a target quantity and budget of 300 lb 
and $30, respectively.  The operating quantity for all collectors is between 10 and 5000 
lb.  The remaining parameters hold the same values as Examples 1 and 2.  Table 5.3 
reports the solutions. 
The solutions are similar to Example 2.  The Sequential Model remains infeasible 
for most π  values.  Moreover, the contracts for efficient and inefficient types differ 
greatly between models, especially for inefficient collectors.  For π  values of 0.1 and 0.2 
which are feasible solutions for both models, the collection network has a much different 
structure.  The Simultaneous Model suggests that the processor should offer contracts to 
all collectors.  The Sequential Model, on the other hand, wants to select only one or two 
collectors.  Again, for these two π  values, the processor net profits for the Simultaneous 
Model are relatively greater. 
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Table 5.3:  Solutions to Example 3 
Sequential Model Simultaneous Model
Eff. Contract  
($,lb)
Ineff. Contract  
($,lb) (y1,y2,y3)
Net Profit  
$
Eff. Contract  
($,lb)
Ineff. Contract  
($,lb) (y1,y2,y3)
Net Profit  
$
0.0 (162, 5000) (77, 772) Infeasible Infeasible Infeasible Infeasible Infeasible Infeasible
0.1 (162, 5000) (77, 772) (1,0,1) 183.8 (100.8, 5000) (1, 10) (1,1,1) 203.3
0.2 (162, 5000) (77, 772) (0,0,1) 190.5 (99, 4910) (1, 10) (1,1,1) 245.0
0.5 (162, 5000) (77, 772) Infeasible Infeasible (101, 5000) (1, 10) (0,0,1) 264.7
0.8 (162, 5000) (77, 772) Infeasible Infeasible (74, 3660)) (1, 10) (0,0,1) 275.2
0.9 (162, 5000) (77, 772) Infeasible Infeasible (66, 3243) (1, 10) (0,0,1) 273.4




To better understand the difference between the models, a problem with more 
collectors and high marginal costs is examined in Example 4. 
5.5.4 Example 4 
In this example, the efficient and inefficient collectors have marginal costs of 10 
and 12 $/lb, respectively.  The processor has a target quantity of 25 lb and a budget of 
$1000.  (imagine this example as the recycling of a high-value low-volume product).  The 
operating quantity domain for every collector is 1 to 30 lb.  There are five available 
collectors with distance from processor and fixed cost of 100 miles and $10, 150 miles 
and $5, 50 miles and $15, 60 miles and $12, and 120 miles and $8, respectively. 
In this example, the Sequential Model cannot find a feasible solution for all π  
values because of the very low value of contract solutions.  On the other hand, the 
Simultaneous Model performs reasonably well for π  value of 0.2 or more. 
 
 
Table 5.4:  Solutions to Example 4 
Sequential Model Simultaneous Model
Eff. Contract  
($,lb)
Ineff. Contract  
($,lb) (y1,y2,y3,y4,y5)
Net Profit  
$
Eff. Contract  
($,lb)
Ineff. Contract  
($,lb) (y1,y2,y3,y4,y5)
Net Profit  
$
0.0 (12, 1) (12, 1) Infeasible Infeasible Infeasible Infeasible Infeasible Infeasible
0.1 (12, 1) (12, 1) Infeasible Infeasible Infeasible Infeasible Infeasible Infeasible
0.2 (12, 1) (12, 1) Infeasible Infeasible (300, 25) (300, 25) (1,1,1,1,1) 138.7
0.5 (12, 1) (12, 1) Infeasible Infeasible (300, 25) (300, 25) (0,1,0,0,1) 141.8
0.8 (12, 1) (12, 1) Infeasible Infeasible (125, 10.4) (125, 10.4) (1,0,0,1,1) 124.7
0.9 (12, 1) (12, 1) Infeasible Infeasible (333, 28) (333, 28) (0,1,0,0,0) 143.6




5.5.5 Example 5 
In this example, three collectors are considered.  The efficient and inefficient 
collectors have marginal costs of 0.1 and 0.3 $/lb, respectively.  The processor has a 
target quantity of 150 lb and a budget of $50.  The operating quantity domain for every 
collector is 10 to 200 lb.  Collectors 1, 2, and 3 have distance from processor and fixed 
cost of 50 miles and $150, 150 miles and $50, and 100 miles and $100, respectively.  The 
coefficient of transportation has value of 0.005 $/lb-mile.  These collectors have the 
common probability of being efficient and probability of accepting a contract of 0.5 and 
0.8, respectively.  Finally, the processor has a linear coefficient of valuation of 5 $/lb. 
Using the Simultaneous Model in the complete and incomplete information cases, 
the contracts, offering decisions, and processor’s net profits are displayed in Table 5.5.  
The solutions to the complete information without collector’s choice and with collector’s 
choice are presented.  With three collectors, there are a total of eight combinations for 
collector’s efficiency.  Let e represent efficient type and ie represent inefficient type. 
From the Simultaneous Model with incomplete information, the processor should 
offer a contract menu for all three collectors, yielding the net profit of $1005.  If the 
processor identifies Collectors 1 and 2 are efficient and Collector 3 is inefficient, then the 
value of information for the complete information case without collector’s choice is $555 
($1560 - $1005).  In obtaining collector’s information (if possible), the processor should 
not pay more than $555.  Similarly for the complete information case with collector’s 
choice, the value of information is calculated from the difference in processor’s net 
profits.  It has the value of information of $415. 
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Table 5.5:  Solutions to Example 5 
Eff. Contract  
($,lb)
Ineff. Contract 
($,lb) (y1, y2, y3)
Net Profit 
$
(29, 200) (13, 43) (1, 1, 1) 1005
Combination 
(Collector1,Collector2,Collector3)
Collector 1  
($,lb)
Collector 2  
($,lb)
Collector 3  
($,lb) (y1, y2, y3)
Net Profit 
$
(e, e, e) (20, 200) (10, 100) (20, 200) (1, 1, 1) 1925
(e, e, ie) (20, 200) (20, 200) (3, 10) (1, 1, 0) 1560
(e, ie, e) (20, 200) (60, 200) (20, 200) (1, 0, 1) 1560
(e, ie, ie) (20, 200) (30, 100) (6, 20) (1, 1, 0) 1125
(ie, e, e) (60, 200) (20, 200) (20, 200) (0, 1, 1) 1560
(ie, e, ie) (13, 43) (20, 200) (30, 100) (0, 1, 1) 1100
(ie, ie, e) (9, 31) (30, 100) (20, 200) (0, 1, 1) 1125
(ie, ie, ie) (26, 88) (50, 167) (25, 85) (0, 1, 1) 608
Combination 
(Collector1,Collector2,Collector3)
Collector 1  
($,lb)
Collector 2  
($,lb)
Collector 3  
($,lb) (y1, y2, y3)
Net Profit 
$
(e, e, e) (20, 200) (20, 200) (20, 200) (1, 1, 1) 1872
(e, e, ie) (20, 200) (20, 200) (23, 75) (1, 1, 1) 1420
(e, ie, e) (20, 200) (22.5, 75) (20, 200) (1, 1, 1) 1445
(e, ie, ie) (20, 200) (43, 142) (7, 22) (1, 1, 0) 1032
(ie, e, e) (23, 75) (20, 200) (20, 200) (1, 1, 1) 1395
(ie, e, ie) (13, 43) (20, 200) (43, 142) (0, 1, 1) 1020
(ie, ie, e) (13, 43) (43, 142) (20, 200) (0, 1, 1) 1032
(ie, ie, ie) (13, 43) (60, 200) (60, 200) (0, 1, 0) 592
Complete Information - With Collector's Choice
Incomplete Information
Complete Information - Without Collector's Choice
 
 
If the processor is uncertain whether each collector is efficient or not, s/he can 
compute the expected value of information (EVOI), calculating with the distribution of p.  
With each collector having a probability of being efficient of 0.5, each combination has a 
probability of 0.125 (0.53).  The EVOI without collector’s choice is $315, which is the 
expected net profit of $1320 minus the incomplete information net profit of $1005.  
Similarly, the EVOI with collector’s choice is calculated from the expected net profit of 
$1226 minus $1005 to be $221.  Knowing the EVOI, the processor recognizes the 
average benefit from knowing collector’s information.  The cost in obtaining the private 
information should not exceed the EVOI. 
The insights from the above examples (and other runs performed) are reported in 
the next section. 
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5.5.6 Insights 
From the above examples, one can clearly observe that 1) the Simultaneous 
Model seems to have more feasibility solutions for given probability of acceptance, π  
and 2) the Simultaneous Model yields better net profit for given π  when both models are 
feasible. 
To explain these results, it is necessary to inspect the Sequential and 
Simultaneous Models.  The Simultaneous Model has an objective function which 
includes contract, transportation, and fixed cost terms.  It has network constraints (QC 
and BC), contract constraints (PC, IC, MC, and DC), and variables constraints.  On the 
other hand, the Sequential Model consists of two sub-models, which are the MTPA 
Contract Model and the Strategic Network Model.  The MTPA Contract Model has 
objective function with only contract terms.  It has PC, IC, MC, DC, and variables 
constraints.  The Strategic Network Model has an objective function with contract, 
transportation, and fixed cost terms.  These are identical to the objective function of the 
Simultaneous Model.  The Strategic network has only QC, BC, and variables constraints.  
I exploit Figure 5.5 in explaining these results. 
 
 







With an identical objective function in the final decisions for both models, 
concentration is on the feasibility region.  In Figure 5.5, the left circle represents feasible 
contract solution space (q and t continuous variables).  The right circle displays feasible 
strategic network solution space (binary variables).  The B area contains the feasible 
solutions to the overall problem.  The Simultaneous Model makes sure that the solution 
(if any) comes from this B area.  However, the Sequential Model solves the MTPA 
contract model to find a possible solution (if any) to be in either A or B areas.  If the 
solution is in A, infeasibility is immediately found in the strategic network model.  
However, if the solution is in B, a feasible solution is obtainable.  Moreover, the solution 
to the MTPA contract is not necessarily the same with the contract solution from the 
Simultaneous Model due to the differences in the objective function.  The MTPA contract 
(Sequential Model) model’s objective function does not incorporate transportation and 
fixed cost in solving for the solution.  As a result, the solution could be the best in terms 
of the contract offered but does not include information on transportation and fixed costs 
at all, which causes a discrepancy in solving for the solution in the strategic model.  
 The above explanations suggest that the Simultaneous Model will always 
dominate the Sequential Model.  Moreover, it is easier to implement.  Although the 
Simultaneous Model is MINLP, it is not much harder than solving NLP and IP models 
consecutively in the Sequential Model.  With superior solution quality, the Simultaneous 
Model is recommended over the Sequential Model for practitioners, supporting the 
hypothesis that co-designing collection network and contracts for materials yield a better 
net processor’s profit than designing each component individually and then combining 
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those decisions.  From this point on in the research, the Simultaneous Model is utilized 
for solving lump sum contract and network problems. 
 
 An additional model to solve the lump sum contract and network problem and 
implementing the concept of stochastic programming will be proposed and discussed in 
the following chapter.  This addresses the limitation in the model created by the 
representation of the acceptance of the contract by the collector.  In reality this would be 
a two-stage process in which the contracts are offered and then infrastructure put in place 
on the basis of which collectors are accepted. 
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CHAPTER 6  
STOCHASTIC PROGRAMMING LUMP SUM MODEL 
  
In this chapter a Stochastic Programming (SP) Model for determining lump sum 
contracts is presented.  In determining the lump sum contracts, the SP approach is quite 
different from the deterministic programming (DP) approach described in Chapter 5 in 
that it considers all possible outcome scenarios.  In the SP approach, there are solutions 
for each possible scenario (recourse).  The SP Model determines regions to operate, 
contracts for each region, hub locations for each region, and collected material allocations 
for each site. 
 The chapter begins with an overview of SP methodology in Section 6.1 followed 
by a problem description in Section 6.2.  The SP model is presented in Section 6.3 with a 
description of parameters, decision variables, assumptions, and the MINLP Model.  
Finally, a numerical study is performed in Section 6.4. 
 
6.1 Stochastic Programming Overview 
Stochastic programming (SP) is a class of optimization problems which considers 
uncertainty.  The major assumptions of SP require a finite number of stages and 
exogenous uncertainties.  SP is typically used when dealing with evolving data and 
making decisions without complete data.  In this situation, one may want to develop 
models whose plans are evaluated against different scenarios to represent alternative 
outcomes.   
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In this thesis the specific SP formulation considered is called a two-stage problem 
with recourse.  The recourse program has some decisions or recourse actions which can 
be taken after the uncertainty (or the random experiment) is resolved.  The set of 
decisions can be divided into two groups which are first-stage and second-stage 
decisions.  The former decisions are taken before the experiment in the first period.  On 
the other hand, the latter decisions are taken after the experiment in the second stage. 
In presenting a generic SP Model, the notation of Birge and Louveaux (1997) is 
followed.  Let ω  represent the random event.  The first stage decisions are represented 
by vector x, while second-stage decisions are represented by vector y or ( )y ω  or ( , )y xω .  
The random vector, ( )ξ ω  , is only known after the random experiment.  The generic SP 
Model can be written as: 
min    [min ( , ( ))]
. .    
           0




c x E Q x
s t Ax b
x
Q x q y Wy h T x y
ξ ξ ω




= = − ≥
 
 The objective function consists of a deterministic term ( Tc x ) and an expectation 
of the second-stage objectives ( ( )Tq yω ) taken over the entire random event set (ω ).  
The constraints include 1) first-stage only ( Ax b= ), 2) second-stage dependent on the 
first stage ( ( ) ( )Wy h T xω ω= − ), and 3) nonnegative constraints ( 0x ≥  and 0y ≥ ). 
 As mentioned in Chapter 2, SP Models are widely studied in a variety of 
applications.  A SP Model for the contract and strategic network problem is presented in 
the following section. 
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6.2 Model Description  
The contract and strategic network problem can be modeled as a two-stage 
problem.  In the first stage, the processor determines 1) regions to operate, 2) contracts 
for each region, and 3) collection hub(s) for each region.  Then s/he offers contracts to the 
individual collection sites.  The uncertainty is whether each collection site accepts or 
rejects the given contracts.  In the second stage, the processor determines the assignment 
of collections to hubs and the vehicle routing.  The SP stages and decisions are 
summarized in Figure 6.1. 
 
 
Figure 6.1:  Contract and Network Design Stochastic Programming Model 
 
The problem is depicted, step by step, in Figure 6.2.  In the first stage, the 
processor selects a subset of regions to offer a contract to ( 1jy = ) [see Figure 6.2 a)].  
Figure 6.2 b) displays the scenarios scheme.  Each collection site can accept or reject the 
Stage 1:  What contract to offer?
Contract ( q, t ) for each collector type (two types for each region).
Which regions to offer the contract?
for each region j.
Uncertainty:  Which collection sites (within regions) accept the contract?
combinations as scenarios.






Stage 2:  Where to locate and allocate the collection hubs?
for each collection hub k within region j of scenario s.








***  Strategic decisions:                                       ***( , ), ( , ),jj jjjq t q t y j∀
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contract, independently of other collection sites.  The combinations of acceptances and 
rejections constitute the scenarios.  The second stage decisions of a particular region are 
described in Figure 6.2 c).  For each scenario, the acceptance decisions of collection sites 
are known.  Hence, the processor makes decisions on hub(s) selection and collected 





Figure 6.2:  Depiction of Contract and Strategic Network Design SP Model- a) Stage 1 
decisions, b) Stage 2 scenarios, and c) Stage 2 decisions 
 
yj =1







Potential Collection Hub Site
Collection Sites
? Accept / Reject
Potential Collection Hub Site
Collection Sites








The optimization model, generally described in Figure 6.3, maximizes net profit 
which is comprised of the first stage revenue and costs and the second stage costs.  The 
relevant constraints can be broken into three groups.  The first group includes first stage 
constraints which do not involve second stage decisions.  The second group includes the 
constraints   linking the first stage decisions with the second stage decisions.  The last 
group contains only the constraints affecting the second stage decisions. 
 
 
Figure 6.3:  Stochastic Programming Model Description 
 
The second stage costs and constraints can further be decomposed into two parts, 
see Figure 6.4.  The first part includes decisions associated with collection sites and 
collection hubs.  The objective function costs associated with this part include 
transportation between collection sites and collection hubs and the hub site fixed costs. I 





- Expectation over scenario {transportation cost within region from collection
sites to hubs + transportation cost from hubs to processor + hub fixed cost}
Stage 1 revenue and costs
Processor’s valuation of collected quantity 
- Processor’s transfer payments - Regional fixed costMaximize
Contract constraints: Participation, Incentive, and Monotonicity
Target quantity constraint
Budget constraint
Linking constraints – region & within region
Within regional (sites & hubs) constraints
s.t.
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(TL) or less than truckload (LTL).   The decisions associated with the second part focus 
on transportation between collection hubs and processor.  For this chapter, I assume that 
the mode of transportation can be either truck (TL) or rail, depending on the region. 
 
  
Figure 6.4:  Decomposition of Stage 2 Costs and Constraints 
  
 Using the model description of the contract and strategic network design, the SP 
Model is next presented in the following section. 
 
6.3 Stochastic Programming Lump Sum Contract Model 
Before starting the model, it is necessary to describe the model indices and 
parameters.  The many indices and parameters previously implemented in Chapters 3 and 
5 are, for the most part, consistent with this notation.  
The indices are: 
j : index of the region, j = 1, 2, …, J 
ij : index of collectors in region j, ij = 1, 2, …, Ij 
kj : index of hubs in region j, kj = 1, 2, …, Kj 
l : index of unique ranking order of collector marginal costs, l = 1, 2, …, L 
s : index of scenario, s =1, 2, …, S 
Collection HubsCollection Sites
{0,1}kjz ∈







One can see that the quantity and transfer payment implements two indices, j and 
l.  The relation is;  
1 2( ) ( ) 1 2 1 2
 ( , ) { , | ( ) ( ) , }jj l lLet l l j l lα αθ θ θ θ α α= = = ≤ , / 2l L J= ≤ . 
 
The known parameters include: 
 truck jc  : LTL transportation cost coefficient of region j, $/mile.lb 
k
jc  : TL transportation cost coefficient from hub k to processor of region j, $/mile.tl 




: Distance from collection site i to hub k of region j, mile 
k
jd  : Distance from hub k to processor of region j, mile 
jF  : Fixed cost to operate in region j, $ 
k
jF  : Fixed cost to open hub k in region j, $ 
Q : Target total material quantity required by the processor, lb 
B : Material budget of the processor, $ 
( )sp s  : Probability associated with occurrence of scenario s 
jπ
 
: Probability of a collector in region j accepting the given contract 
jp
 
: Probability of a collector in region j being the efficient type 
jθ
 
: Marginal cost of efficient collector in region j, $/lb 
jθ  
: Marginal cost of inefficient collector in region j, $/lb 
lθ
 
: Marginal cost of rank order l, $/lb 
 
The decision variables include: 
jt
 
: Lump sum transfer payment to efficient collector in region j, $ 
jt
 
: Lump sum transfer payment to inefficient collector in region j, $ 
lt
 




: Quantity material collected from efficient collector in region j, lb 
jq
 




: Quantity material collected from the rank order l collector, lb 
jy
 
: Binary variable of region j 












: Binary variable of hub k 
,















: Quantity material shipped from site i to hub k in region j of scenario s, lb 
 
 There are two indexing systems for the SP Lump Sum Model.  While one has a 
regional index, the other has a ranking order index.  Figure 6.5 demonstrates the relation 
of the indices j and l. 
 
 
Figure 6.5:  Example Showing the Relation between j and l 
 
The value of ( )sp s is obtained directly from the product of the corresponding jπ
 
and jp .  This follows the independence assumption for collection sites stated in Chapter 
1.  As an example of a four-collection site problem, where Sites 1 and 2 belong to Region 
1 and Sites 3 and 4 belong to Region 2.  The probability of the scenario with Site 1 
rejecting a contract, Site 2 accepting a contract while being efficient, Site 3 accepting a 





: l jα →
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contract while being inefficient, and Site 4 rejecting a contract is 
1 1 1 1 2 2(1 )( )( (1 ))(1 )p pπ π π π− − − .  The probability of each scenario can be computed in a 
similar manner. 
Again repeating that the major assumptions still hold, there are two additional 
assumptions for the SP Model.  The first assumption is that the hub construction is 
instantaneous, i.e., time is not an issue.  The second assumption is that there is no cross-
regional transportation, i.e., the processor cannot utilize hubs and sites to collect from 
other regions. 
Having described the indices, parameters, decision variables, and assumptions, 
the SP Model can now be presented.  The SP Lump Sum Model is posed as follows: 
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The objective function (OBJ) maximizes the processor’s net profit.  The first 
term, the valuation of the collected quantity, is the processor’s revenue, the only positive 
cash flow component. Because the processor does not have complete information on the 
types of collectors within each region, he needs to employ an expectation concept.  The 
second term is the expected transfer payments to the regions that are offered contracts.  
The third term is the fixed cost of administering the selected regions.  The last term is the 
expected cost of the Stage 2 decisions over all scenarios and is comprised of three cost 
terms, namely 1) transportation between collection sites to hubs, 2) transportation 
between hubs and processor, and 3) administration of the selected hubs. 
As before, the transportation between hubs and processor can either be rail or 
truckload, depending on the infrastructure of that particular region.  From conversations 
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with trucking companies, rail typically costs more than truck for short distances of below 
150 miles. 
The first group of constraints imposes the processor’s requirement.  The quantity 
constraint (QC) requires that the total expected quantity of selected regions exceeds the 
target quantity.  The budget constraint (BC) enforces that the total expected lump sum 
transfer payment of the selected regions is within budget. 
 The second group of constraints functions as contract construction.  The 
participation constraint (PC) requires the least efficient collector of all regions to have 
nonnegative utility.  The incentive constraint set (IC) states an acceptable contract should 
have no worse utility than the contract for other types.  As stated in Chapter 3, only 
adjacent types need to be considered.  The monotonicity constraint set (MC) enforces that 
a more efficient collector must have no smaller quantity than the less efficient type. 
The third group of constraints considers collectors operational domains.  The 
lower bound quantity constraint (LQC) and upper bound quantity constraint (UQC) must 
satisfy all types of collectors. 
The fourth group links the first-stage and second-stage decisions.  The hub 
capacity constraint set (HC) requires each opened hub to operate within capacity.  The 
accepted efficient constraint (AEC) enforces efficient collectors to deliver the required 
amount of the efficient collector in that particular region.  Similarly, the accepted 
inefficient constraint (IEC) enforces similar requirements for inefficient collectors.  The 
logical constraint (LC) states that only the hubs in the selected regions can be opened.  
Moreover, the total number of hubs must be no more than what is available. 
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 The final group enforces correct decision variable types, which are non-negativity 
and binary. 
To study the performance of the SP Lump Sum Model, a numerical study using a 
few small examples is presented in the following section.  After presenting findings from 
these examples, insights will be presented. 
 
6.4 Numerical Study  
The parameters in this section do not represent actual data from any industry.  
This is because the goal was not to implement an industry case study, but to verify that 
the solution of the SP Lump Sum Model demonstrates reasonable computational 
behavior.  The examples have been solved using the GAMS software with the Baron 
Solver (www.gams.com).   
The inputs to the model probability of acceptance, probability of being efficient, 
lower and upper bounds of the operating domain, regional fixed cost, and hub fixed cost 
are all generated from prior knowledge of regional collection activity.  Locations of the 
processor, collectors, and hubs are generated from a uniform distribution.  Similarly, the 
collector and hub capacities are generated with the same distribution so that only the 
minimum and maximum of these parameters are required.  Please refer to Figure 6.5 for 




Figure 6.6: Data Generation Flowchart 
 
The numerical study begins with a one region problem and then continues with 
examples having two and three regions. 
6.4.1 Example 1 
In this first example, there are two regions, one contract (for two collector types), 
two collectors within each region, and two hubs within each region.  Region 1, consisting 
of Collectors 1 and 2, also contains Hubs 1 and 2.  Region 2 contains Collectors 3 and 4 





























The parameters for this example include; 
 Efficient marginal cost, θ :  0.05 $/lb, Inefficient marginal cost, θ : 0.075 $/lb 
 Efficient collector’s range: 200 – 10,000 lb, Inefficient collector’s range: 100 – 
5,000 lb 
 Valuation coefficient: 5, Target quantity: 10,000 lb, Budget: $2500 
 Truck transportation coefficient: 0.01 $/lb.mile, Rail transportation coefficient 
(for both Region 1 and 2): 0.006 $/lb.mile (12 $/freight.mile, freight = 2000 lb) 
 Probability of a collector being efficient for Regions 1 and 2: 0.4 and 0.6, 
respectively 
 Probability of collector accepting a contract for Regions 1 and 2: 0.8 and 0.6, 
respectively 
 Fixed cost for Regions 1 and 2: $10,000 and $25,000, respectively 
 Fixed cost for Hubs 1, 2, 3, and 4: $5,000, $5,000, $8,000, and $8,000, 
respectively 
 Distances between Collector 1 to Hubs 1 and 2 are 50 and 100 miles, respectively.  
Distances between Collector 2 to Hubs 1 and 2 are 120 and 30 miles, respectively.  
Distances between Collector 3 to Hubs 3 and 4 are 80 and 60 miles, respectively. 
Distances between Collector 4 to Hubs 3 and 4 are 90 and 20 miles, respectively.     
 Distances between Processor to Hubs 1, 2, 3, and 4: 360, 300, 100, 80 miles, 
respectively 
 Capacity for Hubs 1, 2, 3, and 4: 20,000, 20,000, 12,000, and 12,000 lb, 
respectively 
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 Probability of scenario: calculated from site independent assumptions.  For 
example (Site1, Site2, Site3, Site4); 
o Scenario 4: (reject, reject, reject, accept-efficient) 
probability (s = 4) = 1 1 2 2 2(1 )(1 )(1 )( )pπ π π π− − −  = 0.00576 
o Scenario 17: (reject, accept-efficient, accept-inefficient, accept-efficient)  
probability (s = 17) = 1 1 1 2 2 2 2(1 )( )( (1 ))( )p p pπ π π π− −  = 0.00553 
o Scenario 41: (accept-efficient, accept-efficient, accept-efficient, accept-
efficient)  probability (s = 41) = 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2( )( )( )( )p p p pπ π π π  = 0.013271 
o Scenario 69: (accept-inefficient, accept-efficient, accept-efficient, accept-
inefficient)  probability (s = 69) = 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2( (1 ))( )( )( (1 ))p p p pπ π π π− −  = 
0.013271 
 
The solutions to SP Lump Sum Model of Example 1 include: 
 Contract 
o Efficient type ($600, 10,000 lb) 
o Inefficient type ($302, 4,015 lb) 
o Offer contract to both regions (y1 = y2 = 1) 
 Net profit of  $108,911 
 Stage 2 Policies including hub and allocation decisions (81 scenarios), e.g., 
o Scenario 4:  Open Hub 4.  Collect all from collection Site 3 (10,000 lb). 
o Scenario 17:  Open Hubs 2, 3, and 4.  Site 2 allocates all to Hub 2 (10,000 lb).  
Site 3 sends 2,014.08 lb to Hub 3 and 20,000 lb to Hub 4.  Site 4 transports all 
to Hub 4 (10,000 lb). 
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o Scenario 41:  Open Hubs 2, 3, and 4.  Site 1 transports all to Hub 2 (10,000 
lb).  Site 2 sends to Hub 2 (10,000 lb).  Site 3 allocates 8,000 lb to Hub 3 and 
2,000 lb to Hub 4.  Site 4 ships to Hub 4 (10,000 lb). 
o Scenario 69:  Open Hubs 2, 3, and 4.  Site 1 ships to Hub 2 (4,014.08 lb).  Site 
2 sends to Hub 2 (10,000 lb).  Site 3 allocates 2,014.08 lb to Hub 3 and 
7,985.92 lb to Hub 4.  Site 4 transports to Hub 4 (4,014.08 lb) 
6.4.2 Example 2 
In this example, there are two regions, two contracts (four collector types), four 
collectors within each region, and three hubs within each region.  Region 1 consist of 
Collectors 1, 2, 3, and 4.  It also contains Hubs 1, 2, and 3.  Region 2 contains Collectors 
5, 6, 7, and 8 and Hubs 4, 5, and 6.  There is a total of 6561 scenarios. 
 
The parameters include: 
 Region 1: Efficient and inefficient marginal costs of  θ :  0.05 $/lb and θ : 0.075 
$/lb, respectively.  Efficient and inefficient collector’s range: 400 – 10,000 lb and 
100 – 5,000 lb, respectively 
 Region 2: Efficient and inefficient marginal costs of  θ :  0.07 $/lb and θ : 0.09 
$/lb, respectively.  Efficient and inefficient collector’s range: 300 – 9,000 lb and 
150 – 5,500 lb, respectively 
 Valuation coefficient: 7.5, Target quantity: 10,000 lb, Budget: $2500 
 Truck transportation coefficient: 0.004 $/lb.mile 
 Rail transportation coefficient: 0.0025 $/lb.mile (10 $/freight.mile, 4000 
lb/freight) 
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 Probability of a collector being efficient for Regions 1 and 2: 0.4 and 0.6, 
respectively 
 Probability of collector accepting a contract for Regions 1 and 2: 0.8 and 0.6, 
respectively 
 Fixed cost for Regions 1 and 2: $10,000 and $25,000, respectively 
 Fixed cost for Hubs 1, 2, and 3: $5,000 and for 4, 5, and 6: $8,000 
 Distances between collector-hub (miles) 
DCH 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 313 280 507 10000 10000 10000
2 399 167 610 10000 10000 10000
3 194 342 324 10000 10000 10000
4 601 389 792 10000 10000 10000
5 10000 10000 10000 100 83 627
6 10000 10000 10000 387 506 202
7 10000 10000 10000 395 243 946
8 10000 10000 10000 152 156 738  
 Distances of hub-processor (miles) 
DHP 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 759 504 992 10000 10000 10000
2 10000 10000 10000 824 987 825  
 Capacity for Hubs 1, 2, and 3: 50,000 lb and for 4, 5, and 6: 80,000 lb 
 
The solutions to SP Lump Sum Model of Example 2 include; 
 Contract 
o Region1:  Efficient type ( $693, 10,000 lb), Inefficient type ($377, 5,000 lb) 
o Region2:  Efficient type ( $608, 8,296 lb), Inefficient type ($14, 150 lb) 
o Offer contract to both regions (y1 = y2 = 1) 
 Net profit of  $74,621 
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In understanding the strategic decisions, the first-stage contract and region 
decisions are more important that the second-stage hub location and quantity allocation 
solutions.  With dependency to first-stage decisions and high number of scenarios, the 
second-stage solutions are not reported. 
6.4.3 Example 3 
In this example, there are three regions, two contracts within each region, and six 
total available hubs.  Region 1 consist of Collectors 1, 2, and 3 and Hubs 1, 2, and 3.  
Region 2 contains Collectors 4, 5, and 6 and Hubs 4 and 5.  Region 3 consists of 
Collectors 7 and 8 with Hub 6.  There is a total of 6561 scenarios. 
 
The parameters include; 
 Region 1: Efficient and inefficient marginal costs of  θ :  0.01 $/lb and θ : 0.05 
$/lb, respectively.  Efficient and inefficient collector’s range: 2,500 – 100,000 lb 
and 1,000 – 50,000 lb, respectively, 3 collection sites, and 3 hubs 
 Region 2: Efficient and inefficient marginal costs of  θ :  0.04 $/lb and θ : 0.10 
$/lb, respectively.  Efficient and inefficient collector’s range: 500 – 60,000 lb and 
500 – 20,000 lb, respectively, 2 collection sites, and 2 hubs 
 Region 3: Efficient and inefficient marginal costs of  θ :  0.03 $/lb and θ : 0.08 
$/lb, respectively.  Efficient and inefficient collector’s range: 1,000 – 85,000 lb 
and 1,000 – 40,000 lb, respectively, 3 collection sites, and 1 hub 
 Valuation coefficient: 10, Target quantity: 10,000 lb, Budget: $50,000 
 Truck transportation coefficient: 0.004 $/lb.mile 
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 Rail transportation coefficient: 0.0025 $/lb.mile (10 $/freight.mile, 4000 
lb/freight) 
 Probability of a collector being efficient for Regions 1, 2, and 3: 0.8, 0.5, and 0.6, 
respectively 
 Probability of collector accepting contract for Regions 1, 2, and 3: 0.8, 0.5, and 
0.6, respectively 
 Fixed cost for Regions 1, 2, and 3: $100,000, 300,000, and $200,000, respectively 
 Fixed cost for Hubs 1, 2, and 3: $25,000 and for 4, 5, and 6: $50,000 
 Distances between collector-hub (miles) 
DCH 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 313 280 507 10000 10000 10000
2 399 167 610 10000 10000 10000
3 194 342 324 10000 10000 10000
4 10000 10000 10000 100 83 10000
5 10000 10000 10000 387 506 10000
6 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 412
7 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 77
8 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 203  
 Distances of hub-processor (miles) 
DHP 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 759 504 992 10000 10000 10000
2 10000 10000 10000 824 987 10000
3 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 928  







The solutions (reporting only first-stage) to the SP Lump Sum Model include: 
 Contract 
o Region 1:  Efficient type ( $5367, 100000 lb) and Inefficient type ($4100, 
50000 lb) 
o Region 2:  Efficient type ( $4500, 60000 lb) and Inefficient type ($2000, 
20000 lb) 
o Region 3:  Efficient type ( $5200, 83333 lb) and Inefficient type ($3600, 
40000 lb) 
o Offer contract to all regions (y1 = y2 = y3 = 1) 
 Net profit of  $1,992,473 
 
The results of Examples 1, 2, and 3 raise the question of whether or not quantity 
contracts can trivially be set to their minimums or maximums.  In performing the 
analysis, one (or a few) parameters at a time are varied to see the resultant solution 
changes.  First considered is the two-region example, followed by an analysis of the 
three-region example. 
6.4.4 Analysis of Two-Region Example 
There are 6 hubs and 8 total collection sites for a total of 6561 scenarios.  The 
marginal costs are: 1 21 20.05,  0.07,  0.075,  and 0.09θ θ θ θ= = = = .  The baseline 
parameters are directly from Example 2.   
The differences in parameters between two consecutive runs are described below 
(starting with baseline values).  The solutions are reported in Table 6.1.  The subscript 
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represents the region, j.  Each constraint is investigated to see whether it is tight, T.  
Decision variables are highlighted if they are at boundary values. 
 Run 1:  Lower bounds for all quantities are 0 lb, upper bounds of the efficient 
types are 1,000,000 lb, upper bounds for the inefficient types are 800,000, target 
quantity is 10,000 lb, and budget is $2500 
 Run 2:  Target quantity is 10,000 lb and budget is $20,000 
 Run 3:  Target quantity is 50,000 lb and budget is $3,000 
 Run 4:  Upper bounds for efficient and inefficient types are 35,000 lb and 20,000 
lb, respectively, target quantity is 10,000 lb, and budget is $2500 
 Run 5:  Lower bounds for efficient and inefficient types are 1,000 lb and 500 lb, 
respectively, target quantity is 10,000 lb, and budget is $2500 
 Run 6:  Budget is $3000 
 Run 7:  Lower bounds for efficient and inefficient types are 1,000 lb and 1,000 lb 
respectively, upper bounds for efficient and inefficient types are 40,000 lb and 
20,000 lb respectively, and budget is $3000 
 Run 8:  Target quantity is 50,000 lb and budget is $2,500 
 Run 9:  Target quantity is 40,000 lb 
 Run 10:  Marginal costs of 1 21 20.05, 0.075, 0.10, 0.125θ θ θ θ= = = =  ($/lb) 
 Run 11:  Region 1 has efficient range of  1,000 – 35,000 lb and inefficient range 
of 500 – 20,000 lb, Region 2 has efficient range of 800 – 30,000 lb and inefficient 




Table 6.1:  Solutions to Analysis of Two-Region Example 
RUN teff1 qeff1 tineff1 qineff1 teff2 qeff2 tineff2 qineff2 y1 y2
1 1875 37500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
2 2813 37500 2813 37500 2813 37500 0 0 1 1
3 1928 37500 159 2113 159 2113 0 0 1 1
4 1773 35000 69 916 69 916 0 0 1 1
5 1762 34638 45 500 80 1000 45 500 1 1
6 1818 35000 188 2401 188 2401 45 500 1 1
7 2017 37500 396 5085 396 5085 90 1000 1 1
8 Infeasible
9 1649 32188 90 1000 90 1000 90 1000 1 1
10 1531 29125 125 1000 125 1000 125 1000 1 1
11 1773 35000 63 806 63 806 18 200 1 1  
RUN QC BC PC IC1 IC2 IC3 MC1 MC2 MC3
1 T T T T T T T
2 T T T T T T
3 T T T T T
4 T T T T T T
5 T T T T T T
6 T T T T T T
7 T T T T T T
8 T T T T
9 T T T T T T T
10 T T T T T T T
11 T T T T T T  
 
  
 It can be observed that the least efficient collector, which is the inefficient 
collector in Region 2, has a minimum quantity contract value for all runs (if feasible).  
Moreover, both participation and incentive constraints are tight for all runs (if feasible). 
 The three-region example was next studied to see whether the solution trend is 
consistent with that found for the two-region example. 
6.4.5 Analysis of Three-Region Example 
There are 6 hubs and 8 total collection sites with only 10 scenarios considered, by 
construction, to eliminate unnecessary computation time.  The baseline parameters are 
the same as Example 3.  The marginal costs are 1 2 30.01,  0.04,  0.03,θ θ θ= = =  
1 2 30.05,  0.10,  and 0.08θ θ θ= = =  $/lb.   
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The differences in parameters between two consecutive runs are described below 
(starting with baseline values).  The solutions are reported in Table 6.2 which follows the 
same notation as Table 6.1. 
 Run 1:  Region 1 has efficient range of 2,500 – 100,000 lb and inefficient range of 
1,000 – 50,000 lb, Region 2 has efficient range of 500 – 60,000 lb and inefficient 
range of 500 – 20,000 lb, Region 3 has efficient range of 1,000 – 85,000 lb and 
inefficient range of 1,000 – 40,000 lb, target quantity 100,000 lb, and budget 
$500,000 
 Run 2:  Lower bounds are 0 lb for all regions and types, Upper bounds are 
100,000 lb for all regions and types. 
 Run 3:  Target quantity is 400,000 lb and budget is $50,000. 
 Run 4:  Upper bounds are 500,000 lb for all regions and types. 
 Run 5:  Upper bounds are 1,000,000 lb for all regions and types. 
 Run 6:  Coefficient of valuation of 5 $/lb 
 Run 7:  Coefficient of valuation of 2 $/lb with 1 2 31, 1, 1y y y= = = . 
 Run 8:  Coefficient of valuation of 2 $/lb with 1 2 31, 1, 0y y y= = = . 
 Run 9:  Coefficient of valuation of 2 $/lb with 1 2 31, 0, 1y y y= = = . 







Table 6.2:  Solutions to Analysis of Three-Region Example 
RUN teff1 qeff1 tineff1 qineff1 teff2 qeff2 tineff2 qineff2 teff3 qeff3 tineff3 qineff3
1 5367 100000 4100 50000 4500 60000 2000 20000 5200 83333 3600 40000
2 3500 100000 0 0 3333 83333 0 0 3333 83333 0 0
3 8500 100000 8333 83333 8333 83333 8333 83333 8333 83333 8333 83333
4 12315 500000 8148 83333 8148 83333 7407 74074 8148 83333 8148 83333
5 15982 1000000 6815 83333 6815 83333 741 7407 6815 83333 6815 83333
6 15982 1000000 6815 83333 6815 83333 741 7407 6815 83333 6815 83333
7 10000 1000000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 10000 1000000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 10000 1000000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 Infeasible  
RUN y1 y2 y3 QC BC
1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1
3 1 1 1
4 1 1 1 T
5 1 1 1 T
6 1 1 1 T
7 1 1 1
8 1 1 0
9 1 0 1
10 0 1 1  
RUN PC IC1 IC2 IC3 IC4 IC5 MC1 MC2 MC3 MC4 MC5
1 T T T T T T
2 T T T T T T T T T
3 T T T T T T T T T T
4 T T T T T T T T T
5 T T T T T T T T T
6 T T T T T T T T T
7 T T T T T T T T T T
8 T T T T T T T T T T
9 T T T T T T T T T T
10 T T T T T T T T T  
 
 
Similar to the previous example, both participation and incentive constraints are 
tight for all runs (if feasible).  However, the most efficient collector, which is the efficient 
collector in Region 1, has maximum quantity contract value for all runs (if feasible). 
6.4.6 Insights 
The two examples in 6.4.4 and 6.4.5 provide counter-examples to the hypotheses 
that at the optimal solution (1) the quantity can be set to its upper bound or lower bound 
is not possible nor are (2) the boundary values are always achieved for the most efficient 
or least efficient collector. 
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Due to the complexity of the SP Lump Sum Model, a closed form analysis could 
not be developed.  The aim of the observations from many examples is to reveal patterns 
of behavior in the solutions. 
Since participation and incentive constraints are always tight in the examples (if 
feasible), tightness of these constraints is therefore assumed so that linking constraints 
between Stage 1 and Stage 2 are omitted.  By setting t qθ=  and ( )t t q qθ= + −  for the 
one region problem, it can be shown that the SP Lump Sum Model is simplified to only 
target quantity (QC), budget (BC), and domain constraints.  Considering all possible 
combinations of tightness, the models can be reduced to very small ones.   However 
when 4 4 4t qθ= , 3 3 3 4 4 4( )t q q qθ θ= − + , 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4( ) ( )t q q q q qθ θ θ= − + − + , and 
1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4( ) ( ) ( )t q q q q q q qθ θ θ θ= − + − + − +  for a two region model, the model 
becomes degenerate.  As a result, whether one quantity and lump sum transfer can be set 
to maximum or minimum values without considering interactions with other quantity and 
lump sum transfer terms can not be predicted.  Moreover, this degeneracy can be 
extended to problems with more than two regions.   
Even with tightness of participation and incentive constraints, it is impossible to 
declare which contract quantities have minimum or maximum values.  Moreover, the 
above analysis omits Stage 1 and Stage 2 linking constraints.  Because a more general 
model cannot be less complex than a more specific one, extending this finding to a 
general SP Lump Sum Model cannot trivially predict the contract quantities. 
 
The SP Lump Sum Model offers an additional approach for designing a contract 
and collection network.  With uncertainty in each collector’s decision to accept the 
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contract, SP offers complete decisions for all possible scenarios.  As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, the solution to SP is almost never optimal after the fact, but it often is good for 
all scenarios.  However, one major drawback to SP is the high computational 
requirement.  With large numbers of scenarios in typical applications, SP requires the 
computation for each scenario, which is the opposite of the Simultaneous Lump Sum 
Model in Chapter 5.  One can resolve this high computational effort with Sample 
Average Approximation, Kleywegt et al. (2001), Shapiro (1996), Shapiro and Homem-
de-Mello (1998), and Wei and Realff (2004), for larger problems.  This is a possible 
extension to this research. 
In the next chapter, a variable volume type which offers a different transfer 
payment for different volumes collected, which is truly a very different type of contract 





CHAPTER 7  
CONTRACT/NETWORK VARIABLE VOLUME MODELS 
 
Contract and network variable volume models are addressed in this chapter.  The 
chapter begins with the problem description in Section 7.1, followed by the model 
description in Section 7.2.  The variable volume models consist of two stages:  the first 
stage, which determines the Nash Equilibrium contract values, is discussed in Section 
7.3, while the second stage, which provides network decisions, is presented in Section 
7.4.  A case study of Nylon-6 carpet recycling in the southeastern region of the United 
States is discussed in Section 7.5.  Finally, a summary and extensions are presented in 
Section 7.6. 
 
7.1 Problem Description 
A typical purchasing quotation in supply management offers varying prices for 
different order quantities.  With larger orders, the supplier can benefit from economies of 
scale, and hence a lower price per unit.  As similar practice is considered in this section 
for reverse flows, varying price and quantity contracts (variable volume contracts) in RPS 
have not been explored in literature.  The research goal is to gain insights from analyzing 
simple contract structures. 
Unlike the lump sum contract, with a single monetary and quantity point decision, 
in variable volume cases, a processor proposes a contract structure to the collectors.  Each 
collector decides on the collected quantity from a set of feasible quantities from the 
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processor’s proposed structure.  A methodology to assist the processor design and 
evaluate contract options is proposed.  These contracts must give incentives to collectors, 
satisfy the processor’s requirements, and ensure the viability of the RPS network. 
 
 
Figure 7.1:  Research Tree – Variable Volume Contract 
 
According to the research tree displayed in Figure 7.1, this is the final contract 
type addressed by my research.  The objectives are to 1) analyze each proposed contract 
structure, 2) understand the needed information to make necessary decisions for each 
contract structure, and 3) provide insights.  Although three simple contract structures are 
proposed, the basic procedures can be extended to more complicated ones. 
 
7.2 Model Description 
The Variable Volume Model assists the processor in designing the contract and 
collection network.  This approach, in which the processor gives each collector a 
different dollar amount depending on the delivered quantity, utilizes a two-stage 
Contract & Network Problem Network Problem
Lump Sum Contract Variable Volume Contract
Non-regional Model Regional Model
Decoupled Model Iterated Model
Constant Probability of Acceptance Stochastic Programming Model
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methodology.    The first stage implements the Stackelberg game, Stackelberg (1934), 
whereas the second stage solves a mathematical model incorporating results from Stage-1 
as parameters.  Two different models, the Single Collector Type and the Multiple 
Collector Type, are analyzed.  Initially, the Single Collector Type Model with a single 
global collector type and penalty for deviating from Nash Equilibrium (NE) quantities is 
considered.  Subsequently, the Multiple Collector Type Model, which generalizes to 
many collector types, is studied.   The key difference between these two models is the 
enforcement of the NE collection quantity, as discussed in Section 7.4. 
The Stage-1 game is categorized as a complete information game because both 
the processor and collector know each other’s payoffs.  The known information is 
consistent with the previous chapters in that the processor has a rough knowledge of the 
collector’s costs (fixed and marginal) and revenue.  On the other hand, the collector is 
aware of the processor cost.  With only two players, there are only two moves, namely, 
one by the processor to specify how much money per pound of used product will be paid, 
and the second move by the collector to specify the amount of product delivered at that 
price.  As a result, it is also a perfect game.  Zermelo (1913) and Kuhn (1953) show that a 
finite game of perfect information has a pure-strategy NE.  The backwards induction 
outcome does not involve non-credible threats.  The only sub-game perfect NE is the one 
associated with the backwards induction outcome.  It has NE for every subgame and 
history.  Therefore, the backwards induction is executed in Stage-1. 
Because the NE defines the quantity for the collector to provide, the processor 
must be penalized if he deviates from this quantity.  The objective of Stage-2 is to 
establish a collection network by selecting collectors with specific contracts, a penalty (if 
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there is deviation) from NE, fixed administrative, and transportation costs in the 
processor’s net profit maximization. 
 The original assumptions of one product, one processor and many collectors are 
still used.  Additional assumptions are: 
Assumptions 
 Shipments from collectors directly to the processor (omitting hub cost and 
allocation) 
 Known processor valuation (constant positive slope, i.e. kv $/lb) 
 All-unit contract 
 Single-period setting 
With the central focus of analyzing the contract types between processor and 
collectors, hub cost and allocation are omitted.  However, the model can be extended to 
include this assumption, without loss of generality.  The linear processor valuation 
simplifies the model with each additional collected quantity giving the same marginal 
revenue.  An all-unit contract, in which the collector’s total quantity determines the 
contract type and payment from the processor, is considered.  This approach contrasts 
with the incremental-unit contract which is occasionally implemented in discount 
production planning models.  Finally, a single-period setting with the previous existence 
of the product is assumed as is commonly the case in remanufacturing literature. 
The index, parameters, and decision variables are defined as: 
Index 
s : Contract structure, s = 1, 2, 3 
j : Collector type, j = 1, …, m 
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ij : Collector i of type j, ij =1,…,n  and j
j
n I=∑  
 
For the Single Collector Type Model, m takes the value of one.  Additionally, the 
index j (if applicable) is omitted in all parameters. 
Parameters 
Q : Processor’s target quantity, lb 
B : Budget of the processor, $ 
kv : Processor’s material valuation, $/lb 
ct : Transportation coefficient, $/lb-mile 
,i jF  : Fixed cost of collector i of type j to the processor, $ 
,i jd  : Distance between collector i of type j and the processor, mile 
jθ  : Collector’s marginal cost of type j, $/lb 
jβ  : Collector’s fixed cost of type j, $ 
aj : Collection cost function coefficient for type j, $/lb2 
bj : Collection cost function coefficient for type j, $/lb 
cj : Collection cost function constant for type j, $ 
Ij : Total number of collectors of type j 
   
Decision Variables 
,s jp  : Contract revenue coefficient for structure s and type j, $/lb, $/lb
2, or $/lb0.5 
,s jq  : Contract quantity for structure s and type j, lb 
,s jz  : Structure-Type binary variable 
,
1 if structure  is chosen for collector type 
0 otherwises j
s j




, ,s i jy  : Contract offering binary variable 
, ,
1 if contract structure  is offered to collector  of type 
0 otherwises i j
s i j




NE value is denoted with the * operator. 
Stage-1, which employs the Stackelberg Economic Model, is to analyze 
alternative contract structures and solve for both the NE quantity and the NE contract 
revenue coefficient.  Subsequently in Stage-2, an integer programming (IP) or mixed 
integer nonlinear programming problem (MINLP) to determine network decisions and 
actual quantities provided is solved. 
The Single Collector Type and Multiple Collector Type Models employ identical 
Stage-1 calculations.  A methodology for solving general NE quantity and contract 
revenue coefficient is presented.  Specifically, there are three alternative structures under 
consideration: the contract with linear, square, and square root contract revenue 
structures.  There are additional constraints that are standard for the Stackelberg 
Economic Model.  The Stage-1 Model is presented in the following section.   
 
7.3 Variable Volume Contract Model: Stage-1 
Stage-1 aims to find the NE for the collector’s quantity and the processor’s price.  
The Stackelberg Model can be summarized in Figure 7.2.  It is a pair-wise game between 
the processor and the collector who is a representative collector for the interested group, 
i.e., all collectors in the group have the same cost function and operate in the same 
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manner.    First, the processor offers the contract type to the collector.  Then the collector 
responds with the collected quantity. 
Backward induction is used to find the NE.  As mentioned, the backward 
induction eliminates all the non-credible threats.  Let ( , )g q p  be the contract function, * 
be NE value, n be total number of collectors, b be capacity buffer, and Q be the 




Figure 7.2:  Step 1 of the Variable Volume Contract Model 
 
Procedure 7.1: Stage-1 Backward Induction 
1. The collector determines the best response, in terms of quantity q, to 
processor’s action  by solving: 
Maxq cπ : Collector’s Net Profit = Revenue – Cost = ( , )g q p  - Cost 
s.t. 0cπ ≥  





Offer Contract Select Quantity
p $/lb q lb
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2. Substituting the collector’s best response into the processor’s problem, the  
processor determines his best action, in terms of revenue coefficient p, by 
solving: 
Maxp pπ : Processor’s Net Profit = . *kv q  - ( *, )g q p  
s.t. * (1 )nq b Q≥ +  
 0pπ ≥  
 0p ≥  
  
The Stage-1 Model finds NE contract values, p* and q*, for different contract 
structures.  In some cases, there are multiple NE solutions.  The processor has the first-
mover advantage to select the NE solution that produces the highest processor’s net 
profit.  Possible contract structures are analyzed with the use of the collector’s revenue 
curve.  The revenue curve represents what the processor pays to the collector, which is 
equivalent to how much the collector receives.  The vertical axis has units of dollars and 
the horizontal axis has units of pounds.  For example, the lump sum contract has two 
points representing contracts for efficient and inefficient collectors. 
A key requirement for the revenue curve is revenue increases as collected quantity 
increases.  Figure 7.3 gives examples of infeasible revenue curves.  Figure 7.3a) is 
infeasible because it has negative slope.  As the collector obtains higher quantity, he 
earns less revenue.  Similarly, the collector does not gain any additional revenue by 
















Figure 7.3:  Examples of Infeasible Revenue Curves 
 
In considering contract structures, three structures are studied.  Figure 7.4 displays 
these contract structures with their revenue terms.  Structure 1 employs a constant 
specified $/lb revenue.  Structure 2 has an increasing $/lb revenue as quantity increases.  
Lastly, Structure 3 has a decreasing $/lb revenue as quantity increases.  These three 
structures are selected because they are intuitive and represent three broad categories of 
contracts.  These broad categories are linear (both convex and concave), convex, and 
concave structures.  By exploring these structures, the processor has the ability to select 
different types of contract with knowledge of valuation and cost coefficients.  The linear 
contract, Figure 7.4a), is the default contract structure because it is intuitive and simple to 
the processor.  Hence, if there is no special reason for considering a concave or convex 















Revenue , where : $/lbpq p=  






2 2Revenue , where : $/lbpq p=  






1/2Revenue , where : $/lbp q p=  
c) Concave Contract Structure 
Figure 7.4:  Studied Collector’s Revenue Structures 
 
The other term in the collector’s net profit maximization model is the collection 
cost.  A representative collector from a particular group has a total cost representation of 
TC qθ β= + .  The original assumption that the processor knows the collector’s marginal 
cost, θ , still holds.  Additionally, it is assumed that the collector’s fixed cost, β , is also 
roughly known.  This linear total cost requires relatively little information.  The processor 








collection network.  If not, he should be able to rank a particular collector to already 
known collectors to construct this fixed cost.  If there is no way to approximate this 
information, this collector should not be considered due to high uncertainty and risk. 
 For the linear revenue contract structure, the collector’s revenue and processor’s 
cost functions are pq with the collector’s cost of qθ β+ .  Performing Procedure 7.1 for 




β θ= +  with the condition that *kv p θ≥ ≥ . 
 For a square revenue contract structure, the collector’s revenue and processor’s 
cost have the function of 2pq and the collector’s cost term equals qθ β+ .  Performing 
Procedure 7.1, all possible cases produce no NE solutions.  The processor wants to offer a 
revenue coefficient of zero, which forces the collector to defect.  The intuitive 
explanation is that as the revenue term grows rapidly, the collector wants to collect a very 
high quantity.  However, at this high quantity level, the processor incurs an extremely 
high contract cost with only linear valuation.  Therefore, the processor and collector have 
a conflict of interest. 
 Finally for the square root revenue contract structure, the collector’s revenue and 
processor’s cost have the function of p q and the collector’s cost term equals qθ β+ .  
Performing Procedure 7.1 to the collector and processor problems, the NE solutions are: 
1) *q β
θ




After obtaining the NE solution by setting the first order condition to zero, one 
needs to check whether the solution produces a maximum.  The violations of constraints 
can provide helpful suggestions to the processor.  When * (1 )nq b Q< + , the processor 
needs to expand the collector list or adjust Q.  Both qmin and qmax are related to technology 
advancement.  When the NE quantity falls below qmin, the processor needs to encourage 
collectors to reduce the set up cost or explore new technology.  On the other hand, when 
the NE quantity exceeds qmax, the processor should encourage collectors to expand or 
explore new technology. 
To understand the impact of changes in and θ β , sensitivity analysis is 
performed.  As a subject in an analysis, a collector with marginal cost of $0.08/lb, fixed 
cost of $500,000, qmin of 1M lb, and qmax of 10M lb is chosen.  What if  and θ β  are 
inaccurate by 10%± and 20%± ?  How will the p*, q*, and contract revenue vary for 
linear and concave contracts?  Figure 7.5 displays sensitivity plots.  I only consider 
 and θ β  values within their feasible regions. 
For the linear contract, q* is independent to changes in and θ β .  As θ  varies, p* 
moves in the same direction by the same magnitude (slope of one).  Although β  
influences p* in the same manner, it is less sensitive.  With high qmax value, * /p β∂ ∂  has 
a small impact.  Finally, the contract revenue behaves in a relatively linear manner with 
changes in  and θ β , as depicted in Figure 7.5e).  As long as kv θ≥ , having an accurate 
marginal cost is much more crucial than a fixed cost.  Because the q* is driven to qmax, 
the collector is not concerned about p*; therefore the processor only needs to have p* less 
than kv.  For the linear contract, getting θ  close to the real marginal cost for each 
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Figure 7.5:  Sensitivity Plots for and θ β  
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For the concave (square root) contract, both *  and *q p  depend on  and θ β .  The 
NE quantity has inverse relationship with marginal cost, but has positive linear 
relationship with fixed cost.  Although the changes in and θ β  affect *q  roughly equally 
when the percentage is relatively low, β  has significantly stronger impact at high 
percentage changes.  With a square root function, little changes in  or θ β  have smaller 
impact to the *p  than of the linear contract.  Moreover, changes in  or θ β  have the 
exact same impact to the NE revenue coefficient.  Considering both changes in  and θ β , 
the sensitivity to the contract revenue can be seen in Figure 7.5f).  One can see that 
changes in marginal cost do not affect the contract revenue.  Unlike the linear contract 
where θ  influences more changes, having β  close to their true values is important in the 
concave contract. 
Although the linear collector total cost is recommended and implemented in 
Section 7.5, a u-shaped marginal cost is also considered in order to show that different 
collector total costs greatly influence the NE solutions.  The u-shaped marginal cost can 
be algebraically represented by a parabolic curve of 2( ) , when  0C q aq bq c q= + + ≥ .  
Figure 7.6 shows a typical collector’s marginal cost curve.  The requirements for the cost 
function are 1) c is a positive value, i.e. the fixed set up cost is non-negative, 2) a is 
positive, i.e. a convex cost curve is required, and 3) b is non-positive to require that the 
minimum cost quantity is positive or to the right of the y-axis, i.e. 0b
a




Figure 7.6:  Collector’s Marginal Cost Function for the Variable Volume Contract 
  
 From this u-shaped marginal cost curve, the total cost can be derived by 
integration.  The total cost can be written as 3 2( )TC q aq bq cq= + + .  There are four 
solution pairs for the linear and square contract structures.  However, there are no closed 
form solutions for the square root contract, hence it is necessary to solve for the NE 
solutions numerically.  Because solutions to the polynomial cost function are very 
lengthy and are not used for later analyses, they are presented in Appendix B.  By having 
a more complicated total cost function, the processor could find more accurate solutions 
but with the tradeoff of additional complication.  With a higher order of total cost 
function, there are likely to be multiple solutions, so that a tie-breaking rule must be used.  
However with approximated cost parameters, a more complicated total cost function may 
not give any advantages.  Therefore, the linear total cost function is preferred and is used 
in the case study in Section 7.5. 
 
In Stage-1, the NEs quantity and revenue coefficient for each of the three 
structures are obtained.  When the processor offers a contract specifying the revenue 






with complete and perfect information is modeled with the Stackelberg game.  As a result 
of the backward induction, the NE solutions of q* and p* are selected.  Neither the 
processor nor the collector will want to deviate from these values.  Having all the needed 
parameters, Stage-2 models are next discussed in the following section. 
 
7.4 Variable Volume Strategic Network Model: Stage-2 
The objective of Stage-2 is to construct the collection network.  By incorporating 
decisions from Stage-1, mathematical programming models are developed to select 
collectors to join the processor’s collection network.  Figure 7.7 displays the Stage-2 
problem.  In addition to the contract payment, the processor needs to pay for fixed 
administrative and transportation costs for each chosen collector.  The processor has to 
decide which collectors to offer the contract in maximizing his net profit.  Again, the key 
assumption is that there is a representative collector.  All collectors in the same group 
have the same cost function.  From the Stage-2 model, the processor can maximize his 
net profit and analyze his cost components. 
Two Stage-2 network models are studied.  The initial model is the Single 
Collector Type Model which considers a single global collection type.  Additionally, the 
concept of penalizing the processor for not implementing NE quantities is utilized.  
Following the study of the Single Collector Type Model, the Multiple Collector Type 
Model is analyzed and becomes the final and proposed Stage-2 model because it extends 
to many collector types.  The concept of fixing the NE quantities is applied here.  
Although the Single Collector Type Model is superceded in generality by the Multiple 
Collector Type Model, it is presented in the following section for completeness. 
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Figure 7.7:  Stage-2 Problem Description 
 
7.4.1 Single Collector Type Model 
In this model, the NE revenue coefficient, p*, is fixed going into the Stage-2 
model.  Since the processor is the leader (more powerful), it is assumed that he can fix 
this p* value.  However, he is allowed to deviate from the NE quantity in this model.  
With additional network constraints, the processor may obtain higher net profit by 
moving away from q*.   
In running and analyzing the model, I found that there are numerous examples 
where the processor chooses to deviate from q*, which directly reduces the collector’s net 
profit.  To adjust for this deviation, a lump sum penalty payment from the NE quantity for 
each collector is attached.  This correction is very important to encourage collectors to 
join the network.  Two proposed lump sum penalty forms are: 
 linear in deviation, *| |i ilp q q− , where lp is constant $/lb 
 quadratic in deviation, * 2( )i ilp q q− , where lp is constant $/lb





















The difference between these two forms is the marginal penalty.  The quadratic 
penalty function penalizes marginally less for a small deviation and marginally higher 
when the processor deviates greatly from the NE quantity.  On the other hand, the linear 
penalty function penalizes equally per unit deviated.  For the Single Collector Type 
Model, the quadratic lump sum penalty is chosen to deter the processor from significantly 
deviating from q*.  Examples of quadratic penalty function include Baker and Scudder 
(1990) and Schaller (2004).  For this Single Collector Type Model, individual Stage-1 
and Stage-2 calculations are performed for each contract structures.  In the case of 
contract structures, there are three different Step-2 calculations.  Figure 7.8 displays the 
Single Collector Type Model. 
 
 
Figure 7.8:  Single Collector Type Model (Stage-2) 
 
 Letting i be the collector index, additional notations include: 
lp  : Lump sum penalty coefficient, $/lb2 or $/lb 
Δ  : Profit to be shared among collectors, $ 
if  : Fraction of the profit to be shared to collector i 
Step 1
Compute: p* & q*
Step 2
Compute: , ,   i i iy q f i∀
Step 1
Compute: p* & q*
Step 2
Compute: , ,   i i iy q f i∀
Step 1
Compute: p* & q*
Step 2
Compute: , ,   i i iy q f i∀
Contract: Linear Structure
Single Collector Type Single Collector Type Single Collector Type
Contract: Convex Structure Contract: Concave Structure
 127
SE : Shared excess profit fraction to collectors, 0 1SE≤ ≤  
m  : Number of collectors at NE quantity needed to obtain total quantity Q, / *Q q  
Dm  : / *Q q⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
Um  : / *Q q⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥  = Dm +1 
Qπ  : Net Profit when processor obtains total quantity Q, $ 
Dπ  : Net Profit when processor obtains quantity of *Dm q , $ 
Uπ  : Net Profit when processor obtains quantity of *Um q , $ 
 
The profit to be shared among collectors, Δ , is an excess profit from the 
processor deviating from the NE quantity to obtain the target quantity, Q.  Because there 
is only a single collector deviating from q*, the Dπ  and Uπ  are crucial in determining Δ .  
Once the excess profit is determined, its fractions are to be shared among collectors.  The 
processor can decide on the maximum total fraction to be shared by setting his SE 
parameter. 
To obtain Dπ  and Uπ , one needs to solve the unconstrained objective function of 
maximizing  * ( )i i i i i i
i i i i
kv q p g q ct d q F y− − −∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  for the NE quantity for each 
collector, where ( )i ig q q= ,  
2( ) ( )i ig q q= , and  ( )i ig q q=  for structure i = 1, 2, and 3 
respectively.  By choosing Dm , collectors with the best combinations of Fi and di, Dπ  can 
be obtained.  Similarly, by choosing Um  collectors with the best combinations of Fi and 
di, Uπ  can be found.  Finally, the profit to be shared among collectors, due to deviation 
from NEs, can be from . . 0min { , }s t Q D Q Uπ π π π≥Δ = − − .  To achieve the target quantity, Q, 
one collector must collect either more than q* or less than q*.  Since the processor gets 
penalized for this deviation from q*, the processor must choose the minimum between 
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the positive value(s) of Q Dπ π−  and Q Uπ π−  to be the excess profit sharing among 
collectors.  To calculate Qπ , one solves: 
*: * min ( )Q i i i i i i
i i i
kv Q p g q ct d q F yπ − + +∑ ∑ ∑  
                     s.t.  i
i
q Q=∑  
                                        i iq Qy i≤ ∀  
 
 
 With indices, parameters, and decision variable defined, the Single Collector 
Type Model can be written as follows: 
Single Collector Type Model 
Max * ( )i i i i i i i i
i i i i i




q Q=∑  (QC) 
 * ( )i i
i i
p g q f B+ Δ ≤∑ ∑  (BC) 
 *[ ( ) ( )] 0                           i i i ip f q f c q y i+ Δ − ≥ ∀  (PC) 




f SE≤∑  (TLPC) 
 min,                                                          i i iq y q i≤ ∀  (LBC) 
 max,                                                          i i iq q y i≤ ∀  (UBC) 
 0, 0 , {0,1}   i i iq f y i≥ ≥ ∈ ∀   
 
  
The OBJ includes the additional cost of a penalty cost.  As the fraction of excess 
profit for each collector is found, the summation is a cost term for the processor.  The QC 
and BC are the original target quantity and budget constraints, whereas the PC constraint 
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enforces participation.  Each collector needs to have a nonnegative net profit.  The LPC 
constraint is the lump sum penalty constraint for each collector with the quadratic 
function.  TLPC enforces the total penalty fraction to be less than SE, which is the 
processor’s parameter of value between zero and one.  Finally, the LBC and UBC define 
the minimum and maximum quantities.   
This model assists the processor in deciding 1) who to offer the contract to, 2) the 
amount of collected quantity for each collector, and 3) the fraction of profit to be shared 
by each collector.  
The key drawback of this model is that the NE values are not enforced.  Although 
a penalty is implemented to give an incentive to collectors, the issue of fairness is still in 
doubt.  Moreover, this is a MINLP model with a non-intuitive lump sum penalty 
coefficient.  Although the Single Collector Type Model is not the proposed model, it is an 
initial and alternative approach.  The Multiple Collector Type Model extends to many 
collector types with enforcement of NE quantities and is presented in the following 
section. 
7.4.2 Multiple Collector Type Model 
In this model, both the NE quantity and NE revenue coefficient are fixed into the 
Stage-2 model.  The major extension from the previous model is the multiple collector 
types.  Because population, local recycling laws, and urban density are key factors in 
strategic collection design, they are embedded in the collector type, j.  This model can be 
summarized in Figure 7.9. 
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Figure 7.9:  Multiple Collector Type Model (Stage-2) 
 
Two major decisions are determined which are 1) which contract structure to offer 
each collector type and 2) given the determined structure, which collector to offer the 
contract.  As shown in Figure 7.9, the star represents the selected contract structure for 
each collector type.  The model is an integer programming (IP) mathematical model, 
which is easily solved by any commercial optimization software.  With *,s jp  and 
*
,s jq  
from the Stage-1 model as input parameters, the model can be written as: 
Multiple Collector Type Model 
Max * * *
, , , , , , , , , ,
*





s j s i j s j s s j s i j i j s i j
j i s s j i j i s
s j s i j i j s i j
j i s j i s
kv q y p g q y ct d y
lp q y Q F y
− −
− − −







s j s i j
j i s
q y Q≥∑∑∑  (QC) 
 * * *
, , , , , , ,( ) .( )
j j
s j s s j s i j s j s i j
s j i j i s
p g q y lp q y Q B+ − ≤∑∑ ∑ ∑∑∑  (BC) 
 
, 1                                 s j
s
z j= ∀∑  (SC) 
 
, , ,                         ,
j
s i j j s j
i
y I z s j≤ ∀∑  (LC) 















 The OBJ function includes the processor’s valuation, contract payments, 
transportation, penalty for exceeding target quantity, and fixed administrative costs to the 
collectors.  The QC and BC are the original target quantity and budget constraints.  The 
SC is the structural constraint set that forces each collector type to select the best contract 
structure.  Finally, LC is the logical constraint.  If the contract structure is not the best for 
the collector type, then LC prevents that type of contract from being offered.  If it is the 
best contract structure, the maximum number of collectors selected is Ij.  The Multiple 
Collector Type Model is utilized in the case study which is discussed in the following 
section. 
  
7.5 Carpet Case Study 
This case study aims to test the Variable Volume Model in an industrial scale 
environment with representative cost structure.  Nylon-6 carpet recycling in the southeast 
of the United States is considered.  The states of interest include Alabama, Florida, 
Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee.  As mentioned in Assavapokee 
et al. (2007), the key issue in carpet recycling is the recovery and classification of the 
carpet from consumers.  This is normally facilitated by installers who return carpets to 
the retail store after they have been removed from buildings directly to a recycling 
facility, avoiding an expensive curb-side recycling system. 
 The known information of the collectors remains identical to the previous 
chapters.  The processor only has knowledge of the marginal cost, θ  $/lb, and the fixed 
cost, β  $, of each collector.  The total cost function of collector i, iTC , can be 
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mathematically written as i i iTC qθ β= +  where q is the collected quantity.  Two grouping 
designs are implemented to understand the effect of grouping.  Only the annual carpet 
volume is considered in the first grouping design.  On the other hand, the state in 
consideration and its annual volume categorize the second grouping design. 
 All data, which are representative of an industry instance, are from Assavapokee 
et al. (2007) and Ashman (2007).  The latter has significant carpet recycling experience in 
the northeast region of the United States.  The data are presented in Section 7.5.1.  The 
two grouping methods are explained in Section 7.5.2.  The application of the two-stage 
Variable Volume Model to the case study follows in Section 7.5.3.  Finally, the results 
are presented in 7.5.4 with conclusions. 
7.5.1 Data 
The large recycling processing site being considered for opening is in Atlanta, 
Georgia.   The processor wants to establish a collection network for the southeast region 
of the United States.  The first set of data contains the collectors’ volumes and locations.  
Although referred to as the collection site, it is an aggregation of point sources in a given 
region.  Hence a collection site in Tampa, Florida consists of many smaller point sources 
within that region.  Due to the confidentiality of the data, the annual volume for each 
collection site is not displayed.  Instead, only the minimum and maximum annual 
volumes are presented without explanation.  The 100 sites with the highest annual 
volumes are selected for the case study as seen in Table 7.1.  These sites are ranked by 
volume in descending order with the distances from the processing site displayed. 
The processing facility needs to obtain approximately 80 million lb of Nylon-6 
carpet annually with a material budget of $5.6M.  This budget results from the 
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processor’s target price of $0.07/lb.  Each pound of (mechanically) processed Nylon-6 
carpet (resin pallet form) is valued at $0.28/lb by the processor. With an assumption of 
$0.10/lb processing cost, the collected Nylon-6 carpet has valuation of $0.18/lb.  The 
coefficient of penalty for exceeding the target quantity is $0.20/lb.  The transportation 
mode considered is trucking with a variable cost of $3/load-mile.  The truck capacity 
baled is 44,000 lb/load.  Hence, the coefficient of transportation cost has a value of 
$0.0000682/lb-mile ($0.1364/ton-mile). 
  
Table 7.1:  Collection Sites Information 
Site CityName
Distance 
(miles) Qmin Qmax Site CityName
Distance 
(miles) Qmin Qmax
1 TAMPA, FL 416 10600490 35334967 26 BIRMINGHAM, AL 138 1793548 5978494
2 ORLANDO, FL 405 9645417 32151389 27 MARIETTA, GA 15 1583646 5278820
3 MIAMI, FL 605 7424016 24746720 28 COLUMBIA, SC 204 1548913 5163044
4 POMPANO BEACH, FL 579 6780090 22600301 29 PENSACOLA, FL 280 1417765 4725884
5 JACKSONVILLE, FL 287 6317454 21058181 30 DEERFIELD BEACH, FL 574 1365326 4551088
6 CHARLOTTE, NC 227 5668796 18895987 31 EATONTON, GA 67 1351948 4506492
7 FORT LAUDERDALE, FL 584 4585926 15286419 32 WEST PALM BEACH, FL 547 1332169 4440563
8 ATLANTA, GA 10 4471494 14904981 33 NORTH CHARLESTON, SC 260 1295781 4319271
9 KNOXVILLE, TN 155 3988330 13294434 34 NAPLES, FL 548 1231403 4104676
10 MEMPHIS, TN 332 3988197 13293990 35 MOBILE, AL 302 1168327 3894425
11 NORCROSS, GA 17 3278221 10927403 36 CHATSWORTH, GA 73 1164119 3880398
12 GREENSBORO, NC 306 3146657 10488856 37 HIALEAH, FL 598 1158130 3860434
13 FORT MYERS, FL 515 2872247 9574155 38 MORRISVILLE, NC 348 1152852 3842839
14 SARASOTA, FL 457 2732003 9106678 39 HUNTSVILLE, AL 142 1146800 3822665
15 RALEIGH, NC 357 2678636 8928788 40 SAINT PETERSBURG, FL 427 1137970 3793235
16 DULUTH, GA 23 2440090 8133633 41 DORAVILLE, GA 13 1110948 3703161
17 CLEARWATER, FL 410 2198842 7329475 42 WILMINGTON, NC 375 1110919 3703062
18 LONGWOOD, FL 393 2158210 7194032 43 GALLATIN, TN 214 1097768 3659227
19 NASHVILLE, TN 213 2155604 7185346 44 FAYETTEVILLE, NC 328 1092558 3641859
20 OCALA, FL 343 2072900 6909667 45 PORT SAINT LUCIE, FL 508 1051914 3506381
21 DURHAM, NC 348 2001805 6672685 46 TALLAHASSEE, FL 228 1048123 3493743
22 ADDISON, AL 161 1942056 6473519 47 BRADENTON, FL 446 1023971 3413236
23 LITHIA SPRINGS, GA 13 1931840 6439468 48 LAKELAND, FL 420 1018872 3396240
24 CALHOUN, GA 59 1822670 6075566 49 DAYTONA BEACH, FL 372 1002645 3342149
25 DELRAY BEACH, FL 566 1795750 5985832 50 INDIAN TRAIL, NC 232 967831 3226105  
51 ORANGE CITY, FL 380 961717 3205723 76 HOLLYWOOD, FL 591 569317 1897723
52 GAINESVILLE, FL 307 944789 3149298 77 RICHFIELD, NC 265 566254 1887514
53 AUGUSTA, GA 142 894378 2981261 78 FORT WALTON BEACH, FL 264 561067 1870223
54 MONTGOMERY, AL 145 870201 2900669 79 LAKE BUENA VISTA, FL 408 559661 1865537
55 HAMILTON, AL 206 833402 2778006 80 MURFREESBORO, TN 183 553380 1844600
56 WAYCROSS, GA 213 831064 2770214 81 PELHAM, AL 140 549238 1830793
57 MARYVILLE, TN 139 827265 2757550 82 WHITE PINE, TN 173 541269 1804230
58 MELBOURNE, FL 449 768728 2562426 83 BARTOW, FL 432 526340 1754468
59 BOAZ, AL 104 760642 2535472 84 WOODSTOCK, GA 24 526334 1754448
60 MYRTLE BEACH, SC 318 749015 2496718 85 TUCKER, GA 13 517093 1723644
61 PEMBROKE PARK, FL 593 709433 2364776 86 HOLLY HILL, FL 370 490697 1635657
62 CARY, NC 349 705616 2352052 87 HERMITAGE, TN 209 490228 1634092
63 COLUMBUS, GA 90 683790 2279300 88 LAUDERDALE LAKES, FL 581 489961 1633204
64 APEX, NC 345 682257 2274192 89 ARDMORE, TN 163 489226 1630752
65 BEAN STATION, TN 189 672030 2240099 90 PLANT CITY, FL 419 488213 1627377
66 BUFORD, GA 34 671982 2239940 91 KENNESAW, GA 21 486649 1622165
67 GREENVILLE, SC 139 654889 2182964 92 GADSDEN, AL 93 482011 1606702
68 FRANKLIN, TN 203 640964 2136545 93 PORT CHARLOTTE, FL 487 476237 1587456
69 PANAMA CITY, FL 258 634962 2116541 94 SEBRING, FL 467 469563 1565211
70 SAVANNAH, TN 240 629881 2099602 95 DENVER, NC 228 467856 1559520
71 ORANGE PARK, FL 295 622441 2074805 96 MATTHEWS, NC 232 450337 1501124
72 TAYLORS, SC 144 615734 2052448 97 MACON, GA 78 449238 1497459
73 ANDERSONVILLE, TN 169 604646 2015488 98 SAVANNAH, GA 226 448706 1495687
74 OLD HICKORY, TN 213 590241 1967470 99 OLDSMAR, FL 407 447207 1490689
75 LAKE WORTH, FL 557 586770 1955901 100 LAKE CITY, FL 267 446812 1489373  
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The collector’s total cost data are based on personal communications with 
Ashman (2007).  Some extrapolations and assumptions are made to his initial data.  The 
variable cost consists of the equipment and direct labor components.  The fixed cost 
includes the indirect labor and facility components. 
 
 
Figure 7.10:  Collection Cost Components 
 
The collection equipment cost term includes trucking for hauling containers, fuel, 
baler and its maintenance, bobcat with recycling grapple, bobcat with bale attachment, 
and overhead conveyor with identification equipment.  All of the above equipment are 
usually leased.  The indirect labor consists of the plant manager, sales persons, and 
administrative staff.  The facility cost contains rent (approximately $8/ft2), gas, 
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electricity, insurance, taxes and miscellaneous items.  Typically equipment, labor, and 
facility for the northeast region of the U.S. take values of approximately 15%, 55%, and 
30% of the total cost, respectively.  The breakdown of cost components is presented in 
Figure 7.10.  The collectors’ fixed and variable costs, which directly depend on the 
grouping method, are provided in the following section. 
7.5.2 Grouping 
Given the incomplete nature of the collection problem, it is assumed that the 
processor has estimations of the fixed and variable costs of each collector group.  As a 
result, the implemented methods in determining groupings are crucial.  These grouping 
methods are subjective in that different processors can entirely have different grouping 




Figure 7.11:  Ranked Data by Annual Volume (lb) 
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The major criterion in choosing a grouping scheme is fairness.  Once the grouping 
is determined, it is intuitive that every collector in the same group should be treated 
equally.  If not, the model may propose different contracts to equivalent collectors.  For 
example, if the region is the criterion, two collection sites in the suburb of Atlanta should 
receive the same contract.  If the one finds out that the other receives a much more 
attractive contract, he is very likely to reject his contract due to perceived unfairness. 
 
 
Figure 7.12:  Ranked Data by Distance (mile) 
 
 
The first step in determining grouping criteria for this case study is to analyze the 
annual volume and distance data, as shown in Figures 7.11 and 7.12.  It is apparent that 
there are a few extremely high volume sites with many low volume sites.  As for the 
distance data, although it is crucial to the model, it does not convey much information for 
the grouping since state information provides the same information. 
 
 Two grouping schemes are proposed.  The first grouping method only takes 
annual volume into consideration, Figure 7.13.  The first group, G1, has annual volume 
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exceeding 20M lb/year with 5 sites and has a variable cost (marginal) of $0.04/lb with a 
fixed cost of $495,000.  The second group, G2, has annual volume between 10M and 
20M lb/year with 7 sites.  It has a marginal cost of $0.05/lb with a $396250 fixed cost.  
Finally, the third group, G3, has an annual volume of less than 10M lb/year with 88 sites 
and marginal and fixed costs of $0.10/lb and $237500, respectively. The processor fixed 




Figure 7.13:  First Grouping Scheme 
 
The second grouping system incorporates state information with the annual 
volume.  With various characteristics embedded in the state information; such as 
population density, transportation infrastructure, and collection policy, it is deemed to be 
a suitable gauge of similarity.  The annual volume is still very important.  Hence this 
second grouping system first distinguishes state and then ranks the annual volume, Figure 
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7.14.  This grouping scheme is summarized in Table 7.2 with description, collector’s 
variable cost, and collector’s fixed cost.  The processor’s fixed cost for opening Group 1 
is $1,000,000.  For Groups 2, 3, 4, and 5, the processor has a fixed cost of $500,000.  
Finally, for Groups 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11, the processor’s fixed cost is $350,000. 
 
 
Figure 7.14:  Second Grouping Scheme 
 
Although the grouping scheme incorporating state and distance information is 
also considered, there is a high correlation between state and distance information so that 
offering one is as good as incorporating both sets of information.  Therefore, a distance-
based grouping scheme is eliminated.  As mentioned earlier, one can easily construct 
many other grouping schemes depending on what factor is considered critical.  However, 
just these two schemes are analyzed in this case study. With a linear collector cost 
function, only the fixed and variable costs are needed.  From the analysis in Section 7.3, 
formulations for NE quantity and revenue coefficients are calculated.  Since Structure 2 
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has no NEs, only two structures are considered.  Substituting the input parameters, the NE 
values are summarized in Table 7.3.  The material (contract) costs for different groups of 
Grouping I and II are displayed in Figure 7.15. 
 
Table 7.2:  Second Grouping Scheme Summary 
Grouping II
Group Description # of Sites Var Cost Fixed Cost
1 Florida, > 20M Annual Volume 5 0.04 495000
2 Florida, >10M & =< 20M Annual Volume 1 0.05 396250
3 Georgia, > 10M Annual Volume 2 0.052 396250
4 North Carolina, > 10M Annual Volume 2 0.054 396250
5 Tennessee, > 10M Annual Volume 2 0.056 396250
6 Florida, =< 10M Annual Volume 35 0.1 237500
7 Georgia, =< 10M Annual Volume 16 0.1 237500
8 North Carolina, =< 10M Annual Volume 11 0.102 237500
9 Tennessee, =< 10M Annual Volume 12 0.102 237500
10 South Carolina 5 0.104 237500
11 Alabama 9 0.104 237500  
 
7.5.3 Model 
In this section, Stage-1 and Stage-2 calculations are discussed.  The Stage-1 
includes the calculations to find the NE quantity and revenue coefficient.  For each group, 
the NE values are determined. 
 
Table 7.3:  Stage-1 NE Values Summary for Grouping I and Grouping II 
Grouping I
Group q* p* q* p*
1 27178000 0.0582 12375000 281.42
2 13870000 0.0786 7925000 281.51




Group q* p* q* p*
1 27178000 0.0582 12375000 281.42
2 15286000 0.0759 7925000 281.51
3 12916000 0.0827 7620192 287.09
4 14692000 0.0810 7337963 292.56
5 13294000 0.0858 7075893 297.93
6 3559000 0.1667 2375000 308.22
7 3524000 0.1674 2375000 308.22
8 3599000 0.1680 2328431 311.29
9 2581000 0.1940 2328431 311.29
10 3243000 0.1772 2283654 314.32




These values are entered into the Stage-2 model with parameters from 
Assavapokee et al. (2007) and Ashman (2007).  The Multiple Collector Type Model in 
Section 7.4.2 is implemented.   Stage-2 determines what contract to offer each group and 
which sites to offer the contract.  These results are reported in Section 7.5.4. 
 

























Structure 3 (Square Root)
 
























Structure 2 (Square Root)




The IP model is solved by GAMS with the CPLEX 9 Solver, CPLEX (2007).  
The results of the Grouping I, with only annual volume considered, are presented in 
Section 7.5.4.1.  They are followed by the results of the Grouping II with state 
information and annual volume considered in Section 7.5.4.2. 
7.5.4.1 Grouping I - Results 
 The overall result is that the processor should offer the linear contract (Structure 
1) to only Group 1 and the concave contract (square root) to Group 2 and Group 3.  
Specifically, the processor should offer the contract to the three sites of Tampa, Orlando, 
and Jacksonville, all in Florida.  This solution is presented in Figure 7.16 where the green 
circle represents processor and blue squares represent selected collector sites. 
 
 
Figure 7.16:  Solution to Grouping I 
 
With all sites in the high annual volume group, each needs to collect 
approximately 27M lb of Nylon-6 annually.  Dealing with a few large collectors in one 
region has the advantage that the processor need not have a large infrastructure and many 
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administrative employees to control the operations.  The breakdown of the processor’s 
revenue and cost components is displayed in Figure 7.17. 
 




























Figure 7.17:  Component Breakdown for Grouping I 
 
The material (contract) cost contributes to approximately 50% of the processor’s 
cost and is then followed by the transportation cost, penalty cost for exceeding target 
quantity, and fixed cost, respectively.  The net profit for the collection operation, that is 
excluding the processing cost, totals to $6,576,000.  The selected collectors have a 
breakeven contract, i.e., they only make the embedded profit from the marginal cost. 
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To evaluate the solution quality of the Variable Volume Model, a fixed price 
contract is used as a benchmark.  In this fixed price contract, all collector types are 
offered an identical $/lb contract.  With a first-come-first-serve policy, if the collector 
accepts the contract, all his current material quantity is transported to the processor.  A 
Microsoft Excel simulation is constructed with 10 runs.  Each collector quantity is 
created from a random generator to be within qmin and qmax.  Two accepting criteria are 
implemented.  The first criterion considers non-negative collector’s net profit, i.e. the 
collector’s fixed cost is considered.  With the $0.07/lb target budget, the processor must 
offer the fixed price of $0.06/lb or less.  At $0.06/lb, all 10 runs produce infeasible 
solutions.  The second criterion considers only collector’s marginal cost.  If a collector 
has marginal cost greater than $0.06/lb, a contract is rejected.  Although omitting 
collector’s fixed cost can lead to negative collector’s net profit (eventually defecting from 
the network), I want to determine the performance of the fixed price contract.  Only 3 
runs yield feasible solutions ranging in net profit from $5,872,000 to $6,229,000 with an 
average of $6,062,000.  Compared to the net profit of $6,576,000 for the solution 
obtained using the Variable Volume Model, all these solutions have lower net profits, at 
an average of 8%.  The fixed price contract benchmark shows that the Variable Volume 
Model can find feasible solutions where the fixed price contract cannot.  Also, Variable 
Volume Model also produces superior solutions (net profit) and gives incentive not to 
defect from the processor’s collection network. 
 In addition, more experimental runs are performed with different target quantities 
and budgets.  Table 7.4 displays the results of the four additional runs.  In Runs 1 and 2, 
the original budget target of $0.07/lb can be achieved, unlike Run 3 which yields an 
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infeasible solution.  Finally, Run 4 has an adjusted budget to be able to find feasible 
solutions for target quantities of $0.08/lb.  Figure 7.18 displays the solutions to Runs 1, 2, 
and 4. 
 
Table 7.4:  Additional Runs to Grouping I 
Additional Runs
# Case








1 Q=100M lb, B=$7M 5763000 18028000 6785400 2198000 3250000 153000
2 Q=150M lb, B=$10.5M 12314000 27159000 10196000 2722000 1750000 884000
3 Q=250M lb, B=$17.5M Infeasible
4 Q=250M lb, B=$20M 17528000 45000000 18430000 5792000 3250000 0
 
In Run 1, the target quantity is 100M lb with a budget of $7M.  The net profit, 
revenue, and cost components are shown in Table 7.4.  The processor should offer a 
linear contract to Groups 1 and 2 and a concave contract to Group 3.  All three groups are 
selected.  The sites to be offered are Tampa FL, Orlando FL, Jacksonville FL, Knoxville 
TN, Marietta GA, and Pensacola FL.  In Group I, Miami FL and Pompano Beach FL sites 
are not selected because the processor does not need an additional large collection site to 
meet the target quantity requirement.  Moreover, Miami FL and Pompano FL require a 
significantly larger transportation cost due to long distances.  To avoid large penalty cost 
for exceeding the target quantity, the Groups 1 and 2 receive concave contracts which 
require much less quantities.  Even though, there are additional fixed costs for selecting 
Groups 2 and 3, the transportation cost and penalty cost for exceeding target quantity 
outweigh these fixed costs. 
In Run 2, the target quantity is 150M lb with $0.07/lb budget.  Groups 1 and 2 
receive linear contracts whereas Group 3 gets the concave contract.  Only sites from 
Groups 1 and 2 are selected.  The net profit, revenue and cost components are displayed 
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in Table 7.4.  The sites from Group 1 include Tampa FL, Orlando FL, and Jacksonville 
FL.  The sites from Group 2 include Charlotte NC, Atlanta GA, Knoxville TN, Norcross 
GA, and Greensboro NC.  In this run, many less efficient sites are chosen (Group 2) to 
have smaller transportation cost.  Moreover, by choosing sites from Group 2, the penalty 
cost of exceeding target quantity is reduced. 
 
 
a) Run 1 
 
b) Run 2 
 
c) Run 3 
 
 
Figure 7.18:  Solutions to Additional Runs - Grouping I 
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In Run 3, the target budget of $0.07/lb cannot be achieved.  With this larger target 
quantity requirement, the processor must have a larger collection infrastructure.  Because 
the cost is not growing linearly, the budget needs to be adjusted.  Therefore, the budget is 
adjusted to be $0.08/lb in Run 4.  In this run, only the linear contracts are offered.  Sites 
from all three groups are chosen.  All sites from Group 1, including Tampa FL, Orlando 
FL, Miami FL, Jacksonville FL, and Pompano Beach FL, are selected.  Selected sites 
from Group 2 include Charlotte NC, Fort Lauderdale FL, Atlanta GA, Knoxville TN, 
Memphis TN, Norcross GA, and Greensboro NC.   Finally, five sites from Group 3 with 
smaller material contract quantity are selected.  These are Lithia Springs GA, Marietta 
GA, Doraville GA, Tucker GA, and Kennesaw GA, which are sites nearby the 
processor’s location.  The processor collects exactly 250M lb, hence no penalty cost. 
 
 
Figure 7.19:  Solution to Grouping II 
 
7.5.4.2 Grouping II - Results 
In this grouping, the processor offers linear contracts to Groups 1, 3, 5, and 7 and 
offers concave contracts to Groups 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, and 11.  Only sites within Group 1 
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(Florida-high annual volume) are selected.  Moreover, the same three sites with Grouping 
I results are selected.  The selected sites are Tampa FL, Orlando FL, and Jacksonville FL, 
as shown in Figure 7.19.   
The breakdown of the processor’s revenue and cost components is displayed in 
Figure 7.20.  The processor and collectors’ components are identical to the results in 
Grouping I because the selected sites belong to the group with the same marginal and 
fixed costs.  If these costs were varied, the results would be different. 
 
































A fixed price contract ($/lb) is also implemented as a benchmark.  Again, a 
Microsoft Excel simulation model with 10 runs is created.  In the first criterion, which 
considers collector’s net profit, all runs yield infeasible solutions.  In the second criterion, 
which only considers marginal cost, only 30% of runs produce solutions.  The net profit 
ranges from $5,672,000 to $5,931,000 with an average of $5,830,000.  These solutions 
have 11% lower net profit than solutions from the Variable Volume Model.  It further 
confirms the superiority of the Variable Volume Model over a simple fixed price 
contract. 
Similar to the previous section, additional runs are conducted with different target 
quantities and budgets as shown in Table 7.5.  In Runs 1 and 2, the original budget target 
of $0.07/lb can be achieved, unlike Run 3 which yields infeasible solution.  Finally, Run 
4 has an adjusted budget to be able to find feasible solutions for target quantities of 
$0.08/lb.  Figure 7.21 displays these solutions. 
 
Table 7.5:  Additional Runs to Grouping II 
Additional Runs
# Case








1 Q=100M lb, B=$7M 6925000 18275000 6606000 2438000 2000000 1526000
2 Q=150M lb, B=$10.5M 10952000 27182000 9775000 4253000 2000000 1012000
3 Q=250M lb, B=$17.5M Infeasible
4 Q=250M lb, B=$20M 16962000 45108000 18816000 5859000 3350000 600000
 
In Run 1, the target quantity is 100M lb with a budget of $7M.  The Groups 1, 3, 
and 7, receive linear contract.  The remaining groups are offered concave (square root) 
contracts.  For the network solution, the opened groups include FL-high annual volume, 
GA-medium annual volume, and TN-medium annual volume.  The sites to be offered are 
Orlando FL, Pompano Beach FL, Jacksonville FL, Norcross GA, and Knoxville TN.  
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This solution is different than Grouping I in that 1) Pompano FL is selected instead of 
Tampa FL, 2) Norcross GA (medium annual volume) replaces Marietta GA (low annual 
volume), and 3) Knoxville TN receives a concave contract.  Even though Grouping II 
solution has 75% higher penalty cost, it yields 30% higher net profit mainly from lower 
fixed costs.  It suggests that grouping methods affect the processor’s net profit.  Hence, 




a) Run 1 
 
b) Run 2 
 
c) Run 3 
 
 
Figure 7.21:  Solutions to Additional Runs - Grouping II 
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In Run 2, the target quantity is 150M lb with a budget of $10.5M.  The net profit, 
revenue and cost components are displayed in Table 7.5.  Groups 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 
receive linear material contracts with the remaining groups obtaining concave material 
contracts.  The selected groups are FL-high annual volume, GA-medium annual volume, 
and North Carolina-medium annual volume.  The selected sites are Tampa FL, Orlando 
FL, Miami FL, Pompano Beach FL, Norcross GA, Charlotte NC, and Greensboro NC.  
The material contract cost and penalty cost for exceeding target quantity are reduced 11% 
and 34%, respectively, from Grouping I.  However, the transportation cost and fixed cost 
are increased by 67% and 14%, respectively.  As a result, the processor net profit is 7% 
lower when compared to Grouping I.  This suggests that having more groups does not 
lead to higher net profit. 
 In Run 3, the target budget of $0.07/lb cannot be achieved.  Therefore, the budget 
is adjusted to be $0.08/lb in Run 4.  In this run, linear contracts are offered to all groups, 
except Groups 6, 8, and 9.  All selected sites are offered linear contracts.  All sites from 
Group 1, including Tampa FL, Orlando FL, Miami FL, Jacksonville FL, and Pompano 
Beach FL, are selected.  Selected sites from other groups include Fort Lauderdale FL, 
Atlanta GA, Norcross GA, Charlotte NC, Greensboro NC, Knoxville TN, Memphis TN, 
Duluth GA, Lithia Springs, Tucker GA, and Kennesaw GA.  Although the penalty cost is 




7.6 Summary and Extensions 
 Using the Variable Volume Model, the processor can decide which contract 
structure to offer different collector groups as well as to whom to offer the contract.  The 
concept of fairness is incorporated into the grouping scheme.  Depending on processor’s 
knowledge of the collectors’ costs, s/he can conduct various grouping methods that will 
yield different overall results.  Thus, the case study is presented as an example of how 
one can possibly apply the model.  Nevertheless, many other contract structures can also 
be considered.  In this case study, the Stage-1 calculations are changed, but with the same 
solution procedure.  The Stage-2 Model then selects the best contract-network decisions 
that maximize the processor’s net profit. 
 Given the general structure of the Variable Volume Contract Model, it is 
interesting to examine extensions to a forward supply system.  Figure 7.22 depicts a 
forward supply chain representation, which is a modification of Chopra and Meindl 
(2004).  The forward supply chain stages include supply (components/raw materials), 
manufacturing, distributing (or wholesale), retailing, and demand.  There are 
transportation links between stages, though some of the stages can be skipped. 
 
 
Figure 7.22:  Forward Supply Chain Representation 
 
Supply Manufacturing Distributing Retailing Demand
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The Variable Volume Model can be extended to particular products in the supply 
chain, when the products are sold by weight or volume.  Some examples include metal 
(zinc, copper, and aluminum), jewelry (silver, ruby, and gold), food (meat, dairy, flour, 
and corn), flowers and plants, and also chemicals.  Because the Variable Volume 
Contract Model can be applied to pair-wise game, the stage pairings (excluding supply 
and demand) are analyzed to see applicability.  The limitations to the extension to 
forward supply system include 1) no competition among collectors, 2) no competition 
with other processors, and 3) one time period, hence no inventory.   
It is demonstrated that all pairings are applicable with the given example(s).  An 
example of the manufacturer-to-distributor(wholesaler) pair includes many large 
manufacturers with the ability to choose distributors for the products.  Examples of the 
wholesaler(distributor)-to-manufacturer pair are oil pipelines with the distributor 
selecting the manufacturer and also Wal-Mart or Costco selecting the manufacturers.  
Examples of the manufacturer-to-retailer pair are tire manufacturers choosing Goodyear 
Tires and Discount Tires but not Pepboys Auto.  Target, Publix, and Kroger are examples 
of retailers choosing manufacturers for their brand name products.  The wholesaler 
(distributor)-to-retailer pair example is again an oil pipeline selecting retailers since many 
retailers are also manufacturers.  Finally, there are numerous instances of large retailers 
selecting distributors.  In these cases, the Variable Volume Contract and the Strategic 
Network Model can be applied.  However, the important step is to identify who has the 
selecting power.  Stackelberg contracts will always follow prestige resources. 
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This chapter discusses the variable volume contract, which is similar to a typical 
purchasing quotation in supply management.  The Variable Volume Model, which is the 
major contribution in my thesis, is intuitive and easy to implement.  Incorporating the 
concepts of game theory and Nash Equilibrium, the Variable Volume Model has 
embedded incentives for collectors to accept the offered contract.  Once the contracts are 
determined, the model assists the processor in determining which collectors to offer 
contracts in maximizing his or her net profit.  The Variable Volume Model is tested on 
the carpet recycling case study, showing superior performance over a simple fixed price 
model.  Finally, the model can be extended to forward supply chain in a pair-wise game 
when products are sold by weight or volume. 
In Chapter 8, I summarize the different topics in my thesis.  The contributions and 




CHAPTER 8  
SUMMARY, CONTRIBUTIONS, & FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
8.1 Summary 
This dissertation focuses on the Reverse Production System (RPS) strategic 
decisions of a processor and collectors when the collection network and contracts for 
used materials can be co-designed.  The three key problems from the processor’s point of 
view are: 1) how to design a strategic collection network; 2) how to be competitive in the 
collected materials market place when significant investment is at risk; and 3) how to 
avoid overpaying for materials when collectors are in regions with different volumes and 
costs.  The concepts of mathematical optimization, contract theory, and game theory are 
utilized in proposing models that couple contract and network problems in lump sum and 




Figure 8.1:  Research Tree 
Contract & Network Problem Network Problem
Lump Sum Contract Variable Volume Contract
Non-regional Model Regional Model
Decoupled Model Iterated Model
Constant Probability of Acceptance Stochastic Programming Model
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 In Chapter 1, I provide an overview of RPS problems.  The research motivation of 
the possibility of collectors’ defections from the processor’s collection network is 
introduced.  The formal research problem with key assumptions and goals is given. 
 In Chapter 2, I present the research background and a review of the published 
literature related to various aspects of the research.  I begin with the importance of RPS 
and follow it with a brief literature review of RPS.    Since the Variable Volume Contract 
Model can be generalized to some forward supply chains, the background and literature 
of Supply Chain Management is also given.  The literature review of Mixed Integer 
Linear Programming Modeling as a decision tool is next presented.  With conflicting 
objectives and asymmetric information as parts of the research problem, contract 
(incentive) theory is summarized and a literature review of supply chain management 
contract and principal-agent is given.  The dynamic game and Stackelberg game are 
summarized with discussions of papers of games in reverse logistics.  Finally, the 
Stochastic Programming and Mixed Integer Nonlinear Programming Modeling related to 
my research are given. 
 In Chapter 3, the Classical Principal-Agent model, which is the fundamental 
contract model in my research, is discussed.  The model shows how a contract for 
different collector types can be designed while ensuring participation as well as giving 
incentives.  The Multiple Type Principal-Agent is an extension of the classical model to 
include more than two collector types.  The lump sum contract requires a collector to 
send a specified quantity to the processor to receive a lump sum monetary transfer.  The 
operation marginal cost plays a major role in defining efficiency.  The principal-agent 
game as well as complete vs. incomplete information concepts are the focus of this 
 156
chapter.  By knowing the net profits of complete and incomplete information, the 
processor can recognize the maximum cost of information. 
 In Chapter 4, network problem definitions and models are discussed.  The 
strategic network decisions for RPS include: 1) the number and size of the collection and 
processing sites; 2) the allocation of processing functions to the sites; 3) the routes for 
products and materials through potential task network; 4) the modes of transportation 
used, and 5) the amount of materials allocated to each potential end-use.  The Coupled 
Model was developed earlier by Realff et al. (2000).  I introduce the Decoupled Model 
that initially determines collection decisions which is then followed by processing 
decisions.  I develop an iterative strategy; with clustering techniques for situations where 
the Coupled and Decoupled Models do not perform well, in the Iterated Model.  The very 
small numbers of specific cases, where the Iterated Model is recommended, are 
presented.  Details of Coupled, Decoupled, and Iterated Models are discussed with 
numerical studies.  I conclude that although the Decoupled Model does not provide 
optimal solutions, it does provide good solutions with significant execution time 
reduction in most cases.  Finally, the Iterated Model gives the optimal solution with more 
advantages in computational requirements as the problem size grows. 
 In Chapter 5, I address the Contract and Network Lump Sum Models.  The 
deterministic mathematical programming approach is presented.  Collectors are 
categorized into types based on their marginal cost.  With different space and cost, the 
ease of collection of each region can vary greatly.  Therefore, I present the Regional 
Principal-Agent Contract in which the processor offers different contracts to different 
regions.  The two strategic network models, Sequential Model and Simultaneous Model, 
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are analyzed.    As the name suggests, the Sequential Model solves for contract decisions 
before inputting into the strategic network model.  On the other hand, the Simultaneous 
Model solves for both contract and network decisions at the same time.  I perform 
numerical studies to find that the Simultaneous Model is preferred because of its ability 
to more efficiently identify feasible solutions and better (or the same) processor’s net 
profit. 
 In Chapter 6, the Stochastic Programming (SP) Model for lump sum contracts is 
presented.  This SP Model is different from models in the previous chapters in that there 
is a solution for each possible scenario (recourse).  A two-stage model is implemented in 
GAMS to test the computational feasibility of the model.  In the first stage, the processor 
determines 1) regions to operate, 2) contracts for each region, and 3) collection hub(s) for 
each region.  The processor then determines the assignment of collections to hubs in the 
second stage.  After the model is described, a numerical study is performed to verify that 
the SP Lump Sum Model works properly.  From these examples, I find that the quantity 
cannot be trivially set to its upper or lower bounds for efficient and inefficient collectors.  
The SP Lump Sum Model offers an additional approach for designing a contract and 
collection network.  With uncertainty in each collector’s decision to accept the contract, 
SP can offer complete decisions for all possible scenarios. 
 In Chapter 7, the Variable Volume Model is studied.  Similar to a typical 
purchasing quotation in supply management, a contract that offers varying prices for 
different order quantities is analyzed utilizing a two-stage methodology.  Stage-1 
implements the Stackelberg game which determines Nash Equilibriums (NEs) for the 
collector’s quantity and the processor’s price.  The backward induction procedure is 
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given.  With the selected linear collector’s total cost function and three selected contract 
structures, NEs are obtained.  After studying two different mathematical programming 
models in Stage-2, I recommend the Multiple Collector Type Model, which is an integer 
program, be used in this stage.  Having decisions from Stage-1 as input parameters, the 
processor can decide which collectors to offer contracts in maximizing his net profit.  A 
Nylon-6 carpet case study in the southeastern U.S.A. is developed using industry instance 
data and two different grouping methods.  The Variable Volume Model is implemented 
and tested on the case study.  By evaluating with solutions from the baseline simulation 
where a fixed price ($/lb) is given all collector types, the Variable Volume Model 
produces feasible solutions which are superior in the processor’s net profits.  I find that 




Although several papers employ games in network formation in social networks, 
markets, and electrical engineering, it is difficult to find contract models in network 
formation.  To my knowledge, this is the first research to incorporate contract and 
network design in the reverse logistics field.  I also do not believe anyone has studied the 
recycle/reuse collector and processor contract structure as a cooperative model without 
considering a market. 
The major contributions of my research include: 1) integrating the contract and 
strategic network design in RPS; 2) studying the value of information; 3) developing 
contract mechanism designs to improve system performance under incomplete 
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information; and 4) introducing and analyzing new strategic RPSs network design models 
for effectiveness in solution quality and time.   
My research investigates the impact of collector type, contract structure, and 
regional differentiation in different contract models.  The lump sum contract structure, 
using deterministic and stochastic approaches, for processors to develop a large scale 
network planning model is determined.  I further extend this framework to a more typical 
variable volume contract.  As previously mentioned, this model can be extended to 
forward supply chain contracts under certain assumptions of 1) no competition among 
collectors, 2) no competition with other processors, and 3) a one-time period decision, 
hence no inventory levels.   
Finally, the construction of a large scale carpet recycling case study shows the 
usefulness of my research model.  Significantly, all models can be extended to many RPS 
industries once the indices, input parameters, and different decision variables are adapted. 
 
8.3 Future Directions 
Throughout the chapters of my thesis, the assumption is that only one 
(recycle/reuse) product is to be collected.  It would be quite interesting to model products 
that consist of many components since there would be more options, such as refurbishing 
products, sub-modules and components, at the end-of-life of products.  With more 
components, the concepts of correlation and bundle should also be studied.  Incorporating 
these ideas in design contracts is a significantly challenging task to determine collection 
policy. 
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I have found that the assumption of a one-time period for the problem of a 
processor trying to establish a collection network is sensible.  However, when the 
network becomes up and running, it becomes imperative that more time periods be 
considered.  The issues of inventory and additional recruitment are also regarded as 
important areas in further study.  The notion of fairness must be extended to include 
“inter-generational” issues for collectors since more recently recruited collectors cannot 
be offered more favorable contracts without the risk of annoying members of the existing 
network.  In addition, the multi-period model must eventually consider the problem of 
defections from the network. 
Collectors are modeled as independent entities.  If one considers a company that 
operates in many regions, then the coordination among collectors must also be 
considered.  This will introduce additional fairness and incentive compatibility 
constraints to model the fact that different entities could have access to different 
information if offered different contracts at different scales of operation or in different 
regions.   
Another major future direction is in posing a competition game.  With the 
assumption of collectors independently operating from different regions, competition can 
be omitted.  However, when one considers many collectors wanting to compete for the 
same recycle/reuse products, a totally different gaming model for the resulting 
competition game needs to be studied.  In such a strategic game, additional indices or 
additional layers may be required.  The idea of market is also definitely needed.  With a 
finite supply (end-of-life products from customers) and a target quantity for the processor 
of Q (sum of individual quantity) when one collector collects more (less) quantity, other 
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collectors must have less (more) of the quantity pool.  This mechanism in the reverse 
chain needs to be established.  With multiple processors, there must be competition 
among them.  At a higher level, multiple processors competing against one another 
further complicate the model structure. 
Another extension is the exploration of uncertainties.  Currently, the collector’s 
marginal cost defines the collector types.  I believe additional quantitative parameters can 
help improve identifying collector types.  With more accurate type dimensions, different 
grouping and/or regional settings may provide better recommendations for processors.  
When there is only partial information on the type, different methodologies must be 
made.  In my models, collector uncertainties include the probability of being efficient and 
the probability of accepting contracts.  However, there are significant uncertainties 
beyond these.  For instance, the market size for the processor has been assumed as fixed 
and known.  This is because the recycled material will often be a small fraction of the 
overall market and it will fully use whatever its price.  There are other situations where 
the processor will face price-based competition.  This will couple the cost of collection to 
the amount that needs to be collected.  These kinds of interaction are beyond the scope of 
this thesis because the market dynamics are poorly understood. 
Another extension is in addressing practical issues in RPS.  As many collectors 
are becoming processors to survive in the used-materials industry, what steps need to be 
taken?  A study of important factors can be very useful to practitioners.  Also, cost 
sharing between a current processor and a collector turning into processor may be 
considered.  Additional to the economic study of the end-of-life products, life cycle 
assessment (LCA) is important to analyze the environment footprint.  LCA is a great tool 
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to help evaluate potential environmental impacts and interpret the results to help make a 
more informed decision. 
In Chapter 5, there are a few models with an MINLP structure.  I have not 
contributed to the MINLP algorithm development, but applied MINLP as the modeling 
tool for the contract and network problems.  However, in solving realistic or large 
MINLP, algorithm development may be helpful to the processing companies that are 
trying to establish networks.  In Chapter 6, the Stochastic Programming Model requires 
computation for each scenario.  When there are large numbers of scenarios in typical 
applications, the size of the model becomes rather prohibitive.  One proposed approach is 
the Sample Average Approximation (SAA) algorithm; Kleywegt et al. (2001), Shapiro 










APPENDIX A: NOTATION SUMMARY 
Table A.1:  Notation Summary by Chapter 
 
Contract and Strategic Network Design (Chapter 3, 5, 6, and 7) 
Index 
j:  Index of the region, j = 1, 2, …, m 
k:  Index of the distinct set of collector marginal costs, k = 1, 2, …, m’, where ' 2m m≤ . 
ij:  Index of collectors in region j, ij = 1, 2, …, Ij, where j
j
n I=∑  
kj:  Index of hubs in region j, kj = 1, 2, …, Kj 
l:  Index of unique ranking order of marginal costs, l = 1, 2, …, L 
s:  Index of scenario, s =1, 2, …, S 
 
Parameters 
jct :  Transportation coefficient of region j, $/mile.lb 
 truck jc :  LTL transportation coefficient of region j, $/mile.lb 
k
jc :  TL transportation coefficient from hub k to processor of region j, $/mile.tl 
Q:  Target total material quantity required by the processor, lb 
B:  Budget of the processor, $ 
kv :  Coefficient of valuation of processor, $/lb 
jπ :  Probability of a collector in region j accepting the given contract 
jp :  Probability of a collector in region j being the efficient type 
( )sp s :  Probability associated with occurrence of scenario s 
jF :  Fixed cost to operate in region j, $ 
,i jF :  Fixed cost of collector i of type j to the processor, $ 
k
jF :  Fixed cost to open hub k in region j, $ 
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jθ :  Marginal cost of efficient collector in region j 
jθ :  Marginal cost of inefficient collector in region j 
lθ :  Marginal cost with the rank order l
th  
min jq :  Collector minimum operational quantity of type j, lb 
max jq :  Collector maximum operational quantity of type j, lb 
id :  Distance between processor and collector i, mile 
,i jd :  Distance between collector i of type j and the processor, mile 
k
jd :  Distance from hub k to processor of region j, mile 
,i k
jd :  Distance from collection site i to hub k of region j, mile 
aj:  Collection cost function coefficient for type j, $/lb2 
bj:  Collection cost function coefficient for type j, $/lb 
cj:  Collection cost function constant for type j, $ 
Ij:  Total number of collectors of type j 
lp :  Lump sum penalty coefficient, $/lb2 
Δ :  Profit to be shared among collectors, $ 
SE:  Shared excess profit fraction to collectors, 0 1SE≤ ≤  
 
Decision Variables 
jt :  Lump sum transfer payment to efficient collector in region j, $ 
jt :  Lump sum transfer payment to inefficient collector in region j, $ 
lt :  Lump sum transfer payment to the rank order l collector, $ 
j
q :  Quantity material collected from efficient collector in region j, lb 
jq :  Quantity material collected from inefficient collector in region j, lb 
lq :  Quantity material collected from the rank order l collector, lb 
if :  Fraction of the profit to be shared to collector i 
 165
cπ :  Net profit of the collector, $ 
pπ :  Net profit of the processor, $ 
,s jp :  Contract revenue coefficient for structure s and type j 
,s jq :  Contract quantity for structure s and type j, lb 
jy :  Binary variable of region j 
          








y :  Binary variable of collector ij 
          







, ,s i jy :  Contract offering binary variable 
, ,
1 if contract structure  is offered to collector  of type 
0 otherwises i j
s i j
y ⎧ ⎫= ⎨ ⎬
⎩ ⎭
 
,s jz :  Structure-Type binary variable 
        ,
1 if structure  is chosen for collector type 
0 otherwises j
s j













Strategic Network Design (Chapter 4) 
Parameters 
ijtP  : Price of selling type j material at site i at time t; 
( )r
iK  : Unit cost per time period for storage at site i; 
( )c
iK  : Unit cost per time period for collection at site i; 




ii mK     : Unit transportation cost per distance from sites i to i’ of transportation mode m; 
'ii mb      : Distance from sites i to i’ by transportation mode m; 
jpρ       : Proportion of type j material consumed by process p; 
' jpρ      : Proportion of type j material produced by process p; 
( )s
if       : Fixed opening cost of site i; 
( )r
if       : Fixed storage cost of site i; 
( )c
if       : Fixed material collecting cost of site i; 




ii mf       : Fixed cost of transportation from sites i to i’ by transportation mode m; 
( )c
ijtε        : Maximum capacity for collection of material type j at site i at time period t; 
( )d
ijε        : Maximum amount of material type j that can be sold at site i at any time period; 
( )r




ii mε    : Maximum amount of material that can be shipped from sites i to i’ by 
transportation mode m; 
iptε         : Maximum amount of material that process p can produce at site i at time t; 
( )r
iα        : 1 if storage is allowed at site i, and 0 otherwise; 
( )d





ii mα       : 1 if shipment is allowed between site i and site i’ of transportation mode m, and 
0 otherwise; 
ipα         : 1 if process p is allowed at site i, and 0 otherwise; 
( )c
iα        : 1 if collection is allowed at site i, and 0 otherwise; 
 
Continuous Decision Variables 
ijtM         : The amount of type j material collected at site i at time t;  
ijtS          : The amount of type j material stored at site i at time t;  
'iji mtH     : The amount of type j material shipped from site i to i’ using transportation 
mode m at time period t;  
ijtD           : The amount of type j material sold at site i during time period t; and  
iptξ           : The extent of process p performed at site i in period t. 
 
Binary Decision Variables 
( )c




ii my         : 1 if shipment is allowed between site i and site i’ of transportation mode m and 
equals 0 otherwise;  
ipqy           : 1 if replica q of process p is to be allowed at site i and equals 0 otherwise;  
( )r
ijy           : 1 if storage of material j is to be allowed at site i and equals 0 otherwise;  
( )d
ijy           : 1 if material j is allowed to be sold at site i and equals 0 otherwise; and  
( )s









APPENDIX B: NEs FOR POLYNOMIAL COST FUNCTION 
Table B.1:  Nash Equilibriums for Polynomial Total Cost Function 
Marginal cost function:  
2( ) , when  0
0, 0,  and 0
C q aq bq c q
a b c
= + + ≥
> < >
 
Total cost function:  3 2( )TC q aq bq cq= + +  
 
Structure 1:  Revenue , where : $/lbpq p=  
Solution 1 
*
1q =   
*
1p =  
Solution 2 
*
2q =   
*
2p =  
Solution 3 
*
3q =   
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*
3p =  
Solution 4 
*
4q =   
*
4p =  
 
Structure 2:  2 2Revenue , where : $/lbpq p=  
Solution 1 
*
1q =  
*
1p =  
Solution 2 
*
2q =  
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*
2p =  
Solution 3 
*
3q =  
 
*
3p =  
Solution 4 
*
4q =  
 
*
4p =  
 
Structure 3:  1/2Revenue , where : $/lbp q p=  
*
1q =  No Closed Form Solutions 
*
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